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ABSTRACT
Sisterhood is Cervical: A Sociology of the Body, Gender and Health
This thesis addresses the sociology of the body and of governance, by
presenting empirical material, in the form of both textual and interview
data, drawn from a case study of cervical screening. This material is used to
examine women's experiences and their sense of embodiment in the context
of cervical screening participation. The thesis argues that cervical
screening, as a form of prevention, represents a new form of social
regulation in late modernity. This argument challenges current
understandings of the relationship between the body, gender and health.
First, the thesis poses a distinction between the body and the concept of
embodiment and argues that conflation of these two concepts obscures social
processes and experiences. Second, the thesis addresses tensions between
notions of citizenship and surveillance in literature which focuses on bodily
regulation and issues of health. Third, the thesis reveals previously
obscured aspects of this experience, such as risk, obligation, trust and
entitlement.
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A Letter from the Doctor
Dear
I see from our records that you are due to have your next
cervical smear. I should be grateful if you would please
telephone my receptionist to ask for a cervical smear test
appointment. If you have had a cervical smear taken
elsewhere could you please inform the surgery in order that




A woman receives a letter from her health centre asking her to get in
touch with the receptionist to make an appointment for a smear test.
Information on the status of her cervix is held on computerised records:
there is a pool of data on other cervixes of which her cervix forms part.
Someone has scrutinised those records and identified that her cervix needs
to be monitored. This information is passed onto the woman, in case she
has forgotten. The language of the letter is perfunctory, polite, cajoling
and formal. The onus is on the woman to make an appointment for her
smear, an appointment in a special category of its own. The cervix
occupies a unique place within general practice as a body part subject to
regular assessment and scrutiny. Whilst there is acknowledgement in the
letter that a woman may have a smear taken elsewhere, the onus is on her
to feed this information to her doctor, so that she can be contacted the next
time her smear is due. The letter does not suggest that to opt out altogether
is, in any sense, an option.
Whilst not all women receive a letter from their general practitioner
requesting that they make an appointment for a smear, at some stage in
their life course, most women will be asked when they had their last
smear, and offered a smear. Reluctance to participate is an initial
response for some women:1
1 The quotations presented here are taken from interview data
gathered as part of the thesis, which are presented in Section
Three. Biographical details of the women participating in the study
are in Appendix I.
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'one day I got a letter asking me to go to the doctors to have a
smear. And I thought, cheek, damn, I'm no going for no
smear.' [Margaret]
'...when she suggested to me that I make an apointment to go
back and have a smear done...I thought, I'm not going for
that.' [Rose]
A range of responses are engendered by women who have different
understandings about the purpose and implications of a cervical smear.
For instance, some perceive it as a routine procedure for all women.
'[I thought] it was just part of a routine health procedure at
the family planning clinic.' [Teresa]
'I went for my first smear and I really thought it was par for
the course. You just knew you had to go and get a smear test
and that was it.' [Ann]
'It was just one of those things, I just know that you've got to
get it done. You know, you find out everything's OK.' [Eve]
Some women see it as an explicit means of detecting cancer:
'I thought they were checking you for something like they
check to see if there's anything there. I knew it was related
to cervical cancer.' [Ivy]
Or as a means of preventing cancer:
'I knew everything about it, I knew it was to prevent cervical
cancer or if they had the inforfnabto^ to catch it in time and
clear it up.' [Carol]
'I knew it was to prevent any cancer or anything.' [Lorna]
Others view the cervical smear as part of a package of health entitlements
and as a way of acquiring information about one's own body.
'I just took it as part of what you get.' [Fiona]
'I thought this was very necessary, this needs to get done.'
[Linda]
'I had never had one before so I felt that it was quite good to
have it done.' [Julie]
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Despite the variety of initial responses to this request, invitation or
injuntion to have a smear, many women comply and either make an
appointment to have a smear, or give permission for a smear to be taken at
the time the request is made.
The Examination
'I was quite young at the time so I thought it was a bit
traumatic...getting this instrument up inside you. But once it
was over it was OK. Even although you've been married and
have a kid it's still embarrassing...it's your dignity.' [Susan]
A woman who has a cervical smear taken, is asked to lie on her back in the
examination room, bring her knees up to her chest, to keep her ankles
together, and let her knees fall to either side of her body. Either a doctor
or a practice nurse will take the smear according to local health board or
authority established guidelines. A speculum, either steel or plastic, is
inserted into the woman's vagina and opened out to push the walls of the
vagina apart, and make the cervix visible. The doctor or nurse then
observes the shape, contour and colour of the cervix.
Occa sionally, it can be difficult to see. Once the cervix has been observed,
the smear is taken, using a standard technique devised in the 1940s. This
method scrapes cells from the surface of the cervix which are then spread
onto a microscopic slide and 'fixed' for their journey to a laboratory. The
cells are examined cytologically using a stain which distinguishes
between different kinds of cells, and cells in different stages of
development. The cells are then classified according to a variety of
categories, devised by the British Society for Clinical Cytology.2
Waiting for the Results
'[The smear result arrived in] two or three weeks. It said it
showed mild changes and could I please come back to have a
second one in three months? I thought then, I don't really
like this.' [Julie]
After the smear is taken and interpreted, a brief letter is normally sent to
the woman from the laboratory, (although practices vary, and in some
health boards and authorities, women must phone their general
2 For details of the classification systems used see Appendix H.
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practitioner in order to obtain their smear result). Women are informed
about smears which are not classifified as 'normal', which are described
through a variety of expressions, such as 'pre-cancerous', 'suspicious',
'abnormal', 'mild changes' or 'positive'. Depending on the classification of
the cervical cells, the woman may be asked to return for a repeat smear.
If it is normal, she will be called for a repeat smear in three or five years'
time, depending on local policy. If there are abnormal changes, repeat
smears are taken in either three, six or twelve months, depending on the
degree of abnormality. Alternatively, the woman is referred for
colposcopy.
Colposcopic examination, usually an outpatient procedure, shows where
the changed cells are and what they look like. A colposcope is a
microscope which makes it easier for the doctor to see the cervix and
cervical cells. The cervix is stained with fluid such as saline, ascetic acid
and sometimes iodine, to show up particular parts of the cervix. Sometimes
a biopsy is taken from what appear to be the most affected areas and sent
for histology. If this is the case, a local anaesthetic is often injected into
the cervix. If pre-cancerous cells are detected, they may be treated by
'ablative therapy' or excision. The former includes laser; 'cold'
coagulation; cryocautery; diathermy treatment and may be treated on an
out-patient basis. Excision involves a variety of procedures such as
diathermy loop excision, cone biopsy or more radically, hysterectomy.
Cervical screening has developed as a form of secondary prevention based
on the identification of precancerous cells, which is typically represented
as a simple, safe procedure with high levels of success. Despite the
certainty in which these interventions appear to be framed, for many
women, there is considerable ambiguity associated with the language and
experience of screening. In contrast to the linear development of
interventions detailed by policy and laboratory guidelines, women may
have a more disruptive and truncated experience of screening. Whilst a
majority of smears are classified as normal, many are classified in degrees
of abnormality which may or may not progress to cancer or other forms
of cervical disease. Abnormal smears may appear normal upon repeat
smear, then regress to abnormal on the second repeat. The natural
history of cervical cancer is itself unclear and non-linear, and abnormal
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cells require further investigation, examination or treatment in ways
which may intensify women's participation in a series of out and/or in¬
patient encounters.
The experience of further observation and/or treatment in the name of
prevention can therefore be ambiguous and uncertain. The identification
of cervical smears as detecting 'pre-cancerous' cells has potential for
confusion both for women and for medical practitioners, as the latter
increasingly acknowledge. Further examination through colposcopy may
be perceived by some as treatment rather than examination. For many
women, the experience of screening and the contact with a variety of
actors and social negotiations which this may bring, may raise issues of
risk and anxiety. There is considerable scope for ambiguity and diversity
in the experience of cervical screening, despite its representation and
rhetorical power as a simple form of secondary prevention. Indeed,
cervical screening represents what has been termed the 'prevention
paradox' (Rose, 1985), in the sense that whilst screening is measured as
beneficial for populations, it may be troubling for individuals. Despite
this, women who participate in cervical screening develop strategies to
negotiate and transform the sense of risk and anxiety which may
accompany this experience. Moreover, participation in screening is often
accompanied by a strong sense of social obligation.
Sociology and the Cervix
This thesis arises from the observation that cervical screening
exemplifies what Bryan S. Turner (1987) has termed the 'Foucault paradox'.
In contemporary capitalist societies, where welfare systems provide a
greater degree of equality of opportunity in relation to health care, and
where health is increasingly perceived as a desirable, though limited
resource, the state is required to provide a correspondingly greater degree
of regulation over its populations. Citizenship is broadly considered as a
series of individual rights and entitlements, therefore, the paradox is that
the provision of citizenship, of which health is an aspect, entails greater
surveillance and social regulation by quasi-governmental organisations
and agencies.
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In this regard, prevention has been identified as a new form of social
regulation, in which new populations and new aspects of people's lives
have increasingly come under state and other agencies of surveillance
(Arney, 1982; Armstrong, 1983). This observation derives both from
sociological analysis of the body and health and from sociological analysis
of governance. The thesis addresses such analyses by presenting
material, in the form of interview and textual data, drawn from a case
study of cervical screening. This material is used to examine women's
experiences of participation in cervical screening, their sense of
embodiment in this process and sociological understandings of the
relationship between the body, gender and health.
The thesis is presented in three sections. Section One reviews the status of
the body in sociological thought, the relationship of this thought to
categories of gender and health and the relevance of Foucault in this
enterprise. Whilst Foucauldian frameworks have been used to identify the
processes through which bodies are socially marked out for surveillance,
they have failed to identify the embodied experience of surveillance.
Indeed, the development of the sociology of the body has tended to conflate
the body and embodiment in ways which, I shall argue, obscure social
processes and experiences. Chapter One, therefore, addresses sociological
debates on the body and surveillance and Chapter Two examines the
contribution of feminism to understandings of embodiment. In conclusion
of Section one, I present an emerging critique of the Foucauldian
literature on the body, and, drawing upon feminist argument as a
statement of gendered subjectivity, I pose a distinction between the body
and embodiment.
Section Two outlines the substantive area of cervical screening and
introduces the research which forms the core of the thesis. Chapter Three
presents historical and documentary data from medical and other health-
related journals which I use to examine the development of cervical
screening as a modern medical project. Thesi, data suggest a shift in
medical observation of the cervix, from diagnosis and detection to
prevention. I examine discourses which underlie this shift and suggest
that considerable implications for lay understandings of prevention are
embedded within the unresolved epistemologies which underpin
6
screening. These epistemologies relate to issues of intersubjectivity in the
interpretation of smears and raise questions about the nature and status of
both expert and lay knowledge in the context of prevention.
Chapter Four introduces current approaches in social science to cervical
screening, which have primarily focused on issues of lay knowledge,
belief and attitude. This work has self-consciously contributed to the
production of knowledge which is used to challenge and correct lay
beliefs in the interests of securing participation in screening. In
contrast, drawing on the concerns presented in Section One, I suggest an
alternative approach, which addresses the ways in which women make
sense of a 'routine' experience and what this reveals about the
relationship between the body, gender and health.
This approach is developed in Section Three, in which I introduce
empirical material in the form of interviews with women who have had
different categories of smear tests, both normal and abnormal, and a
range in between. I have used this data to examine the talk, stories and
language which describe and detail experiences of screening. The
material in Chapters Five and Six points to considerable diversity in
women's interpretations of their screening experiences. In particular I
have focused on the ways in which themes and accounts of obligation and
entitlement, risk and trust are expressed, and I draw attention to the ways
in which the experience of surveillance, within cervical screening,
produces and intensifies understandings of risk and obligation. In
Chapter Seven I present a methodological discussion as reflection on the
creative process through which the thesis has been produced.
These different kinds of data inform the central arguments of the thesis in
three main ways. First, they highlight the status of the body in
sociological thought and point to a need for conceptual clarity between
the body and embodiment. Second, they highlight tensions between
citizenship and surveillance as they are negotiated and managed by
women in the context of cervical screening participation. Third, a
concern with embodiment reveals previously obscured aspects of
experience, which have implications for sociological reflection on the
body, gender and health.
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SECTION ONE
This section reviews sociological thought which has addressed the body
and draws attention to both the relevance of Foucault and feminism in this
enterprise. In Chapter One I trace sociological interest in the body, and
suggest that the emergence of a (re)new(ed) focus on the body is
fundamental to the development of sociology as a discipline. It is not that
the 'body' has been added to other sub-areas of the discipline, but that the
idea of the discipline, and the language of 'discipline', has been
transformed through an address to the body. I will, therefore, outline
analytical frameworks through which the body and embodied experience
have been developed and highlight the sources of sociological influence
on this thesis. Among these frameworks, that of Foucault and his
emphasis upon a new regime of bodily regulation is the most distinctive.
In particular, I draw on key studies which focus on medical practices and
aspects of prevention which exemplify the processes and practices of
surveillance.
In Chapter Two I introduce feminist discussion of embodied experience
relating to issues of health. Feminist theory has been crucial to the
development of a sociology of the body, through arguments around gender
differentiation, power and knowledge and the challenges posed to the
'givenness' of the body both across historical time and culture. Of
particular importance for feminist theory, discussions of female embodied
experience draw attention to the ungendered nature of Foucauldian
arguments. However, the notion of embodied experience itself implies a
universal and static position and further, occupies an ambiguous status in
feminist analysis. In Chapter Two, therefore, I challenge this ambiguity
through the concept of embodiment and revisit the significance of
Foucault for understandings of the body, gender and health, by
presenting an emerging critique of the use of surveillance in the
sociology of the body. I argue that whilst this work has been valuable in
developing a Foucauldian framework with which to identify the processes
through which bodies are socially marked out for surveillance, the




THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE BODY
Locating the Body in Sociology
Sociological Theory and the Body
The body in sociology is now a 'phenomenon considered worthy of detailed
study in its own right in the late twentieth century' (Shilling, 1993, p29).
Indeed, the editorial of the first issue of Body and Society is emphatic that
it is no longer the case that the body is ignored within sociology
(Featherstone and Turner, 1995). However, it is commonly agreed that
sociology has responded to, and created, a new interest in the body in ways
which have been theoretically driven. Sociological interest in the body
has centred on tensions between the development of theoretical
frameworks with which to put the body into the project of general theory
and the (re)introduction of embodied agency to the sociological project
(Turner, 1984; Bury, 1995).
The body has been identified as an 'absent presence' within sociology, in
the sense that the body has been acknowledged as integral to agency, but
has not formed part of the extended conceptual treatment of human action
and interaction. For instance, Turner has focused much of his work on
reclaiming general theory for the body, whilst at the same time, drawing
attention to the way in which this work has reproduced the Cartesian
legacy of Western systems of thought, in which mind and body are viewed
as discrete. Turner has consistently argued that the human body has not
formed an explicit part of the development of sociological theory (see for
instance, Turner, 1984; 1987; 1991; 1992).
One of the principal ways in which the body has been conceptualised
within sociological theory is as an organic entity, which forms a stable
condition of social action (Turner, 1992). Assuming the body's biological
stability provides it with a determining status, onto which social
categories are superimposed. The body in sociological theory is perceived
as external to the actor, as a constraint, or as a condition of action which
may, at times, be understood as a source of opposition to instrumental
reason. Within sociological theory then, the body has historically been
positioned outside the social, or as pre-social, as entering into social
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action, and as constituent of it, but not itself constituted through social
action.
Turner's work must largely be seen as a critique of Cartesian dualism, in
which mind and body have been perceived as separate entities. As he
argues, sociology has developed as a science of action and interaction,
where 'action' reproduces this dualism between mind and body. Indeed,
Cartesianism can be seen as a false 'bourgeois' dichotomy in which
subject/object; organism/environment; mind/body are analytically
separate (Freund, 1988).1 Furthermore, sociology's disciplinary
acceptance of a biological frame of reference in which to locate the body
is not unusual. The history of Western thought has developed through a
progressive embodiment of the self (Elias, 1978), in which the body, as an
discrete entity, has been used to make a significant distinction between
self and other, thus bracketing out the body as a condition but not as a
constituent of action.
The critique of sociology mounted by Turner, and those who follow him,
draws attention to the way in which Cartesianism has informed the project
of general theory. Others have pointed out that the development of a
disembodied sociology has itself been a response to biological
reductionism, in order to establish intellectual autonomy (Freund, 1988).
Neverthless, despite debate about the degree to which Cartesian dualism
has been the paradigm in which sociology has operated, Turner gives
himself the task of integrating notions of embodied agency into the
contemporary sociological project. For instance, he seeks to reclaim
Weber's work on agency for the sociology of the body, and recent attempts
by other sociologists have developed these claims (see for instance,
Hughes, 1995).
In similar fashion, Turner points to the work of Parsons and draws
attention to the implicit forms in which the body is present in his version
' Other commentators, however, have argued that this dualism was never
as sharp as theoreticians such as Turner suggest. Bury (1995) for
instance, vigorously denies this version of Cartesianism and suggests that
theorists such as Nietzsche and Popper operated with much more blurred
notions of the relationship between mind, body and also emotion (Freund,
1990).
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of structural-functionalism. In his hierarchy of social life, Parsons (1966)
positions the organism as the lowest and most stable aspect of social
relations. The body, indeed, is seen as an action system, or as 'an
integrative sub-system of action in general' (p8). Turner makes passing
reference to this set of relations and suggests that, as sociology has
developed, the material or physical body has been subordinated by the
metaphysical body, or the social self. The claim made here is that within
general theory, the body is clearly conceptualised as an important
analytical category, for instance, in relation to its responses to disease,
and the implications of these for social roles. It is, however, subordinated
by reference to the agency character of social action, in which the body
follows decisions made by its inhabitant or those reponsible for its social
maintenance, for instance, within medical culture. Hence, Turner's
discussion of Parsons acknowledges the analytical potential for
developing the notion of embodied agency, but simultaneously identifies a
dualism between body and self.
Yet a rereading of Parsons suggests that the body is placed as a more
explicit and critical focus for analysis, in which the organism, or the
body, can be understood as the ultimate condition for social relations.
Indeed, Parsons outlines the body's place in his hierarchy of control in
which cybernetic systems, high in information but low in energy,
regulate other systems higher in energy but lower in information (p9).
Parsons himself appears much less ambivalent about the status of the body
in relation to both social action and formal analysis. For instance, he
asserts:
'...we know the physical world only through the organism'
(emphasis in the original, 1966, p8)
The implication here would appear to be to highlight the body as an
unchanging basis for social action. Yet, simultaneously, there is
considerable ambiguity in such a statement, which not only identifies the
body as a condition for human action, therefore fulfilling the 'absent
presence' to which Turner refers, but also as a construction of human
action. Whilst Turner acknowledges the body in Parsons, by assuming
that Parsons reproduces the Cartesianism inherent in formal theory, he
fails to recognise the analytical potential which Parsons' work provides.
1 1
It is not that the body is bracketed out in Parsons' general theory,
although clearly a dualism is apparent. However, it is a dualism between
condition and construction, or between the universal and the particular,
rather than between mind and body. The statement here points to the
body as both a condition of action, which Turner also finds in Weber
(1978), and as a means of interpretation. Therefore, Parsons's insight
here, unintentionally perhaps, draws attention to the necessity of a
sociological treatment of the body in the development of general theory.
However, whilst the body has been addressed as a condition for social
action its theoretical development remains in nascent form.2
Running through discussion of the ontological and epistemological status
of the body is a major unresolved tension between the biological and the
social, the body and embodiment. A key issue for analysis has been the
implications of reproducing Cartesianism in sociological theory (Freund,
1988) and the validity of sociological knowledge about the body. The
reproduction of this legacy has produced a particular version of
sociological theory which is premised on an implicit acknowledgement of
the importance of the body to human action, but at the same time, a refusal
to incorporate the body into its analytical categories.
Interpretive Traditions
Whilst general sociological theory has developed by acknowledging the
body as a condition of action, but ultimately failing to incorporate the
body in its categories, other sociological traditions have highlighted the
analytical importance of the body. For instance, sociology, although less
concertedly than anthropology, has dealt with the cultural meanings
bestowed upon the body (Crawford, 1984), or how the body operates as a
medium through which social reproduction, control and order is shaped.
Drawing on anthropological approaches to the 'lived' body and its
symbolic relationship to the social world, phenomenological sociologists
have also been concerned with the issue of how 'being-in-the-world' is
crucially linked to embodiment.2
2 See Berthelot (1986) for a discussion of the body in social theory which
traces the sociological encounter with the body.
2 Merleau-Ponty (1962) in particular provides discussion of the 'openness'
and beingness of the body and its relationship to the social world.
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Social constructionism and symbolic interactionism also highlight the
importance of the human body for social expression and interaction, for
making and remaking social life. Turner (1992) acknowledges the
influence of the work of both Goffman (1959) and Berger and Luckmann
(1967) which he argues should be seen as nascent versions of a sociology
of the body.4 Goffman, for instance, positions the physical body as a
surface or a filter through which expression of self is performed and
acted out. Phenomenological approaches also allow us to address the body
as a dialectic of being and having a body, and provide a means of
examining the relationship between social actors and their physical
bodies, which can be seen as both constraints on, and capacities for,
action. This approach is elaborated more recently by Shilling (1993) and
others.
Whilst these traditions address the body in more explicit terms than those
deploying the categories of general theory, it remains the case that the
organic basis of the body is seldom under question here. In common with
general theoretical traditions, within phenomenological or interactionist
approaches, the ontological status of the body is not problematic. It is
understood as a stable organism which supports or constrains interaction,
or it is seen as an organic means of production. Indeed, it is taken for
granted, in ways which perhaps tell us about the social power of medical
knowledge and the extent to which medical culture has successfully
contested the body as its own legitimate territory. Consequently, sociology
has accepted the assumptions of biomedicine, and has bracketed out
physiology and biology, either real or apparent (Freund, 1983).
Some anthropological traditions acknowledge the way in which the body
is bracketed out as a pre-social entity, and in so doing, attempt to
(re)centre the body as the focus of analysis. For instance, the work of
Mary Douglas (1970), has focused on the the notion of the body as a
symbolic representation of the social and moral world, and others have
posed the body as a narrative of social processes (Scheper-Hughes and
Lock, 1987). From this work the concept of embodiment has developed
4 Freund (1988) makes the point that whilst Berger and Luckmann (1967)
utilise pheonomenological concepts, such as those developed by Merleau-
Ponty, in their discussion of the 'openness' of human nature, they do not
develop this into discussion of the social construction of bodies.
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(Csordas, 1989), through which social actors experience social, moral and
political exigencies. Nevertheless, despite attempts to re-negotiate the
analytical status of the body, the body present in this work must also be
seen as a relatively stable organism. Certainly it is variable in its
interpretation, for instance, through medical language and perceptions,
but is complete, of and in itself. This observation returns us to Parsons'
insight, and reminds us of the potential of the complex model of social
hierchary he developed, in which the organism, or the body, might be
seen as the ultimate condition for social relations, which in turn, can only
be understood through social relations.
Social constructionist approaches to the body have, in the main, addressed
the surfaces of the body, the interface between the corporeal and the
social, leaving the biological/organic basis of disease, sociologically
intact. This perspective, adopted by essayists in the Wright and Treacher
(1982) collection for instance, addresses the social conditions in which
diseases and illnesses emerge, rather than disease itself, and the ways in
which they are socially created, through interests which shape responses
to disease. For instance, Brandt's (1985) work on sexually transmitted
diseases, demonstrates how disease can only be fully understood as both
social and biological phenomena, or as the outcome of socio-historical
processes. Here, however, the body and its social context work in parallel,
with no explicit interaction between them.
The work of Elias (1978) on civilising processes, challenges the view of a
stable body by posing the body as an organism which is constantly
changing across historical and biographical time (see also Shilling, 1993,
for an overview). This notion of historically and biographically shifting
bodies has emerged in work which explores bodily disruptions through
chronic illness (Williams, 1984), and the ways in which embodied
experiences have changed across time (through the emergence of new
reproductive technologies; genetic screening; surgical techniques).
Illich (1986) for instance, argues that the body has been objectified by
medical understandings which have exerted a dualist monopoly in the
twentieth century. This monopoly has increasingly contributed to
feelings of alienation, which underlie a shift towards an understanding of
the body in which people are encouraged to objectify themselves, by
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internalising medical categories, and therefore locate themselves under a
medical canopy (Turner, 1987). In this work, the stability of the body
increasingly comes under question.
Therefore, within social constructionism, the actions and interests of
groups and individuals are often under scrutiny, rather than bodies
themselves. Whilst social structures provide the context in which
knowledge is produced, for instance, within medical culture, nevertheless,
knowledge is produced by individual actors with interests to secure and
resources to gain. In this production of knowledge, the body is
compartmentalised, as a means of securing territorial boundaries, and
commodified, as a means of deploying technologies which are developed in
order to secure new specialisms. The development of ultrasound, for
instance, is a form of technological change which has contributed to the
establishment of specialist boundaries. Oakley (1984) and McLeod (1986)
demonstrate how visual images of the fetus enabled obstetrics to establish
itself as a specialism separate from gynaecology, by partitioning the
developing foetus from its mother and, consequently, posing a clear
distinction between the body of the baby and the body of the woman
carrying it.
Knowledge, Discourse and Deconstruction
Knowledge of the body, therefore, plays an instrumental role in securing
professional, occupational or state interests, and is constructed in the light
of prevailing dominant notions about, for instance, gender or class. Yet
even within these frameworks, the social is mapped onto the biological
and the body is not placed centrally as an analytic category, in need of
examination or explanation. We begin to see this, however, where
knowledge is scrutinised as ideology, particularly within feminist
research, or where a 'strong' social contructionist approach leads to a
firmer suggestion that medical knowledge can be 'made' in the laboratory
as a consequence of numerous contingencies, rather than as the neutral
product of a disinterested science (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). For
instance, knowledge concerning the female body has been argued to
reflect little stability about that body. The nineteenth century category of
hysteria, for example, owed less to medical 'knowledge' than to the
profession of medicine's patriarchal attitudes to women which were
15
linked to strategies to prevent women entering professional occupations
(for a review of female entry into law and medicine, see for instance
Sachs and Wilson, 1978).
Whilst these kinds of approaches have been criticised as obscuring the
emancipatory aspect of medicine and reducing medical practice and
knowledge to the appropriation of power (Scambler, 1987), they tend to
address society rather than the body. In contrast, post-structuralist
approaches challenge the stability of the biological order by questioning
legitimacy claims and problematizing the facticity of the body itself. Post-
structuralist analyses of the body have been more influential in the
humanities perhaps, than within sociology itself, although there are a
growing number of studies which take up post-structuralist positions and
identify the social meanings of a given situation or object, including the
body, as one of many possible social meanings.
These approaches draw attention to the ways in which discourses, for
instance, medical talk and practices, do not reveal claims to truth, in any
rationalist sense, but rather, reveal alternative discourses (Fox, 1992;
Atkinson, 1996). Here, taken-for-granted assumptions of the social world
are deconstructed to reveal the fragmentation of subjects and,
furthermore, are done so in ways which demonstrate the author's
awareness of the production of his or her text. In this approach to the
body, diseases or bodily conditions cannot be regarded as natural events or
facts which exist outside the language in which they are described or the
historical context in which they reside (Benoist and Catherois, 1993).
Post-structuralist thinking poses the possibility of reading the body as a
text and invites us to decode its inscriptions (Grosz, 1994). This approach to
the body has been explicitly deployed within social history and the
humanities. The work of Laqueur (1991) is seminal in this respect. His
historical research on the body, drawing on Foucault, suggests a more
radical position, in which the body we know collectively, or understand as
a universal category, must be seen as a product of particular contexts and
practices. For example, Laqueur argues that both historical and current
understandings of gender differentiated bodies, stem from social shifts
through which the body was rewritten in response to changes in women's
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social and political positions. I will return to these arguments and how
they have been used in feminist discussion of embodiment in Chapter Two.
The body has been identified as a target for rationalisation processes in
the work of Marx (Freund, 1983), Weber and Foucault (Turner, 1992),
through regulatory strategies and technologies of social control, through
which power is imposed upon the soul (Rose, 1990). Foucault's work in
particular, has opened up a way of exploring the interdependency of mind
and body by examining the power of discourse to produce the body
(Foucault, 1972), or the shaping of the body through social practices and
contexts (Connell, 1987; 1995; Shilling, 1993), such as surveillance
(Armstrong, 1983; 1995). In parallel with poststructuralist developments,
Freund (1988) points to the interplay between phenomenology and
historical materialism as a framework through which to capture the
intersection of mind, body and society, and place the body central to
analysis. Freund suggests the body should be seen as:
'...socially constructed in historically changing settings of
production and consumption, and by the institutions that
characterise these settings. Modes of social control as well
as power relationships based on class, age, race, ethnicity
and gender also play a signficant role in the body's social
construction.' (1988, p581)
There are parallels here with Parsons' attempt to integrate personality,
social action and social structure. A focus on the interpenetration of the
social and biological is posed as more fruitful than a 'strong' approach
which casts the body as a 'pure' social construction. This view engages
with a sense of a changing and unstable body across both historical and
biographical time. In particular, the effects of the 'civilising process' are
important here (Elias, 1978), since it may create distinctions and
disjunctions between bodily states and our expression of them. It is not
simply that the body has responses to stimulae which social actors
'express', but that society intervenes to shape, and create the conditions
in which responses can be made. As Martin (1984; 1989) so clearly
demonstrates in her work on menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth,
such a process may create and sustain a set of disjunctions between
physiological states and the subjective experience of biology.
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Here the facticity of the body is a constituent of action and interaction.
This turns the social constructionist position on its head, by arguing that
what we know of the body is not determined by knowledge which is
produced by interests, politics, resources and social context, but that
practices themselves, in historically changing circumstances, produce
knowledges of the body. This turn towards the production of knowledge
and hence the production of the body, has developed in a wider context of
postmodernism, in which plurality and fragmentation are celebrated as
facets of both social life and sociological theory.
Sociological theory concerned with the body has both fragmented and
multiplied (Bertholot, 1986), as we see in O'Neill's Five Bodies (1985), which
has been much mobilised in attempts to develop a sociology of the body.
Overviews and introductions to the body now typically address different
kinds of bodies. Hence, Turner (1984) identifies the 'discursive' and
'material' body; O'Neill (1985) addresses the 'individual/social', 'physical',
'communicative', 'consumer' and 'medical' body; Frank (1990) identifies
the 'sexual' body and the 'disciplined' body; Frankenberg (1990) makes
distinctions between the 'somatic' and 'corporeal' body; Shilling (1993)
addresses the 'uncertain' body, the 'naturalistic' body, the 'socially
constructed' body; Turner (1992) adds 'medicalised' and 'talking' bodies to
his list; Lupton (1994) addresses the 'commodified' body and the 'regulated'
body. Such an elaborate list of bodies underscores Shilling's observation
about the 'uncertainty that sociologists have in identifying what the body
is' (1993, p39) and illustrate Turner's (1984) difficulties in identifying the
substance of the body. More significantly, however, they illustrate a
failure to incorporate the body into the categories of general theory and
draw attention to the way in which the development of deconstructive
sociology has focused not upon the body, but upon discourse.
Therefore, there is a tension in the pursuit of an attempt to identify and
know the body. Discourse is analytically central to this enterprise, yet the
enterprise itself is profoundly modernist, and therefore stands in contrast
to the discursive turn. Hence, a recurring issue within the sociology of
the body is whether bodies exist independently of their social
construction, or whether they exist only in relation to the practices which
produce them. This concern is posed as a distinction between
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foundationalism and anti-foundationalism within the sociological
literature (see Nettleton, 1992 for a discussion) and has been organised
around the tension between the real or apparent body, and the status of
knowledge in relation to the body.
Turner (1992) highlights this problem and argues that the development of
a sociology of the body has replicated a dichotomy between whether it is
real or constructed. His resolution to this tension has been to accept a
body which is both an organic entity and socially constructed. This
resolution, however, as my discussion of Parsons illustrates, reproduces a
distinction between the body as a condition for action and the body as a
means of interpretation. This oversight limits sociological
conceptualisation of corporeality (Berthelot, 1986; Freund, 1988), in which
the body remains as a stable entity, undifferentiated across space and time.
What the reproduction of this distinction points to is the way in which the
body and embodiment have been collapsed in sociological debate.
Sociologists cannot ask the same questions of the body as it might once
have asked of class, which have been fully reviewed and critiqued. So for
instance, what class is, how it is manifest, and to what it relates, are not
questions which may be easily translated to the body. Rather, sociological
analysis is better placed by beginning with what individuals know of
their bodies and how embodiment is experienced; how this shifts
according to time, space and context; and why the body has become
significant for sociology in late modernity. General theory and other
sociological traditions have struggled to 'bring the body in' as a focus for
analysis, but have failed to think about the reconstruction of categories,
which is a condition of an adequate understanding. In contrast, both
feminism and Foucault have produced a more explicit attempt to
reconceptualise categories of analysis.
From the general to the particular
Some commentators have argued that the mind/body dualism to which
sociological theory has addressed itself, is reproduced in the solutions it
provides (Freund, 1988). First, as some have argued (Shilling, 1993;
Turner, 1992), it becomes increasingly difficult to define what the body is,
in late modernity. Its 'beingness' is uncertain and disappears. Second,
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and relatedly, an emphasis on 'the' body, obscures the dialectic between
body, mind and society. Douglas (1970) expresses this dialectic in the
following way:
'The social body constrains the way the physical body is
perceived. The physical experience of the body, always
modified by the social categories through which it is known,
sustains a particular view of society. There is a continual
exchange of meanings between the two kinds of bodily
experience so that each reinforces the categories of the
other. As a result of this interaction the body itself is a
highly restricted medium of expression.' (1970, pxiii)
In contrast, an embodied sociology would foreground the relationship
between the experience of 'having' a body and of 'being' a body. Here
embodiment serves not only as a bridge between voluntaristic action and
the biological body (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), but crucially, is
understood as the expression of a dialectic process, through which the
body as both object and subject, in and of itself, can only be understood
through 'the practices that conceptualise it, represent it, and respond to it'
(Crimp, 1988, cited in Frank, 1990, pi35).
Of emerging importance to debates around the status of the body in
sociological theory is the way in which feminism is implicitly
acknowledged as a form of social change which has forced body politics
onto social and political agendas. Both the raising of body consciousness
and the reclamation of the body as central to self and identity mark an
historical turn in the relationship of the body to sociology. Sociologists
have incorporated feminist emphases on embodied experience, in order to
enhance the status of the body within sociology. Zola (1991) argues that
this is a challenge for sociology which is as yet unfulfilled. He notes the:
'importance of women's perspectives in health care, man's
domination in particular, the necessary breakdown of the
split between public and private worlds, and the role of the
body in one's identity.' (1991, pi)
However, this position takes its force from observations about embodied
experience in ways which uncritically accept the notion of authenticity
inherent within feminist discussion around issues of health.
Furthermore, whilst feminism is acknowledged in sociology, it is not
20
addressed as central to the analytical categories which develop from it,
and it has not been used to highlight the fundamental distinction which
underlies the abstract categories of formal analysis. Nevertheless,
sociology's acknowledgement of feminism can be developed to produce a
shift in disciplinary consciousness, in which embodiment is foregrounded
as the basis for social action and the medium through which it is
understood. I will return to these issues in Chapter Two.
The body has also been central to debates in the sociology of health and
illness which have developed Foucauldian frameworks to address the
connections between health and society. In particular, sociological
literature on surveillance examines changes in medical practices and
perceptions, which in turn, have created new knowledges of the body.
Hence, in this view, the body is produced through the development of new
gazes, as a particular object, as a site for the application of power and as
the material on which rationalisation techniques are applied. Through a
sociological affirmation of Foucault, we see an implicit attempt to rework




In sociology, as well as within other disciplines in the social sciences and
humanities, Foucault's legacy is palpable. Perhaps more than any other
theorist, Foucault embodies the 'postmodern turn', although he would not,
perhaps, have cast himself in such a way CMcNay, 1992). Yet, in attempts
to critique 'grand narratives' and make flesh their demise, sociological
theory which draws on Foucault, paradoxically, creates and reinforces a
new 'grand narrative', a Foucauldian paradigm.
Within the sociology of health and illness, and within feminist theory,
Foucault's influence is perhaps more keenly felt than in other sociological
sub-disciplines. There are clear reasons for this. Whilst Foucault was not
a sociologist, his work addresses areas of interest to both sociologists of
health and illness and feminists, and he develops ways of thinking about
power, knowledge and the body which have attractions for both groups.
Some of his work directly addresses the relationship between medical
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knowledge, power relations and historical changes in collective
perception (Foucault, 1973) and the government of the body (1979). His
work also directly addresses both the regulation of female sexuality in the
context of a broader examination of the history of sexuality (Foucault,
1990), and issues of power, knowledge and the body (Gordon, 1980). In
particular, Foucault has been used to examine the government of the body
through techniques of surveillance.
Not only has the substantive and theoretical basis of Foucault's work been
identified as important by feminists and sociologists of health and illness,
but also his methodological and epistemological approaches. In particular,
his framework provides a means through which to challenge liberal
humanism. Turner (1992, pl79) summarises Foucault's position as one
which is critical of historical accounts which assume a teleological
development, which see the development of rational knowledge as
progressive, continuous and liberal, or as necessarily associated with
improvements in human conditions (Silverman, 1989), for instance,
through the welfare state. In contrast, Foucault stresses discontinuities in
the development of knowledge and the exercise of power. To this effect,
he emphasises the importance of discourse, calling into question the
nature of knowledge and challenging the empirical basis of knowledge,
including the body. He asserts discourses are:
'practices that systematically form the objects of which they
speak...it is through discourses, that is, the mix of beliefs,
ideas, and concepts which make up and organise our relation
to reality, that power and knowledge come together.'
(Foucault, 1972, p48)
Drawing on this approach, sociologists of health and illness have
scrutinized the independent pre-existence of knowledge, concerning the
body, for substance. Nettleton (1988), for instance, uses this framework to
explain the separation of the mouth from the body and the emergence of
dentistry, and she suggests that:
'...the consequence of the mouth was not dentistry, rather
dentistry produced the mouth.' (1988, p 158)
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Foucault's work has been used to examine how techniques of surveillance
in the twentieth century have created new knowledges and orthodoxies in
and around the body. The emergence of specialties and interventions,
such as prevention, are explained in relation to the kinds of techniques
they employ and the social context in which knowledges are created of
and around the body. For instance, the development of clinical medicine,
as a new form of knowledge, emerged from the birth of the clinic, as a
particular kind of social space in which new practices were engendered.
In this space, practices were institutionalised and knowledge made
systematic, in ways which established control over the body.
Therefore, of particular significance for sociologists of health and illness,
has been Foucault's work on the regulation of bodies, surveillance and
disciplinary power. Foucault's thesis is this: the development of the prison
system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries corresponded with a
shift towards a new conceptualisation of the body, which in turn,
produced changes in the relationship of the body to the state (Foucault in
Gordon, 1980). A shift occurred here, from penality within the enclosed
institution, spatially established on the edges of society, towards the
discipline mechanism typified by the Panopticon. The Panopticon,
identified by Foucault as a new concept in penal surveillance, in general
represented a minimal, but calculated, architectural constraint which
created the capacity to see objects dispersed in a wide, heterogenous field
(Foucault, 1979, p87). It represented a new form of control through the
creation of fields of visibility, such as penality or public health.
Commentaries on Foucault characterise the exercise of Panopticon power
as lighter, more rapid, more effective, more subtle (Garland, 1990). Of
particular significance for the sociology of the body, is the way in which
the concept of surveillance draws attention to the observation and
monitoring of populations, for example, by the state. The penal discourse
to which Foucault makes reference, corresponded with a move toward
greater surveillance of populations, and, indeed, the historical record
identifies the emergence and expansion of, for example, public health as a
move to the systematic monitoring of populations, on the part of the state
(Fee and Porter, 1992). As practices changed, so understandings of the
body shifted. For instance, the nineteenth century produced the body as a
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solid invariable entity, via the practice of detailed microscopic analysis
(Wear, 1992), and in the twentieth century, as medicine began to look
upon the social spaces occupied by bodies, the potentially ill, or the
otherwise healthy and normal, are sought out and monitored (Armstrong,
1983; 1993). Parallel to the emergence of more systematic provision for
health care, through the welfare state, perceptions within medicine of
new 'social' diseases created a corresponding need for surveillance, not
only of those bodies in which disease might be localised, but also within
the social spaces in which bodies were located (Armstrong, 1983, p33).
Other sociologists also note this shift (de Swaan, 1990) and social historians
make similar observations, albeit within different conceptual frameworks
(Laqueur, 1991). Hence the localisation of disease within the individual
body became the focus for medical intervention.
Therefore, Foucault observed an historical shift, from the eighteenth
century, in the relationship between the human body and the state
(Foucault, 1979). Greater surveillance of populations by the state, to which
public health was central (Lupton, 1995), established a new principle of
the 'body of society' (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987). As Turner (1992)
points out, population growth in North Western Europe throughout the
eighteenth century created coordination and integration 'needs' for the
apparatus of production (p20). These needs, associated with the
development of capitalism, referred specifically to the regulation of
health and longevity through the control over bodies, individual and
collective, in reproduction and sexuality (Turner, 1984; 1987), in work and
leisure (Freund and McGuire, 1991) in sickness and other forms of
difference (Frank, 1990; Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987). Various authors
point to capitalist development (Turner, 1987), the civilising process
(Elias, 1978; Illich, 1986) and the requirement for precision and
calculability (Weber, 1978) as the basis on which a new relationship
developed between the body politic, the social body and individual bodies.
The regulation of the social body which this shift engendered,
(symbolised, for instance, in public health), was shaped through agencies
and practices associated with the prison, the school and the hospital
(Lawler, 1991). In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault points to the
growth of examinations, timetables, registers and classification systems as
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a means of etablishing detailed population surveillance. Sociologists draw
on this insight to address the rapid growth in hospitals, which allowed
increasing numbers of people to be organised and observed centrally, and
which made the history given by patients secondary to clinical
observation (Jewson, 1976). This shored up medical epistemology by
providing an 'examining apparatus' which established a rationale to
examine bodies physically. Hence the policing of populations through the
examination became part of a new social order. This new order developed,
argues Foucault, not as a consensus of wills, but as the:
'materiality of power operating on the very bodies of
individuals.' (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980, p55)
According to Foucault, practices and knowledges of surveillance, through
population observation and monitoring, regulate the phenomena they
constitute. However, individuals are not coerced by the state to behave
according to norms which it establishes. On the contrary, practices of
surveillance, for instance through public health or welfare policies (see
for instance, Hewitt, 1983) encourage individuals to observe and monitor
their own behaviour. Foucault (1979) also, therefore, refers to self-
surveillance, through which individuals come to behave in particular,
specified ways through 'self-correction to norms'. It is this lighter mode
of 'liberal governance' (Rose, 1990) which has drawn so much attention
from sociologists and feminist theorists.
Foucault is seen as important because of the way in which he placed the
body as central to the development of medical epistemology. He viewed the
body as both the material on which agencies practice, such as medicine,
and identified the ways in which the body provides a source for the
expression and creation of self. Both Discipline and Punish (1979) and The
Birth of the Clinic (1973) discuss how 'bodies' are constituted by
disciplines, bureaucracies and the medical gaze, and therefore offer a
challenge to the disembodied self of theory. Sociologists have used
Foucault's work to more directly address the body's 'absent presence' in
sociological theory and undercut the abstractions which are seen as part
of the sociological project. In particular, his work has provided a means
of conceptualising the emergence of the individuated, autonomous self,
created by surveillance and self-surveillance. By providing a framework
25
for sociological exploration both of those practices which constitute the
body, and those which contribute to the constitution of self, by inviting
individuals to govern themselves, the marriage of Foucault and sociology
has been seen as a way of reinstating the commensurability of mind and
body.
Some of the clearest statements in this regard can be found in the
sociology of health and illness. The work of Armstrong (1983), Nettleton
(1992) and Arney and Bergen (1984), have all contributed to a way of
examining the relationship between the body and society, regulation and
surveillance. Such work has focused on practices and perceptions which
have shaped medical knowledge, which in turn have established a
regulatory imperative towards 'health' (Lupton, 1995). Health, in this
work, is conceptualised as a new social value (Crawford, 1984), through
which bodies are regulated and identities formed. Prevention is critical to
this regulatory imperative. In what follows I detail the conceptual use of
surveillance in the sociology of health and illness and draw attention to
the reproduction of tensions in Foucault's work which have implications
for the status of the body in sociological thought.
Mapping Surveillance
The Clinical Gaze
Armstrong's early work identifies perceptions of a new body from the
eighteenth century (Armstrong, 1983, p6), and draws heavily on
Foucault's version of the status of the hospital clinic in eighteenth and
nineteenth century Paris. Armstrong's thesis is that a new form of
anatomical recording provided a different perceptual framework through
which to read the body, establishing a different language through which
the body could be interpreted. This language developed because the body
became increasingly accessible through physical examination and the
analytical rigours of pathology, in which corpses were opened up in the
name of scientific observation prior to the observation of the bodies of
patients. Armstrong draws attention to the 'medical gaze': many bodies
were observed through a new visualisation process which viewed them
singly. The practices underlying the medical gaze included: the physical
examination, anatomical recording, the location of individual bodies
within hospital space.
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Armstrong (1987) describes these processes in some detail in order to
provide a clear statement of disciplinary power, which, he argues,
manifests itself through relations of observation. He therefore draws
attention to the disciplinary practices which establish conditions for the
analysis of the body. The Dispensary, for instance, was a model clearing
house for the care and treatment of tuberculosis in the late nineteenth
century, through which it became possible, theoretically, to observe and
examine patients and their contacts. Armstrong deploys the tuberculosis
Dispensary as a device through which to perceive the new form of social
organisation, embedded within social medicine, and later institutionalised
within health centres (1983; 1995). In detailing such processes,
Armstrong argues that those under surveillance transform their identities
and actions.
Drawing on Armstrong, Nettleton's (1992) study of dentistry develops this
argument further and demonstrates how the mouth came to be policed:
through the examination, or dental check-up; measurement and
comparison through dental epidemiological records and the production of
dental 'norms'; and through the power of the toothbrush drill.
Importantly, the agents of surveillance within the parameters of
disciplinary power are not only dentists, general practitioners, health
visitors but also women as mothers, as they develop diligence in the
monitoring of their children's teeth (Nettleton, 1988). This is a signficant
demonstration of surveillance both as centralised coordination which
individuates subjects, and as disciplinary power which creates subjects.
Similarly, Arney (1982) emphasises the power of the perceptual
framework in the classification of disease and bodily normality, and links
changes in perception to the professional development of medicine. He
argues, for instance, that in response to the ever present threat of
midwifery, obstetrics narrowed its gaze to focus on internal body space,
circumscribed by the uterus and pelvis, and sought ways to 'foresee
pathology and act prophylactically' (p51). His work points to a shift in the
status of pathology as the arbiter of medical knowledge, an observation
similarly noted by social historians (Sturdy, 1992). Within obstetrics, the
control of technology formed the basis on which professional position was
secured. However, in contrast to arguments which locate professional
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specialisation within technological imperatives (such as McLeod, 1986), it
is worth noting that such control emerged as an outcome, rather than as
an explicit goal, within professional specialisation processes. This
developed synergistically, through the incorporation of other subjects
who internalised and reproduced the specialist knowledges of these
disciplines, which in turn, incorporated non-specialist knowledges as part
of obstetric discourse.
This version of the professional development of obstetrics also emphasises
the perceptual framework through which obstetrics 'sees' its subjects, a
framework in which pathology is presumed to abide in the body, waiting
to be revealed as 'truth'. The development of foetal monitoring, listening
to the heart of the developing foetus through an instrument designed, in
1819, for auscultation, allowed obstetrics to incorporate pregnant women
as 'joint adventurers' in its project (Arney, 1982, plOO). This intervention
attempted to prevent pathology developing, and relied on the
establishment of categories of normal and abnormal, in order to place
subjects within classification systems. Arney argues that this
development in particular, allows a 'new mode of social control' over
childbirth, one which is softer and lighter, because it extends into a wider
community of reproductive women, with that community's consent. Its
location within a preventive discourse, provides a route into wider aspects
of women's lives, and increases the births which are subject to the
obsteric gaze. This process of 'normalisation', of which Foucault was
critical (Turner, 1995), subjects individuals to monitoring and
observations, with a view to classifying them in degrees of
normality/abnormality. Significantly, however, normalisation processes
invite women to participate in their own observation as active
collaborators, or as agents of prevention. Prevention in obstetrics or
community medicine was concerned with identifying the potential for
pathology in the community, rather than hospital space, in which the
experience of being examined became normalised and routine.
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Power/knowledge
'...power is not a structure, or a certain force with which
certain people are endowed; it is a name given to a complex
strategic relation in a given society.' (Foucault, quoted in
Gordon, 1980, p27)
Foucault has drawn attention to the nature of power and pointed to the
exaggerated role given to repression. Foucault defines power, in the first
instance, in relation to what it is not. Bell (1993) suggests that power for
Foucault should not be seen as repressive or as a force held by a subject
which is used to censor, block or exclude. Therefore, power should not be
understood as centralised, coordinated, or exercised by groups or
individuals over others, and is no longer embodied in the rule of law
(Smart, 1990). Rather, Foucault redefines power, in the second instance, as
a force producing effects at the level of desire and at the level of
knowledge.
Power/knowledge are bound together within the expansion of
surveillance, such as that expressed by preventive strategies. A power to
control is integral to a power to know, or to know implies the potential for
control, which in turn, is made possible through mechanisms of
surveillance. Within Foucault's rubric power is never still, and indeed,
could be seen as somewhat circular, in the sense that:
'...the individual which power has constituted is at times its
vehicle...' (Foucault, quoted in Gordon, 1980, p91).
This foregrounds the participation of the individual in his or her own
bodily discipline and the ways in which people govern themselves and
how they are governed by others. Supporting such governance are the
production of technologies in the formation of knowledge: the methods of
observation used, the social spaces in which observations are made, the
techniques of investigation and so on. These conceptual elements of
power/knowledge are common to the sociological studies of the body and
governance which I have cited here.
The advantage which is attributed to power/knowledge is that power is
seen to be exercised in ways which produce knowledges. Hence the body
is discursively produced through the exercise of power, constituted
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through particular discourses. Effectively, power/knowledge underpins
processes through which the self creates itself as an object, thus implying
a more fluid notion of subjectivity. For instance, as patients become
partners in medical culture (Armstrong, 1979; 1984) through, for instance,
preventive programmes, they draw on medical discourse to articulate
their experiences, and engage in a dialogue with medical culture, in ways
which reinforce their recruitment to the management of their own
bodies. Surveillance here is seen as a form of social organisation which
establishes a degree of enclosure or confines people to certain conceptual
categories, in ways which ensure they internalise power/knowledge
(Nettleton, 1992).
The conceptual utility of power/knowledge allows, indeed urges, a detailed
focus on practices, or the 'meticulous observation of detail' and the
'political awareness of small things' (Foucault, 1979, p 141), and their
location within discourse. This emphasis on minutiae has the effect of
shifting analysis from interest-led developments in medical knowledge,
such as with social constructionism, to the practices through which such
interests are engendered. Such a methodological gesture has the effect of
locating medical developments, such as public health and prevention, and
the body, as outcomes and effects, rather than as technological
imperatives or as a stable entity. This avoids locating medical practice and
knowledge within relations of domination, and interjects a critique of
Enlightenment reason, in which the accumulation of scientific knowledge
is linked to notions of progress.
Creating Subjects
The 'fabrication' of the autonomous individual is a prerequisite for the
humanist versions of liberation of which Foucault is critical. Foucault's
main point here is to establish the relation between 'soft' surveillance and
social order. The prisoner, in the panoptic system, is obedient under the
threat of observation (Foucault, 1979). This is later elaborated when
Foucault (1990) asserts that any subjection to a field of visibility creates an
ever present 'incitement to discourse', since the field contains within it
technologies for extracting information. One is invited to 'confess all', so
that a 'grid of observations' can be constructed and individuals located
within it (Foucault, 1979). The invitation to subjects to enter into the
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construction of their own subjectivity within the field of visibility, hence
appears as liberation rather than restraint. This notion of confession has
been elaborated most clearly by Armstrong (1984), although it is also
developed in more recent work on sexuality (Bell, 1993; Weeks, 1986).
If practices of seeing produce new knowledge, then the developing
practices stemming from new knowledge reinforce dominant ways of
seeing. Disciplinary mechanisms, through which individuals are drawn
into surveillance, transform subjects through the new actions and
thoughts which are engendered, in which surveillance effectively
reconfigures individuals 'through their constant and pervasive
observation' (Foucault, 1979, p71). Furthermore, subjection:
'...is born mechanically of a fictitious relation...The
efficiency of its power, its constraining force, have, in a
sense, passed over to the other side - to the side of its surface
of application. He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of
power. He makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of
his own subjection.' (Foucault, 1979, p202).
In this extract from Discipline and Punish, Foucault introduces a shift
from surveillance to self-surveillance, which read through the
context of public health, moves from state regulation and population
monitoring, towards disciplinary power and self-surveillance. This shift
highlights a key tension in Foucault's work between discourse and subject.
There are provisionally two forms of surveillance working in parallel,
which Foucault implies in his discussion of the distinction between
regulatory and disciplinary power. Indeed, the concept of the Panopticon
which Foucault mobilises as an image of a softer version of power, also
encapsulates a notion of centralised knowledge. Yet it is precisely the idea
of centralised knowledge and juridical power of which Foucault is critical,
particularly through discussion of a shift towards self-surveillance from
surveillance.
It is important to note the analytical shift here from surveillance towards
self-surveillance as a process in which subjects come to locate themselves
as active participants and knowledgable subjects. Subjects within this
logic, are separated, individualised, made socially visible and offered
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technologies, such as the toothbrush drill or foetal monitoring, which
have the effect of normalisation, because of their increasingly widespread
use and the expansion of their deployment in new social locations, such as
the health centre. Normalisation, through disciplinary power, subjects
individuals to monitoring and locates them within deviations based on
probabilistic distributions (Armstrong, 1995). Hence, disciplinary power
conceptualises the ways in which institutionalised disciplines look at
bodies, describe and assess them, and how the application of such power is
met with 'multiple resistances'. It is significant, however, that whilst this
approach, with the exception of Arney (1982), draws attention to the
conceptual utility of disciplinary power, it appears unable to identify the
'multiple resistances' which such power is said to engender. The studies I
have cited are unable to identify resistances because of the way they have
tended to focus on practices of surveillance rather than the experiences of
self-surveillance. Consequently, and significantly, any sense of the
resistances which power/knowledge are said to produce are obscured. As
Section Three will demonstrate, when we acknowledge this oversight,
previously obscured aspects of experience come into view.5
The apparatus of surveillance is seen to increasingly contribute to self-
surveillance and conformity to the norms created within particular
discourses. Normalisation invites the patient to 'confess', producing new
levels of intimacy which enables the continued examination of bodies,
through, for instance, ante-natal care. Foetal monitoring, for instance, is
not understood here as part of a medicalising process (Zola, 1972), but as
part of a new organising concept which incorporates reproductive women
as participants, and thus increases their visibility. Yet the emergence of
self-surveillance raises questions about responsibility and attribution; and
the relationship between empowerment and choice. On the one hand,
women are placed as active subjects who may be empowered to exercise
'choice' in their experience of pregnancy and childbirth, through the
information and knowledge shared in the monitoring process. On the
other hand, if women are active participants in their pregnancy and
labour, issues of responsibility are raised in relation to outcomes, which
may themselves become more uncertain. Hence, the discourse which
5 For a discusion of resistances in relation to welfare surveillance see
Bloor and Mcintosh (1990).
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creates active, participant subjects, equipped with shared knowledge to
enable 'choice', simultaneously creates subjects on whom responsibilty
may be placed. Such an argument draws attention to the neo-liberal logic
into which more recent Foucauldian arguments have become locked (for
instance, Rose, 1990). Furthermore, this insight raises the status of
embodiment, precisely because, as Greco has pointed out (1993, p361), in
this new context, patients have to be more aware of their embodied
experience and become skilled at translating this into medical discourse.
Conclusion
The sociology of the body has developed analytical frameworks through
which to address medical power in relation to bodily regulation, without
conceding such power to be interest-driven. The work cited here has
focused, largely, on enterprises which have produced preventive regimes:
for instance, the development of pathology, community medicine;
dentistry; and obstetrics. It has addressed the body as a site of surveillance
and of transformation. Similarly, power/knowledge has a dynamic quality
which could also be read as a dialectic. Specific analytical claims are made
in relation to concepts derived from a Foucauldian approach and their
utility for unpacking surveillance. Such claims have importance, first,
because medical practice is approached in a way which acknowledges the
salience of professional power and interests in the development of
knowledge, but also emphasises the importance of everyday conflicts,
struggles and unintended outcomes in the creation of new ways of seeing
and fresh practices. Second, such work is important because of the
potential for incorporating the notion of resistance to practices and
knowledges, within the analytic framework. Whilst the first claim is
largely met, considerable shortfall exists in the claims of the second. For
Foucault, the body enters:
'a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and
rearranges it. A "political anatomy" which was also a
"mechanics of power", was being born.' (Foucault, 1979, pi 38)
Furthermore:
'The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and,
conversely, knowledge constantly induces the effects of
power.' (Foucault, quoted in Gordon, 1980, p52)'
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These two statements represent the tension in Foucault's discussion of
surveillance and power. In addressing the expansion of population
surveillance and bodily regulation, the sociological literature on the body
has deployed both disciplinary power and the medical gaze as key concepts
through which to examine social process and change. In Foucault's work,
surveillance, as an aspect of regulatory power or later, as an aspect of
governance, is a machinery of discipline. It is the 'meticulous observation
of detail' and the 'political awareness of small things' which underpin
social regulation; it 'generates a whole corpus of methods and knowledges,
descriptions, plans and data' (1979, p 141). It therefore incorporates both
the coordination of information and knowledge for the purpose of
regulating populations and the constitution of mechanisms which
encourage individuals to moderate and govern their own practices in line
with dominant discourse.
The work of Foucault examines the nature of power and the way in which
it has changed historically. This insight is developed most critically in
relation to medical practice, knowledge and health, where 'biopower',
signals a transition in the form of power itself, from a coercive and
sovereign force, to one which is lighter and more localised in its effects.
However, whilst this work details the development of surveillance and its
relationship to power/knowledge, it does so on the basis of observations
made about changes in medical practice. These observations are, in turn,
a consequence of merging the notions of both clinical gaze and the
Panopticon to produce a more unified analytical framework than is
warranted (Osborne, 1992).
Foucault's work, significantly, retains a tension between surveillance and
self-surveillance, which is reproduced in sociology, when applied to the
body and health, in order to satisfy a particular logic of analysis. We see
this most clearly when sociology uses the concept of disciplinary power to
address social action and suggest that individuals become active
participants in the monitoring of their bodies and in the production of
health. The focus on self-surveillance is filtered through discussions of
medical discourse, practices and techniques, and draws attention to
practices of self. It fails, however, to demonstrate the experience of self-
surveillance, and thereby reproduces a dualism between the body and
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embodiment. Therefore, despite the analytical importance of the body in
this work, sociology has reproduced a tension between surveillance and
self-surveillance, and indeed between the body and embodiment, in the
way it has focused on practices of surveillance to the neglect of
experiences of self-surveillance. This attention, consequently, obscures
responses to surveillance, to which Section Three will return.
An overemphasis on practices associated with historical change in the
nature and perceptions of the body has prioritised the importance of
medical practices over the experience of those practices. A consequence
is that this work has created a somewhat disembodied approach to those
issues of the body which it has addressed. Furthermore, there has been a
tendency to uncritically accept the context in which surveillance has
been set. This oversight makes it difficult to locate experiences of
participation and membership in the domain of health, therefore
resistances are both neglected and undertheorised.
In addition, this work has not explicitly addressed the gendered nature of
power, nor the relationship of gendered bodies to regulating processes.
With few exceptions (Bordo, 1989; Holland, Ramazanoglu, Sharpe and
Thomson, 1994), sociological work on surveillance has failed to address the
specificities of the regulation of female bodies, or how regulation creates
specific identities for female subjects. There is, certainly, an inference
within Nettleton's (1991) work that female subjects are differentially
marked out as mothers and guardians of children's teeth within
preventive dental discourse (see also Graham, 1979). Armstrong (1983) too
alludes to this as he addresses female subjects as carers in the community,
but neither place gender as a central category in their work, and are,
therefore, unable to demonstrate the internalisation or negotiation of the
identities attributed to them.
In conclusion, sociology has been a science of action, where general
theory has addressed the body as a condition of action. However, even in
Parsons' general theory, we find a stronger notion of variability and
difference in his notion of the cybernetic hierarchy, which implies the
body as a construction. A stronger version of the body as a construction is
found in social constructionism and symbolic interactionism. These
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approaches point to embodiment as variability, rather than as simply a
condition of action, and demonstrate a shift from 'Knowledge' to local
knowledges as categories of analysis. Yet, despite some acknowledgement
of the body as both condition and construction, the body in general theory
ultimately retains its sense of the general, therefore the sense of
particular, local embodiment is disregarded.
In contrast, Foucault's work provides a stronger statement of construction
and variability, which sociologists have found valuable in their attempt to
'bring the body in'. This work has focused on regulation and governance,
particularly in relation to public health and prevention. Critical to this
work, is the implicit shift from surveillance to self-surveillance and the
implications of this for considering gendered subjectivity and
embodiment. However, this shift is equivocal in Foucault's own work.
Therefore sociological affirmation of Foucault has tended to reproduce
both this tension and the distinction between condition and construction
implict in general theory. Furthermore, Foucault's attempts to address
power relations do not deal directly with issues of power and gender, or
how this relationship might be experienced and negotiated. Hence, whilst
the sociology of the body pays lip service to feminist insight it has failed
to read feminism as a strong statement of gendered embodiment. It is to
this statement which Chapter Two now turns.
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CHAPTER TWO
FEMINIST DISCOURSE - FEMALE EMBODIMENT
Historical Transformations of the Body
Feminist Theory and Sociology
As Turner and others (Shilling, 1993; Frank, 1990) see it, feminism has
foregrounded the relationship between the body and society in a number
of ways. First, feminists have argued that femininity has been aligned
with 'nature' and they have therefore posed a distinction between sex and
gender (de Beauvoir, 1972; Oakley, 1976). Second, alongside what Turner
calls 'the feminization of life' (1992, p46), the female body has been
politicised through the expansion of technological possibilities which
recast the potential of bodies by providing support for alteration and
intervention. In particular, the revolution in technically assisted
reproduction foregrounds the malleability of bodies and their position
within formal and informal systems of regulation. This revolution has
been read as a form of 'biopolitics' (Foucault, 1979; 1990), but this also
draws on earlier feminist work on the regulation of female reproduction
(for instance, Firestone, 1972). Furthermore, debates and struggles around
access to abortion (Gordon, 1976), the commodification of the female body
in pornography (Dworkin, 1981), prostitution (Edwards, 1993) and more
recently, surrogate motherhood (Singer, 1994) has made female embodied
experience more visible as a topic for sociological analysis.
This politicisation of the body has occurred alongside, and in connection
with, the way in which consumption patterns have developed in the latter
half of the twentieth century. For instance, Featherstone (1982) has
mapped out the ways in which the surface of the body increasingly plays
a prominent role in marking out social identities, through practices such
as dietary management and sport. Other work draws on Bourdieu (1984) to
demonstrate how these practices shape bodies in line with Western value
systems of thinness and fitness (Shilling, 1992), and in turn, contribute to
the production of social distinction. Linked to shifts towards consumption
as a key characteristic of late modernity, has been the way in which
ageing is obscured as a social and biological process. 'Sequestration' of the
ageing body from public life (Shilling, 1993), has engendered work on
ageing as a process which individuals are under pressure to conceal and
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manage (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991). This process is thrown into
relief by consideration of feminist debates around menopause (Lewis,
1993) and technological 'solutions' to ageing such as hormone
replacement therapy (Hunt, 1994) and cosmetic surgery (Davis, 1994).
Finally, the body has also been made more visible through postmodern
culture and the emergence of a context of sexual anxiety. The
development of HIV/AIDS has raised questions about the security of the
body and has provoked debate about body invasions and the need for body
regulation (Kroker and Kroker, 1988; Martin, 1990; Haraway, 1989).
Alongside the internal bodily regulation and control which, arguably, late
modernity and rationalisation has ushered in, is a range of uncertainties
around meaning and risk (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992). In conjunction with
new abilities to control and reshape bodies, from cosmetic and transplant
surgery (Davis, 1994; Helman, 1991; O'Neill, 1985), to artificial
insemination, the body is increasingly the focus for anxieties about safety
and security. Such anxieties are typically manifest in popular culture
where body boundaries are identified as problematic and unstable
through visual representations found in such films and television
programmes as Terminator, Alien, The Silence of the Lambs, The X Files.1
This focus on boundary security in general engages with fears about the
female body in particular, as lacking secure boundaries, and with feminist
arguments about the fluidity of female body boundaries (Kristeva, 1982).
This concern has also been explored in feminist fiction in ways which
suggest that the boundaries of the female body point to more open and
connected social relations (Atwood, 1986; Piercy, 1979). Of particular
concern for feminism are the boundaries between the body and self. The
publication of and response to the Boston Women's Collective classic, Our
Bodies Ourselves (Phillips and Rakussen, 1971), illustrates the point that
feminist scholarship has emphasised connections between practices on
the corporeal and their affect on the existential (Bordo, 1993; Lupton,
1994). Furthermore, the cyborg has been endowed with positive virtue in
academic texts (Haraway, 1990), as a potentially productive fusion between
1 Concerns around body boundaries in feminist film theory predate
concerns within the sociology of the body (for instance, see for instance
essays by Kuhn, 1985).
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bodies and robotics, in ways which will stimulate new 'hybrid' identities.
The journal Body and Society has recently provided fertile ground in
which to develop discussions of cyberbodies.
Hence in contrast to general theory, feminism has been both implictly
and explicitly concerned with female embodiment and has sought to
examine the ways in which the female body interacts with the social
world. As I argued in Chapter One, whilst sociologists pay notional tribute
to feminist theory in the development of body sociology, they
underestimate the extent to which feminism has addressed practices
which explicitly confront the status of the female body and embodiment
(Stacey, 1988; Lewin and Olesen, 1985; Oakley, 1980). For feminists, focus
on the body as a site of struggle, as the material basis of social and
individual rights, has been of particular importance and is largely
formulated through a critique of Cartesian dualism. Within feminism, we
find a strong statement of variability and gendered embodiment, through
work which addresses medical practices which respond to, represent, and
shape understandings of the body.
In what follows, I explore this statement through two kinds of feminist
argument in relation to health and medicine. First, feminist debate has
drawn attention to the historical transformation of the female body into a
body open to expert scrutiny. Scientific rationality and medico-legal
culture have contributed to this transformation and are identified as
discourses which have differentiated male and female bodies on the basis
of biology. Such differentiation has been linked to the maintenance of
public/private dualisms which place the female body in the sphere of
nature and sustain social divisions between men and women. A further
dualism generated in this regard, and subject to critique, is that between
embodied femininity and disembodied masculinity.
A second, though often implicit, issue in feminist scholarship, has been
the ambiguous status of the female body in relation to social membership
and participation. At the core of feminist discourse around women's
health and the female body has been a political need to address the basis of
gender. This has taken place through, on the one hand, a denial of
materiality in order to liberate the female body from what was perceived
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as the shackles of reproduction (de Beauvoir, 1972), and provide a route
into the public sphere and the marketplace. It has also, more recently,
taken place through a reclamation of the specifities of the female body
and its daily lived experiences, in order to ground difference as a resource
for social change and to enhance social participation (for instance,
illustrated in Rich, 1986). There is a well defined literature addressing
issues of female embodied experience and social control, in the context of
health and illness. Strategies for addressing social control include
education, the encouragement of 'women's knowledge' based on the
experience of female embodiment, and the empowerment of women to
challenge perceived bodily restrictions. These kinds of strategies mobilise
a liberal model of citizenship in which empowerment plays a critical role,
to which Section Two will return, through a discussion of its signficance
to the substantive issue of cervical screening.
Problematising the Female Body
A key issue for feminist scholarship in sociology has been to argue that
gender is a product of, and sits between, historically located dichotomies
(Sydie, 1989). Enlightenment thought, in particular, has been subject to
feminist critique as the intellectual and philosophical context in which
dichotomous ideas about men and women were formed and consolidated
(Jordanova, 1980). Whilst different political perspectives have
underpinned the development of feminist thought, at the core of much
debate has been this dichotomy, familiar by now to most readers of
feminist texts: nature/culture; mind/body; masculinity/femininity. Of
particular significance in historical processes of gender differentiation,
has been the relationship of the body to systems of thought, ideas and
practices.
A growing corpus of sociological, social and cultural historical, and
literary scholarship has drawn attention to historical processes and
systems of representation through which male and female bodies have
been subject to differentiation. For instance, pre-Enlightenment medical
illustrations and knowledge display a considerably less differentiated body
than contemporary scientific and medical images represent (Jordanova,
1989; Gallagher, 1987). Skeletal and anatomical representations of male
and female bodies were more marked by their representational similarity
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than through their differentiation (Schiebinger, 1987; Shildrick and
Price, 1994). It should be noted that this stands in contrast to feminist
debates within art history which point to the inabilities of male artists to
faithfully represent the female body prior to the Enlightenment (Pointon,
1986). Furthermore, this understanding of the similarities between bodies
should not be taken to support a view that pre-Enlightenment eras were
less patriarchal than post-Enlightenment eras, but that the character of
patriarchy varies historically, and epochs may be associated with
different perceptual frameworks.
The period between the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries,
however, was characterised by rapid and extensive social change in
relation to the nature of knowledge and the social position of women, as
well as broader shifts in the meaning of culture, nature and civil society.
Knowledge, based on empirical observation derived from the senses, was
increasingly perceived as essential for the improvement of the human
condition, and scientific and medical thought was crucial to the
development of this notion (Jordanova, 1980). Eighteenth century
scientific thought became preoccupied with anatomy which was contained
within a hierarchical model of thought (Jordanova, 1989). Anatomy
concerned itself with the functioning of body parts and how the body fits
together. Its focus on dissection shored up this concern and enabled
practitioners to explore the 'invisible' layers of the body, in ways which
underpinned the development of a new perceptual framework in medicine
(Armstrong, 1983). Stafford (1991), highlights more general processes at
work which helped to transform perception and ways of thinking about
the world.
Processes of historical transformation are key to understanding
contemporary feminist discussions of gender differentiation. Jordanova
(1989) argues that this period was one in which crucial dualisms were
engendered and later crystallised. Schiebinger's work on the skeleton
(1987), for instance, suggests that skeletal differentiation appeared at an
historical point when women's social positions were being redefined.
Socio-political shifts in the position of women were deployed as the basis
for designating bodies as differentiated (Shildrick and Price, 1994).
Ovaries, were, in particular, marked out as the anatomical carriers of this
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difference, and femininity was associated with animality and nature.
However, different body parts have been emphasised in different
historical periods. Whilst the uterus was an important symbol of
femininity in the nineteenth century, and central to public debates about
women's social position, breasts were important in the eighteenth century
as a symbol of maternal femininity and the social importance of
nurturing (Jordanova, 1980).
Further support for this association between the female body and
animality comes from Jordanova's (1989) work on scientific imagery. She
argues that science and sexuality have been historically linked in ways
which have produced a nature/culture dichotomy. In particular, the
female body has become a basis for oppression, through practices of
representation which increasingly differentiated male and female bodies.
A key tool through which representation occurred was the wax model used
for both teaching and drawing, which was made and presented in an
increasingly differentiated way, marked by recumbency, jewellery, long
hair and display on velvet or silk cushions. Cultural historians have
argued that this form of representation was analogous to, and
underpinned, the practices of scrutiny embedded in anatomy itself. The
metaphorical use of the female body supported the development of a
perceptual framework in which anatomical knowledge was created.
Natural philosophy began to address phenomena in the 'natural' world
from a privileged position from which it contrasted itself to religion. The
mind became an object of celebration, in contrast to the body, which, it is
argued, became associated with nature. This framework made the female
body an object of scientific scrutiny, which in turn, was a vital component
to the acquisition of knowledge in Enlightenment thought.
The thrust of these arguments is based on the notion that such imagery
carries assumptions about gender and it is these assumptions which define
the body in general and the female body in particular as an object of
scrutiny. Work in this vein suggests that gender was first mapped onto
'the' body, then differentiated bodies were used to support arguments
about social position and identity. This argument is made within cultural
and social history but has also been made increasingly within sociological
theory and feminist philosophy (see for instance, Delphy, 1993; Gatens,
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1992; Grosz, 1994). This theme is also familiar in other approaches, for
instance that of de Beauvoir (1972), in which the female body is
understood as a repository for ideas, which are historically located within
post-Enlightenment thought. However, the historical development of
dichotomous thinking and the production of nature/culture dualisms have
become reified in much of the feminist literature.
Divisions between nature and culture, were transformed in nineteenth
century debates about the position of women in public space. The female
body was explicitly seen by medicine and located within medical
discourses in the nineteenth century as unstable (Poovey, 1987), the
source of sexual pollution (Walkovitz, 1980) and inferior to the male body
(Gallagher, 1987). These constructions were played out, for instance, in
relation to issues of employment and prostitution. As women began to
identify possible routes of entry into professional and political space, the
female body was identified in professional discourse as a pathological body
in need of containtment and control (see for instance, Sachs and Wilson,
1978). The category of hysteria was a particular carrier for this
pathological understanding of the female body, in which the uterus was
seen through medical gazes as the seat of mysticism and symbol of
femininity. Professional debate upheld middle class notions of femininity
and was deployed to legitimise the exclusion of middle class women from
the public sphere (for instance, see Turner, 1984). The Contagious Disease
Acts of 1864 and 1866 identified the bodies of prostitutes as the carriers of
disease, therefore as pollution and threat.
Distinctions between nature/culture were underpinned by the
development of medical specialisms such as gynaecology, understood by
contemporaries as the 'science of woman1 (Moscucci, 1990, p5), through
processes of specialisation and technological development which
supported the idea of anatomical, physiological and psychological
differentiation. Indeed, Moscucci argues that gynaecology in the
nineteenth century must be seen as the legitimation of dichotomised,
prescribed roles for men and women: a modern medical discourse on the
nature of women, developed around organs specific to female bodies.
Furthermore, the development of gynaecology as a specialty within
medicine and its centralisation within hospital space reinforced
43
reproduction as central to female embodiment in ways which separate the
female body as conceptually distinct from the male body (Moscucci, 1990).
The historical development of obstetrics and gynaecology as specialisms
established at the cost of midwives' knowledge and practice, has also been
well documented (Donnison, 1977). The introduction of forceps (Wajcman,
1991) and the association of midwifery with witchcraft and superstition
have, in particular, been identified within feminist discourse as key
elements of the professionalisation of medicine and the deskilling of
women's traditional healing abilities (Gamarnikow, 1978).2 Deskilling
such as this entrenched the notion of embodied and problematic
femininity, in ways which have parallels with more recent examples of
medical practice. Whilst there has been diversity in feminist critical
approaches to modern medicine and issues of health, critique within
sociology has largely developed through the concept of medicalisation.
The idea of medicine as an institution of social control has had a powerful
influence on the nature of sociological enquiry around issues of health
and illness. In this approach, classically formulated by Zola (1972), disease
and sickness are seen as forms of deviance which must be regulated
through specified and sanctioned agencies. Medicalisation expresses the
processes through which medical culture encroaches on various aspects
of life and to a degree wins consent for doing so (de Swaan, 1990). Illich
(1976), elaborates on this idea and argues that in contexts of capitalist
processes of specialisation and differentiation, medicine deliberately seeks
to expand its boundaries and 'colonise' new areas of the body and mind.
The concept of medicalisation has proved valuable for feminist analyses of
the female body and power, in particular because of its critical emphasis
on medical knowledge and practice. Ehrenreich and English (1979) have
2 Debates about deskilling, of course, have to to be offset against
arguments about the contribution of medical developments to reducing
mortality and morbidity. For instance, whilst deskilling processes have
clearly been at work in relation to women healers and midwives, infant
mortality has been significantly reduced this century. However, it is also
important to note that reproductive mortality in general has increased in
the same period (see Beral, 1979, for instance, for a fuller critiqiue). This
undermines support for the contribution of specialist technology to the
production of health.
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argued that modern medicine has adopted the patriarchal mantle
previously worn by religious institutions. Further, within this model of
relations, in which sickness, real or constructed, is understood as
deviance, medical culture defines the female body as an object. The female
body is compartmentalised in ways which support the social construction
of disease categories around the specificities of female embodiment. In
medical culture, the female body has been targetted as a critical vehicle
for expansion, through rational science and technological innovation.
As the female body is defined in terms of threats posed to the moral and
social order, so there is a concomitant construction of 'women's
complaints' which reinforce the instability of female subjects. Therefore,
certain aspects of female embodiment have been medicalised, such as
pregnancy and menstruation, through, for instance, surgical
interventions (Dally, 1991). Feminist work in this area has further
developed insights from the sociology of health and illness and the
sociology of scientific knowledge to critique the ways in which ideologies
inform medical practice (Fox, 1989; Jacobus, Keller and Shuttleworth,
1990), as well as the social basis of the development of scientific thought
and knowledge (Rose, 1987). These claims point to variability in expert
understandings of the female body and the historically constructed nature
of representations of the female body. They draw our attention to the
ways in which femininity has been marked out in feminist discourse, and
reified, as explicitly embodied, in contrast to implicitly disembodied
masculinity. This assumption obscures the observation that the male body
too, is regulated in specified ways, according to the demands of waged
labour and capitalist time (see for instance, Morgan, 1993). The female
subject has been addressed by feminism as an embodied subject, yet, it has
been done so in ways which throw the ambiguous status of embodiment
into relief.
The Ambiguous Status of Female Embodiment
Health Activism and Embodied Experience
Attention to embodied experience has been of particular concern for
second wave feminist critique in general and for the women's health
movement in particular. This form of critique has developed in a number
of ways. First, feminism challenged the way in which health was defined
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in the language of biomedicine and argued that the female body is a target
for medical intervention, as a means of sustaining and reproducing
patriarchy. Hence activism focused on the embodied experience of health
care. Second, feminism addressed issues of access and inequality within
the organisation and delivery of health care. Third, feminism revealed
the ways in which social life obscured the specificities of female
embodiment. In much of this critique, female embodiment occupies an
ambiguous position.
Ehrenreich and English (1974), for instance, emphasise the paradox of
female embodiment, open to redefinition within medical culture as
socially prohibitive. They argue:
'Say that menstruation is painful and distressing, and women
will be arbitrarily barred from occupations that involve
concentration and responsibility. Say that it is unnoticeable
and that we are as consistently healthy as males are supposed
to be, and all women will be required to lift the same weights
and work the same long hours required of men regardless of
the degree of discomfort experienced. Say that the last
months of pregnancy are difficult, and we will be fired at the
first signs of swelling. Say that there is 'nothing unhealthy
about being pregnant', and we will be held to eight hours a
day, five days a week. There are real dangers — for all of us —
in either underestimating or exaggerating our needs as
women.' (1974, p88)
The female body, as a leaky, messy, bloody body, is expressed here as
paradox. It is identified as a potential barrier to social membership for
women in ways which have underpinned debates on the exclusion of
women from the public sphere (see Pateman, 1989). It is therefore noted
as a body in 'trouble',3 in ways which reveal both the implications for the
denial of a specific form of embodiment and for the redefinition of
embodiment in ways which might transform social and political life. This
ambiguous status is best illustrated through examples drawn from feminist
documentation of reproductive health.
3 I draw here upon a forthcoming paper by Hughes and Witz (1996) which
plays on the notion of 'trouble' in relation to the female body, in order to
stage a critical discussion of how both Simone de Beauvoir and Judith
Butler address the relationship between the body and gender.
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The history of the women's health movement in the West has often been
written as a triumphant history. It is seen as a movement in response to
medical power and control over aspects of female embodiment, through
which many women found ways of raising critical voices to the
organisation and delivery of health care in general and reproductive care
in particular (Lewin and Olesen, 1985). In the 1960s, issues of
reproductive control through access to abortion and contraception were
of particular concern in Western societies. For instance, women formed
clinics in order to enable women to gain access to abortion and
contraceptive services and knowledge.
The raising of critical voices in North America spawned body
consciousness raising and ways of producing alternative knowledges of
the female body (Ruzek, 1978). Self-help, in particular, was a means of
appropriating medical knowledge as a way of 'learning the language of
the professional' (Ehrenreich and English, 1979) in order to enhance
personal autonomy and create the potential for empowerment. The Boston
Women's Health Book Collective and the publication Our Bodies Ourselves
(Phillips and Rakussen, 1971), is a classic illustration of this approach, as
indeed, in Britain, was the proliferation of radical critique and sources of
information, such as Spare Rib. Both feminist health education and later,
promotion, became an important challenge to the medical model of health
care producing written materials and information for women through
myriad national and local groups such as the Women's Health Information
Network in England and the Cervical Smear Campaign in Scotland. These
groups and materials were perceived at the time as radical strategies for
challenging medical knowledge and developing alternative sources of
information and knowledge bases for women.
Feminist critique addressed the ways in which health was defined within
the medical model. Nurses played a large role in challenges to the medical
model as a way of responding to the female body and women's health,
developing critiques of the medical model around the notion of 'health
care for women, by women' (Lewin and Olesen, 1985). The identification
of healthy women as 'patients' was problematised and spawned practices
such as 'well woman clinics' to provide services such as breast and
cervical screening (Gardner, 1982). In Britain well women clinics and the
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concept of 'women's health' began to enter not only academic critiques of
medicine, but also clinical practice itself.
However, there is significant debate within feminism around the
particular identities which are associated with the 'well woman'. For
instance, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1994) argue that the identity of 'well
woman' introduces a route for increased victim blaming in which women
themselves become ever more responsible for the production of their own
health. Nevertheless, the development of a 'well woman' critique and the
pursuit of health promotion was perceived by some feminist activists as an
empowering and enabling way of challenging the medical model, and one
which would be sensitive to the diversity of experiences and choices with
which women were faced (Hastie, Porch and Browa,1995). Health
promotion could thus be read as producing a different kind of health,
through which 'empowerment' is the rubric under which internal
change is produced. Chapter Four will pick up the issue of empowerment
and its relationship to responsibility and personal choice in the context of
prevention.
Feminists in sociology have also developed the argument that a biomedical
approach to the body objectifies and idealises the female body as 'Other'.
The biomedical paradigm is seen to entail compartmentalization,
segmentation and fragmentation (Oakley, 1984; Stacey, 1988; Martin, 1989).
Pregnancy and childbirth in particular, have been subject to medical
scrutiny in ways which pull it further into a relationship in which
medical culture exerts a significant degree of control over the experience
of pregnancy and childbirth. The medicalisation of pregnancy and
childbirth was identified by feminist sociologists, who argued that medical
culture framed these experiences as a medical event (Graham and Oakley,
1981), and reinforced it as such through the deployment of technologies
such as ultrasound (Oakley, 1993). As Stacey (1988) has observed, the
objectification of the female body has implications for clinical practice
and for women's experience. In childbirth, for instance, ultrasound has
become a crucial tool of confirmation, one through which women may
legitimately 'know' they are actually pregnant. What the reliance on
technological and visual representations of pregnancy does for women is
to transform the terms of their embodiment by placing emphasis on the
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visualisation of the foetus as confirmation of pregnancy (Petchesky,
1987).
Similarly, ante-natal screening practices such as chorionic villi sampling,
or amniocentesis, are more recent examples of the way in which
technological interventions at an early stage in pregnancy potentially
transform pregnancy in to a medicalised experience. Pre-conceptive care
has become accepted practice within primary care, as women are given
advice on dietary intake and vitamin preparation prior to conception
(Lupton, 1994). Such care raises issues of body boundaries and feeds into
both debates about foetal protection, for example, in relation to smoking
during pregnancy (Tsing, 1990) and suggests that the boundaries between
the female body and medical culture are being redrawn, as medical culture
defines the embodied experiences of reproduction earlier and earlier (see
also for instance Rowland, 1992).
Technological innovations have been visited by feminists in sociology as
undercutting the validity of embodied experience and knowledge in ways
which redefine embodiment as a secondary form of knowledge.
Consequently, many challenges to medical knowledge and practice in
relation to pregnancy and childbirth, were staged in ways which
emphasised the specificity and authenticity of female embodiment.
Campaigns such as Active Childbirth, sought to reshape the choices and
possibilities in which women might experience pregnancy and
childbirth. The Natural Childbirth movement similarly challenged the
disempowering experience of medically organised pregnancy and insisted
on the rights of women to be listened to and included as active participants
in the birth process (Arney, 1982). It is worth noting, however, that this
kind of response mobilised notions of authenticity and promoted choice in
ways which potentially reinforce an essentialist framework in which to
locate female embodiment.
The emergence of body consciousness, the redefinition of health and
radical texts, placed particular emphasis on the notion of empowerment
and self-knowledge as the means to challenge medical culture and
transcend medical power over the female body. The following passage
from Sheryl Ruzek's history of self-help illustrates the priority placed on
49
empowerment in the genesis of the women's health movement and self-
help:
'The "invention" of self-help gynaecology more than any
other event transformed health and body issues into a
separate movement. Self-help gynaecology was born on
April 7, 1971, at the Everywoman's Bookstore in Los Angeles.
For some time, feminists had met there to discuss health and
abortion issues. After exhausting "book learning", Carol
Downer, a member of the group, urged empirical
observation. That evening, Downer inserted a speculum into
her vagina and invited the other women present to observe
her cervix." (Ruzek, 1978, p53)
Here, women are positioned as users of a health care system which fails to
deliver according to their needs, and which, furthermore, claims
knowledge ownership of the female body. Significantly, the statement
also illustrates a tension between the identification of female subjects as
'service users', such as that provided within a political economy approach,
and the female subject as a medicalised subject. The patriarchal nature of
medical culture and the delivery of health was the initial target for
feminist activism and academic feminism. The emphasis in this extract is
on reclaiming the authenticity of embodied experience, in order to
redefine health as the core concept around which care is organised and
delivered.
Whilst the zenith of the women's health movement in North America was
never quite matched in Britain, symbolised, for instance, by cervical self-
examination groups, nevertheless, the construction of knowledge about
the female body was seen as a key way of improving women's confidence
and validating their embodied experiences (Doyal, 1983, p22; Hastie, Porch
and Brown, 1995). Feminist redefinitions of health handled embodiment
as a source of empowerment and transcendence, rather than as a barrier to
social and political participation.
A second emphasis within feminism was towards issues of access to health,
inequalities and the organisation of health care (Doyal, 1983). These
issues crystallised around a gendered division of labour in the production
and maintenance and health. This phase of health activism made the
sexual division of labour within health care more visible and highlighted
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the ways in which women did paid and unpaid in the production and
reproduction of healthy bodies and minds (Stacey, 1988). Activism focused
on women as providers and users of health care, with the establishment of
ad hoc political groups which represented a spectrum of interests across
formal health care workers, such as the Radical Midwives, Radical Nurses,
Women in Medicine. Groups such as these, as well as female participation
in trade unions representing health care workers, struggled to defend
health care cuts and defend the NHS against privatisation in the early
Thatcher years (Salvage, 1985). Women in both North America and Britain
were identified as the major users of health care (Verbrugge, 1985; Doyal
and Pennell, 1979; Stacey, 1977); as the major producers of health care in
the public domain, both formally and informally (Gamarnikow, 1978); and
as the major providers of informal health care in the private sphere
(Finch and Groves, 1983).
Women, therefore, have been directly and adversely affected by the
political ideology associated with Thatcherism and New Right politics and
policies over the 1980s (Lister, 1990). This approach can be revisited as an
acknowledgement of the specific embodiment of care in both public and
private space. Within this kind of argument about feminised health care,
feminists associate female embodiment with the care of other bodies, both
through waged work and informal care. As a challenge to medicalised
models of health care, knowledge and practice, feminism has also located
the female subject as one charged with care of the self and her own body.
Therefore this position also reinforces embodiment as central to female
experience in relation to issues of care and self-care.
The third emphasis for feminism was the way in which social life obscures
the specificities of female embodiment and the processes which make
women sick (Doyal, 1983, p21). This emphasis identified a more general
division of labour which took into account the social position of women
and their location between and across worlds of paid and unpaid work.
Particular conditions, such as menstruation and menopause, bridge these
worlds and have come under sustained feminist scrutiny in ways which
have drawn attention to the ambiguities of female embodiment. Concepts
of pollution and taboo have been important in the construction of
menstrual blood as 'matter out of place' (Douglas, 1966) and some feminists
51
have further identified historical links between anxieties about
contamination and pollution from menstrual blood, for instance, within
biblical discourse and the segregation of menstruating women, and
contemporary contamination anxieties expressed in the sanitising
language of advertising (Laws, 1990). These kinds of anxieties find
expression in the ways that women are implicitly encouraged to adopt
concealment strategies in their management of menstruation (George and
Murcott, 1992). Concealment is also dominant within the advertising of
'feminine hygiene products' or 'sanitary products' (Treneman, 1988).
Laws (1990) locates both the concealment of menstruation and medical
knowledge about menstruating women more generally in masculine ideas
which position female embodiment as a deviation from a male norm.
Menstruation is understood within medical knowledge as a biological
deviation and it is this deviation which provides the basis for regulation
and intervention. Hormonal treatment and the surgical practice of
dilitation and curettage, for instance, are two mechanisms through which
menstruation is brought under medical scrutiny. Laws uses this insight to
illustrate how the creation of new medical categories in relation to
embodied experience should be seen as a strategy through which the
female body is constructed as a deviant body. This strategy finds its
clearest expression in the notion of pre-menstrual syndrome (PMS), a
conceptual umbrella under which a variety of embodied experiences are
addressed within gynaecology and general practice (Rodin, 1992). The
implication of this approach is that the authenticity of female embodiment
is subsumed beneath incongruous - masculinist - ideas about the female
body.
Rodin (1992) has argued that there are historical continuities between
current models of PMS and nineteenth century ideas about hysteria.
Within the latter, legal and medical discourse was used to highlight the
irrationality and lack of control embodied by the hysterical woman. As a
diagnostic category in the twentieth century which focuses on hormonal
imbalance, PMS embodies ideas about femininity and the female body and
reflects views about women's place in society as carers and servicers. Just
as marriage was a 'remedy' for hysteria in the nineteenth century,
emphasis on hormonal imbalance in the twentieth century, and therefore,
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implicitly, 'unpredictability', is sometimes drawn upon to legitimate claims
that women ought not to be given positions of responsibility in the public
sphere (Rodin, 1992). However, this line of argument has also been used
by feminists to draw attention to embodied difference. For instance,
'diminished responsibility' has increasingly been deployed within legal
discourse as a defence for women charged with crimes of violence (Atkins
and Hoggett, 1984). Feminist reliance on the category of PMS, in many
ways reinforces ideas about the female 'at the mercy of her hormones' and
therefore reproduces essentialism in addressing female embodiment.
In contrast to medical and feminist discourses which have supported
understandings of PMS in essentialist terms, feminist anthropologists
have suggested that PMS should be seen as a 'symbolic safety valve'
(Johnson, 1987) through which women give expression to the social
contradictions inherent in expectations around production and
reproduction. This view emphasises both the material ways in which
women experience bodily disruptions in ways which make it difficult to
carry on the dual and diverse burdens carried by women in the Western
world. Riessman (1992) argues that women participate in the construction
of medical categories, such as PMS, as a way of finding solutions to
embodied experiences which pose disruptions to their lives. Here the
'medicalisation' of PMS, through the construction of medical categories
and the shaping of interventions such as surgery and hormone therapy,
has also provided a mechanism through which women have been able to
find legitimation and authoritative support for such disruption. This
approach shifts analysis away from both arguments about social control,
and the way in which women are placed as victims within them, and away
from a strong version of constructionism, in which embodied experience
is held as the authentic counter to medical knowledge.
Embodiment, Empowerment and Authenticity
The initial focus of the second-wave of feminism was clearly on the
'politics of the body' as Bordo (1993) has observed, in the sense that what
women do to the surfaces of their bodies, and have done to spaces within
their bodies, has implications for the ways in which women come to
experience social membership. Feminist work thus sought to expose the
social processes through which the female body was placed in an uneasy
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relationship with society, and to attempt to liberate it through both denial
of its specificities and embrace of them. Yet in doing so, tensions and
dualisms have been reproduced, between the body as a universal category
and embodied experience, as a particular category. Arguments around
medicalisation, social control and construction, either deny the
significance of embodiment or embrace embodiment as a source of
authenticity and as a means of empowerment.
Medicalisation has been a key concept with which to address a female body
which is variously denied and embraced. Furthermore, this concept
depends upon a hierarchical model of power relations, or a strong version
of patriarchy. This is illustrated in the language of colonisation through
which medicalisation has been expressed. Yet it is a problematic model of
relations, since, however patriarchy is defined, there have been
significant shifts in the latter part of the twentieth century which point
to the inappropriateness of a strong version of patriarchy. Such a model
is unable to address the presence of conflict within medical culture in the
development of knowledge and practice. Furthermore, it is unable to
address the ways in which embodied subjects use the effects of
medicalisation as a strategy to legitimise those embodied experiences
which were previously not held as legitimate in the social sphere. In
short, medical culture needs to be acknowledged as a form of power which
produces effects with which women interact and use productively.
Debates on social participation and citizenship place emphasis on the
female body as an emancipated body^ in contrast to a body chained to
biology, as destiny. The critiques of medical knowledge and practice
which this position produced emphasised the ways in which medical
understandings of female embodiment, health and illness were socially
constructed. Hysteria was, for instance, redefined within feminist
discourse as a political device through which medical and legal discourse
sought to exclude women from professional participation.
Whilst the rejection of biology has been an important political tool of
early second-wave feminism (de Beauvoir, 1972), it also contains within it,
allusions to the 'truth' or authenticity of female embodiment as an
essentially troubled body (Hughes and Witz, 1996). However, debates
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around women's health have redefined such trouble as a source of female
empowerment by drawing attention to the ways in which the denial of
embodiment is embedded within medical culture. Empowerment has been
posed as a strategy of political resistance in this discussion, particularly
from within radical feminism (see for instance, Daly, 1978) in ways which
reinforced the significance of the specificities of female embodiment.
Menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding began to be seen
as unique embodied experiences which might also redefine the
importance of the relationship of body to self and vice versa (Ruzek, 1978).
The reclamation of the female body and its unique experiences grounded
the redefinition of the relationship of women to their bodies, and was
underpinned by the emergence of body consciousness courses and groups;
the resurgence of 'traditional' female healing techniques; and the
emergence of 'well woman' clinics.
These gender specific moments can also be located within a broader
project associated with modernity, in terms of 'knowing' one's own body
and one's own self (for instance, see Lasch, 1980), which underpinned a
cultural politics which invests power in the feminine through sexual
difference (Daly, 1978) and uses this to argue for the special status and
contribution of women to the social body (MacKinnon, 1987). Indeed, the
shift towards self knowledge and body knowledge as an aspect of
feminism, reflects a more general desire for foundationalism, or a more
solid basis for self (Freund, 1988). Yet, as Ruzek (1978) also points out, the
redefinition and celebration of the female body which this engendered,
reinforced the importance of reproduction as the core of femininity.
Feminists have argued that the female body has been shaped as an object
of scrutiny for science and medicine in ways which have allowed political
action to deny the significance of female embodiment. On the one hand,
the female body has been identified as a target for expert power, socially
controlled through medical practices, the formation of medical
knowledges and the ideologies which underpin medical culture. Here, the
specificities of female embodied experience are held problematically
within relations of power which make liberation a political necessity, as
we might see in Laws (1990) discussion of menstruation. Simultaneously
however, the female body has been identified as a body which is socially
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constructed through practices, knowledges and ideologies, but in ways
which serve the broader interests of capitalism or patriarchy. The case of
premenstrual syndrome illustrates this position. Such analysis views the
female body as subject to the jurisdiction of sovereign power, as displayed
within medical culture.
Feminist discourse has perceived the female body as a medicalised, and
therefore disempowered body, through the construction of expert
pathologies which deny the authenticity of embodied experience. Female
experience has been understood as embodied experience, for instance
through the regulation of reproduction and the symbolic meanings
attached to it (Lawler, 1991); through the management of menstruation
(Laws, 1990) or menopause (Lewis, 1993). Feminism, whilst not explicitly
foregrounding embodiment in early critiques of practices and knowledges
which claimed the body as its site of power, has nevertheless emphasised
the importance of embodied experience. Central to the development of
feminist critique has been the troubled relationship between mind and
body. However, whilst feminism has critically addressed dichotomous
thinking within general theory, in sociology and elsewhere, it has done so
in terms which produce ambiguities.
Debates about the status of the female body in relation to the construction
of difference have generated an over-emphasis on embodied experience
and analysis of the female body, as though each were separate entities.
The specificity of the female body is mobilised in opposition to the male
body and simultaneously, the universality of the female body is mobilised
in relation to other female bodies. Embodied experience is deployed as a
final arbiter of self, through its corporeality and materiality. Female
subjects are seen to appeal to embodied experience as a means of resisting
the categories and definitions which experts are seen to impose on women.
Embodied experience, as subjugated knowledge, is deployed within
feminist discourse as a political strategy with which to resist abstract
theorising around the female body. Yet it raises the issue of authenticity
and forces us to question what it is to which feminists and/or women
appeal when they speak of embodied experience.
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Embodiment, Feminism and Sociological Theory
Gendered Embodiment
'...embodiment [is] a cultural process by which the physical
body becomes a site of culturally ascribed and disputed
meanings, experiences, feelings.' (Stanley and Wise, 1993,
p 196)
Bordo (1993) observes that early feminist theory can be seen as embodied
theory, although it may have not proclaimed itself as such through its
concern for political drive and clarity. It is true that feminism has been
concerned with embodied experience and its implications for social
membership and feminist argument has to a large degree been discharged
through the female body. It has not been the case, however, until
relatively recently, that embodiment has been the core concept addressed
within feminist theory and research practice (Morgan and Scott, 1993),
but rather, the relationships between the female body, the demands of
femininity and the maternal role, and patriarchal oppression (Potts and
Price, 1995).
Feminists have also been concerned with the potential slide from
embodied experience and an attention to materiality, to physicality, to
corporeality, into essentialism and anatomical rigidity (Potts and Price,
1995). The central problem in this debate is the need for clarification
between a pre-social body, which hints at subjugated authenticity, onto
which cultural ideas and social meanings are inscribed, positioned against
a discursively produced body which reduces material to immateriality and
therefore denies any significance for embodiment. Feminist discussion of
female embodiment has most recently been channelled through post-
structuralism and in particular, 'new French feminism'. Much of this
work addresses the relationship between the female body, female
subjectivity and power with a view to developing arguments about female
embodiment which avoid essentialism, by identifying an 'imaginary body'
(Irigaray, 1986). In this work, the female body is not understood in
essentialist terms, but nevertheless, the diversity associated with female
embodiment is essentialised. In the work of (Irigaray, 1986) and Wittig
(1981) for instance, the 'body vanishes into the self and interior is
privileged over exterior' (Marshall, 1996, p254).
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Embodiment therefore occupies an unresolved status in feminist
discussion which addresses the relation of the body to. experience and
what female subjects appeal to in the articulation of experience. Emphasis
on embodied experience and the female body is characterised by
conceptual slippage. This is politically problematic, as we have seen, but
is analytically problematic because such slippage confuses different
things: the body as a social construct and a set of ideas; embodied
experience as subjective experience; embodiment as a concept with which
to capture the interaction between these two. The notion of embodied
experience is problematic because of the way in which it always mediated
through discourse, ideas, practices. Sociologists (Morgan and Scott, 1993;
Zola, 1991) have argued for the central placement of embodiment within
work on gendered embodied experience, and reciprocally, the necessity of
using work on gender to explore the sociology of the body. Female
embodiment, as anthropologist Martin (1990) has so clearly established, is
understood and articulated through a variety of different social and
cultural categories.
Martin's work on pregnancy and childbirth suggests that whilst the
management of female embodiment is a common thread of experience for
many women, the emphasis and priorities placed on such maa^ement
varies culturally and historically (for a recent development of this
argument see Marshall, 1996). Such a perspective points to the difficulties
of raising embodied experience as a critique in itself of medicalised
approaches to reproduction, since embodied experience is shaped and
understood culturally. Bodies have been differentially constructed across
historical time and space. Hence conceptual distinctions are required
between the female body as a universal category and the historical and
cultural contexts through which it is transformed into experience. Other
anthropologists (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987) make similar
distinctions between different levels of understanding about the body.
From within feminist ph ilosophy, Butler (1993) argues for materiality
which avoids essentialism, embodied subjectivity which is both object and
effect of discourse, and for theorising as an embodied act (Potts and Price,
1995).
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Martin's analysis provides a starting point from which to think about
embodiment, in contrast to the female body or, indeed, embodied
experience. The notion of 'thinking through the body' (Caddick, 1986), or
of perceiving embodiment as a means of interpretation returns us to the
project of general theory. In Chapter One I argued that this project has
recently been concerned with 'bringing the body in' and that Foucault
should be seen as a means of achieving this incorporation. Foucault has
also been drawn upon within feminism to explore power, the analysis of
resistance by those on whom such power is enacted, and indeed by those
associated with the mode and means of power.
A solution, therefore, to the tension between the reification of embodied
femininity on the one hand, and the ambiguous status of female
embodiment on the other, is to adopt a critical position in which the
significance and nature of embodiment is never fixed. Such a position
would capture the extent to which people do appeal to embodied
experience as a means of interpretation, and at the same time, reveal the
various ways in which body and self interact and interconnect. Of
particular importance for feminism, is the gendering of embodiment and
issues of power. The task for feminism is to demonstrate the ways in
which the body, embodiment and subjectivity interact and set 'truth' in
place, and to demonstrate the particular ways and contexts in which such
tensions operate. Therefore I now revisit the significance of Foucault for
developing the conceptual utility of embodiment.
Revisiting Foucault
'Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently able to
serve as a basis for self-recognition or for understanding
other men.' (sic) (Foucault, 1990, p 152 )
Foucault offers a caution here to those who appeal to the body as
authenticity and warns against thinking of the body as the basis of self.
For Foucault, the body is socially and historically produced through the
effects of power and it is this approach which has been especially
seductive for feminism. Feminist debate has begun to rethink
hierarchical concepts of power. Critiques of the oppositions of Marxism to
liberalism have embraced 'deconstructi ve' (Gatens, 1992), 'post-
structuralist' (Irigaray, 1985) and Foucauldian frameworks (Bordo, 1989),
59
for instance, by incorporating analysis of resistance to the theoretical
handling of substantive areas (Bordo, 1990; Holland, Ramazanoglu, Sharp
and Thomson, 1994). Here we find a more explicit statement of gendered
embodiment and the nature of the link between the body and gender.
Foucault's observation that analyses of power need to concern themselves
with materiality and the local production of knowledge, (Foucault, in
Gordon, 1980), has been critical to this concern.
Nevertheless, Foucault did not address the gendered nature of embodied
experience, therefore, feminist engagement with his work has produced a
variety of responses from within feminism (Bell, 1993). Many feminists
have rejected Foucault because of the failure to acknowledge the
specificity of female embodiment and of the apparent reduction of power
to discourse, in ways which undercut a sense of universal domination (see
Evans, 1993 for a critique; Harstock, 1990). Strategic rejection of Foucault
is premised on what many feminists have seen as the political necessity to
retain a sense of the common oppression of women (see Walby, 1992, for
example). This view has been well critiqued elsewhere (Flax, 1990).
If the first response from feminism has been rejection of Foucault, the
second has acknowledged the potentiality for the concept of 'disciplinary
power' as a way of demonstrating the specifically differentiated ways in
which female bodies are marked out and empowered to perform particular
kinds of task (Gatens, 1992). This position has developed through largely
theoretical and philosophical writings to address the complexity of
power's operations; the exercise rather than the possession of power and
the contingent rather than static nature of power. Grosz (1994) for
instance, offers the notion of 'corporeal feminism' as a means of
integrating 'lived experience' and its production and interaction with
cultural categories. She argues that the body can be understood as:
'the site of the intermingling of mind and culture; it can also
be seen as the symptom and mode of expression and
communication of a hidden interior or depth.' (1994, pi 16)
As can be seen from my discussion in Chapter One, this position, although
stemming from feminist philosophy, has parallels to the kind of position
set out by sociologists such as Shilling (1993), who poses embodiment as a
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dialectic. However, the position of Grosz and other feminist philosophers,
draws more heavily on Nietzsche and Foucault. In particular, the notion
of 'disciplinary power' is important in this work and has been used within
feminism in two key substantive areas, in an attempt to build in an
analysis of resistance. First, Bordo (1989; 1990) has argued that eating and
menstrual disorders amongst women in the late nineteenth century and
the twentieth century, from hysteria to bulaemia, are embodied responses
to social closure and the ways in which society forces women to nurture
others at the expense of therrtiblves. The female body is seen as disciplined,
as a means of regulating femininity, and analysis places emphasis on
'practices of femininity' (Bartky, 1988), through what women do, in the
construction of female subjects.
Second, in a series of papers addressing young women's sexuality and
negotiation of sexual encounters in the context of AIDS and sex education
discourse, Holland and her colleagues (for instance, 1990; 1992; 1994) have
developed a post-Foucauldian model for the exploration of power, pleasure,
risk and trust. This model attempts to incorporate not only the relations,
powers and forces which shape particular experiences and the
articulation of experience (Smith, 1989), but also explores the ways in
which young women interpret their interaction with those relations.
Such an approach more than hints at conceptual distinctions and
interactions between the body, embodied experience and embodiment. For
instance, feminists have demonstrated the problems associated with dualist
assumptions, and how they obscure the extent to which women may live a
disembodied femininity, yet lack a consciousness of it (Holland,
Ramazanoglu, Sharpe and Thomson, 1992).
Post-Foucauldian feminist critique utilises the relational character of
power/resistance and the way in which power is conceptualised as 'the
multiplicity of points of resistance within strategic power networks'
(Foucault, 1990, p95). Furthermore, whilst the body in early Foucault has
been perceived and developed as a docile body (see Bordo, 1990), in later
Foucault, the female body is developed as the effects of power, discursively
produced through practices of self (Deveux, 1994). This development has
emerged from an unresolved tension between surveillance and self-
surveillance, or regulatory and disciplinary power, and the different
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forms of power which they imply. Foucault's later work, for instance, in
The Care of Self (1986) begins to acknowledge this conceptual problem
and reintroduces agency and reflexivity. McNay (1992) has argued that
Foucault reworks Enlightenment categories through the development of a
theory of practices of self. Whilst Foucault rejected the possibility of
universal claims to truth, his work has been drawn upon to examine how
individuals actively define identities through bodily practices which are
themselves defined by the social context in which they occur. McNay
argues that rather than being positioned in opposition to the
Enlightenment, later Foucault is more closely linked to the Enlightenment,
since practices of self imply a degree of reflexivity and individual critical
thought missing from his earlier work. Feminists have drawn upon this
insight in order to illustrate how emphasis on the body and the relations
of power allow us to consider how discourses and practices create subjects;
how they construct certain kinds of body with particular powers and
capacities, how bodies are relate to their subjects (McNay, 1992; Sawicki,
1991; Gatens, 1992).
This opens up potential for analysis of both process and experience and
hints at interaction between embodied experience and the female body, by
focusing on the dispersed nature of power and the ways in which 'tactics'
may operate towards different objectives. The emphasis here is on
'biopower', which is understood as an historically new form of regulation
over life (Hewitt, 1983). However, feminist debates have not, by and large,
explicitly addressed a sociological community in their discussion of
gender, power and the body. My approach has been to relate these debates
to sociological concerns and therefore, \W*s\n&c"-I revisit the
concerns to which I drew attention in Chapter One through the
discussions of both Foucault and feminism developed in this chapter.
Sociology, the Body and Surveillance - an Emerging Feminist Critique
Sociological theory has begun to address the problem of 'bringing the
body in' but has done so in ways which separate analysis of the body from
analysis of embodiment. My discussion of general theory in Chapter One,
highlighted how sociological theory has attempted to incorporate the body
but has failed to allow this incorporation to reshape the discipline or the
categories of general theory. At the same time, sociologists have borrowed
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from Foucault and feminism in order to address the body and power,
particularly in relation to issues of regulation and surveillance. This
work has developed common analytic features: practices produce
knowledges; discourses produce objects of examination; individuals are
placed as knowing subjects. However, I have argued that there are
problems associated with this work, linked to the failure of Foucault, and
the reproduction of this failure in sociological work, to resolve tensions
between his use of surveillance and self-surveillance. The conceptual
problems I have identified in this work are associated with the over-
reliance on regulatory power and the under-development of the concept
of disciplinary power.
First, this work has a tendency to make claims about the relation between
surveillance as a new form of social regulation and the creation of new
identities, on the basis of observations made about practices of
surveillance. Such work focuses on regulatory forms of power at the
expense of disciplinary forms of power, despite claims to the contrary.
Claims about the connections between the discursive creation of norms,
the deployment of power/knowledge and individuals' incorporation of
them into their own thoughts and activities are made on the basis of
observations about the application of medical knowledge and practice, not
the experience of such application. Hence the power addressed in Chapter
One, is observed from the perspective of how it is installed, rather than
from the standpoint of those who are subject to power (for a more general
criticism of Foucault in this respect, see McNay, 1992, pi34). Consequently,
there is a pressing need, which Nettleton's work begins to address, to
locate the embodied subject at the centre of enquiry.
Second, Foucauldian work claims to be able to identify resistance to
power/knowledge in medical culture. Indeed, the utility of disciplinary
power as a concept, is in identifying the minute areas in which power is
located, or its 'points of application', whatever subjects individuals to
dependence, control and ties the individual to her own identity through
the development of self-knowledge. It is at these points analysis will
discover 'multiple resistances'. However, the 'multiple resistances', which
the authors I have cited claim power produces, are often obscured, and
what is analytically available is an endless conformity to norms. This both
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over-emphasises professional power and obscures the significance of
embodiment. In contrast, in order to identify not only the new
subjectivities which such work claims to reveal, but also the diversity and
complexity of such subjectivities, a methodological shift in focus toward
embodied subjectivity, or embodiment, is required. As sociologists of the
body have moved towards Foucault and a constructed body it has been
forced to confront feminism as a statement of variable embodiment.
Feminism has focused, both implicitly and explicitly, on the female body
and embodied experience. The female body has been a focal point for
feminist politics and theory as either dystopian, as the source of pain and
conflict, or as the source of imagined Utopia, through reclamation and
reinscription.4 The publication of Our Bodies Ourselves makes an essential
connection between the corporeal and the existential, through the claim
that whatever is done to bodies has a political dimension. Much of this
work mobilises embodied experience, but I have been arguing that more
recently, feminist discussion has begun to utilise the notion of
embodiment. Embodied experience, in a sense, is always mediated through
speech, text, and other observations which claim an 'objective' standpoint,
such as heart monitors or cervical smears. Our understanding and
knowledge of the body rests on the gauges we deploy to measure and
penetrate its depths. Our individual embodied experience can only be
represented in measures other than the experiences themselves, hence
there will always be a disjunction between experience and representation
of it.
This is not to argue that the body stands, alone, as a final arbiter of truth
in the face of postmodernity. The task for sociology, is rather, to
demonstrate the ways in which the truths of the body come into being,
and the relations of power in which they are held. As Dorothy Smith
(1989) says:
'Designing a sociology for a knower situated in the
everday/everynight world of her actual lived experience
means proceeding differently from the standard practice of
sociology. It means, among other things, turning the
4 There is an extensive range of feminist fiction, particularly science
fiction, which utilises female embodiment both as dystopian (for instance,
Piercy, 1979) and Utopian (for instance, Atwood, 1986).
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established enterprise on its head: Rather than explaining
how and why people act (or behave) as they do, we would
seek from particular experience situated within the matrix of
the everyday/everynight world to explore and display the
relations, powers and forces that organize and shape it.'
(P 3 4)
To this we might add embodiment as a concept which expresses the body as
both a condition and constitutent of action and interaction. Within this
perspective, then, the body ceases to preoccupy sociological theory, and
embodiment becomes a prism through which to examine the social world.
Embodiment becomes the conceptual framework through which empirical
observations are made, and sociological analysis derived. Such a
manoevre makes more possible an approach through which gender is
made an explicit focus for analysis, by examining the processes and
mechanisms through which female materiality manifests itself. The link
between the body and gender, in this approach, is therefore, not reified
and embodiment potentially reshapes the sociological project. I now




In Section One I presented theoretical debates around the body and
surveillance; gender and embodiment and located these debates within an
analytical shift from general theory to particular experiences, and from
universal knowledge to local knowledges. In Section Two, I develop this
shift in relation to the substantive issue of cervical screening. Cervical
screening is upheld by a rhetorical power which obscures uncertainties
and inadequacies in practice and experience. On the one hand screening
is located within a framework of individual choice, which stems from both
consumerist rhetoric and feminist emphasis on empowerment. On the
other hand, in an attempt to secure higher levels of participation, the
nature of choice has shifted through the introduction of targets and
quotas within general practice, through which the delivery of screening
is now regulated.
Consequently, there is a tension between the liberal language of
information and choice and an authoritarian framework, in which
population monitoring is emphasised, but which relies on the market in
order to regulate professional practice. Indeed, the basis of this
relationship is now initiated by practitioners who invite individuals to
participate in prevention programmes, and in turn, are themselves
subject to scrutiny by the state. Furthermore, cervical screening is also
located within the context of shifts in the client/professional relationship,
in which individuals are increasingly encouraged to question and
challenge medical knowledge, yet, at the same time, expected to comply
with invitations to participate in screening. Hence both the status of
knowledge and the nature of the relationship between clients and
professionals is under redefinition.
It is within this context that social science research has addressed cervical
screening as a taken for granted instance of prevention. This work has
been characterised by tacit acceptance that such intervention is
necessary for the detection of disease, as part of the project of public
health and its concerns with establishing universal betterment. For
policy makers and health promoters, early detection of pre-cancerous
cells continues to be an important strategy in the prevention of cervical
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cancer. Consequently, research agendas have focused on the
identification of reasons and causes for non-participation in preventive
regimes, such as screening, and indeed, have contributed to the
normalisation of such participation.
In this Section, I develop these arguments along two interlocking axes.
First, Chapter Three traces a discursive transformation within medical
culture, from diagnostic testing and disease detection to community
prevention. Prevention is the critical discourse through which cervical
screening is understood, yet it has been constituted as such across
different contexts. In this chapter, I identify observations which have
contributed to the production of knowledge around the cervix, and of
screening. I draw on textual data derived from medical journals and
published documents which address issues of cervical smear
interpretation and classification, and the identification of screening
subjects. In particular, I focus on the agents of observation: professional
debates around the meaning of cervical smears and the language which is
used to describe and represent this meaning. I use this material in two
main ways: first to illustrate the creative processes through which the
project of cervical screening has been engendered, and second, to develop
an argument about surveillance and its emergent relationship to risk.
The second axis along which Section Two develops is in relation to current
social science approaches to cervical screening, and the critical concerns
therein. Chapter Four outlines these approaches, which have largely
engaged in a project of knowledge acquisition for the purpose of policy
formation and implementation. With few exceptions, this work has
focused on women's attitudes to and knowledge of cervical screening.
Furthermore, in presenting cervical screening as a form of prevention,
this work has seldom addressed the experience of abnormal or positive
smears, and the interpretation of such an event by those women who
experience it, except to point up women's knowledge deficiencies, or to
identify areas for improvement in relation to issues of access.
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CHAPTER THREE
FROM DIAGNOSIS TO PREVENTION
Diagnostic Testing and Prevention
Introduction
Before I introduce empirical data on the experience of cervical screening
in Section Three, I wish to highlight the relationship between
surveillance, prevention and diagnostic testing. In this chapter, I present
textual material drawn from public debates in medical journals which I
use to draw a conceptual distinction between diagnostic testing and
prevention, although both emerge from similar imperatives and
demonstrate the shift in medical culture from acute to chronic conditions
in the twentieth century. The material I present here suggests that we
should see the emergence of prevention as an expression of surveillance.
However, this should be viewed as a contingent process, rather than a
dominant value driving the pursuit of diagnostic test refinement. One
implication of this is that risk, therefore, should be seen as a product of
surveillance, rather than as the basis of its expansion.
As outlined in Section One, sociological interest in surveillance has
developed through studies of public health and prevention. In this work,
health is understood as an imperative of modernity (Lupton, 1995)
underpinning the emergence of surveillance as a new form of social
regulation. In turn, surveillance, as a new governing medical framework
(Armstrong, 1995) has emerged in the context of struggles around the
status of expert knowledge and professional development (Arney, 1982).
For example, the need to define public health as distinct from general
practice created a space in which social medicine emerged, premised on
diagnostic testing, which involved the examination of healthy populations
(Armstrong, 1993).
With regard to this latter development, the boundaries between normal
and abnormal have become increasingly precarious in ways which have
opened up potential for disease detection (de Swaan, 1990) or 'detecting the
undetectable' (Stone, 1986). This opening up of disease potential has been
shaped into prevention. Screening programmes in the twentieth century
illustrate the relationship between the perception of disease potential and
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prevention. Screening for tuberculosis, child immunisation, blood
pressure and cervical cancer, demonstrate the extent to which systematic
and periodic 'check-ups' have become a routine experience in which
many individuals come into medical view, defined as 'potentially at risk'
(Armstrong, 1995).
The prevention of disease is therefore a strong theme in the collective
management of health in the twentieth century. The development of a
welfare model of citizenship in Britain was entrenched in the emergence
of a National Health Service, through which the state would provide and
guarantee social rights in relation to health. This development also
entailed a transformation of public health, associated with social medicine
iV\ the inter-war years (Lewis, 1986), from concerns directed towards
the social environment to concerns associated with individual behaviour
(Armstrong, 1993). Utilitarian objectives directed towards improving
health status for all, were carried out through measurement, the
establishment of order and the containment of disease in populations
(Lupton, 1995).
Nevertheless, as scholarship in this area has demonstrated (for instance,
Lewis, 1986; Wear, 1992; Fee and Porter, 1992), the development of, and
responses to public health, contain a number of tensions. First, in the late
nineteenth century, public health was seen by some liberals as
authoritarian and hence perceived as infringing upon individual rights.
Those who identified with an anti-state intervention position advocated,
alternatively, a more laissez-faire approach to public health which placed
emphasis on individual responsibility. In contrast, those who, later in the
twentieth century, criticised public health's authoritarian and
interventionist position from a radical perspective, drew attention to both
the tendency towards 'victim-blaming' (Crawford, 1979) and the failure of
intervention to address structural problems in relation to health and
illness. Political economists such as McKinlay (1984) for instance,
advocated a stronger role for state intervention in order to address
structural factors which underpinned poor health.
However, as Lupton (1995) argues, whilst we can identify traditional
oppositions between the state and civil society, between gestures of
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coercion and consent in the relationship between the two, the state,
through public health, should not necessarily be understood as an
instrument of oppression or disempowerment, from either the right or the
left. This view presupposes power as hierarchical and sovereign, and
reduces the relation of state and civil society to one of opposition. In
contrast, Foucauldian frameworks have been arguing for a more
productive model of power which allows us to examine the social sites in
which practices and knowledges both constitute and regulate phenomena,
such as prevention.
Whilst prevention policy largely developed in the 1960s, which I will
discuss in more depth in Chapter Four, it was preceded by and premised
upon diagnostic testing, carried out both in Local Authority clinics and in
acute specialisms such as obstetrics and gynaecology. Preventive
impulses drew on practices and values which were themselves premised
on nineteenth century models of public health. The bacteriological
revolution of Pasteur in the 1880s, which enshrined the principle of
specificity (Fee and Porter, 1992), the growth of hospitals and the relative
integration of pathology, physiology and chemistry, shored up the
identification of disease in particular, specified populations (Wear, 1992).
Mass screening stems from the importance to public health of early
diagnosis in the early years of the twentieth century and the perceived
threat of cancer in Western Europe and North America. Similarly, mass
radiography for tuberculosis in the 1930s and mass serology for venereal
disease in the 1950s can be viewed as precedents for the systematic
screening which prevention has largely entailed.
Cancer detection emerged as a key target in the early part of the twentieth
century, identified as the 'dread disease' (Patterson, 1987), riven with
metaphor (Sontag, 1978) and the focus of extensive campaigns (Pinell,
1992). The publication of the Dawson Report (1920), for instance,
enshrined the principle of diagnostic testing and disease detection in
community populations (Armstrong, 1983). The Cancer Act (1929)
advocated health centres for the detection of disease under the auspices of
independent general practitioners and was geared towards the pro-active
identification of cancer for the purpose of treatment and cure. The idea of
diagnostic testing supported clinical observation and the principle of the
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examination through a variety of procedures, such as the vaginal smear.
Indeed, the female body was most often the body under scrutiny within
this principal. Cancer in general was a significant preoccupation of the
interwar period but cancer of the uterus and cervix became a particular
preoccupation for gynaecologists, pathologists and general practitioners
from the 1930s. For instance, cancer of the uterus was a specified target
for intervention within the Cancer Act and by the late 1930s the cervix
was targetted for systematic examination as a means of supporting the
early diagnosis of disease.' Hence whilst the story told of diagnostic
testing is in many respects familiar, it is important to note that it is a
gendered story, since many of the tests developed in the interwar period
were those made possible through physical and social accessibility to the
female body.
The Female Body and Specialist Scrutiny of the Cervix
Much of the literature on the social organisation of medicine in the
twentieth century implies a gender neutral body on which observations
were made and tests developed. However, the female body in particular, as
Chapter Two suggests, has historically been made accessible for medical
scrutiny, for instance, both through Local Authority clinics and acute
specialisms such as obstetrics and gynaecology. The establishment of
women's hospitals in the nineteenth century supported physical access to
the female body in general and to the cervix in particular, from at least
the 1850s. The development of instruments such as the speculum in the
mid-nineteenth century (Moscucci, 1990) enabled the direct observation
of the cervix and surgical interventions were largely practiced on women
in poorhouses, charity hospitals (Corea, 1985) and in psychiatric hospitals.
Indeed by the end of the nineteenth century, the identification and
removal of reproductive organs, defined as diseased, was discussed in
medical journals as though it were entrenched practice within obstetrics
and gynaecology. For instance, leucorroea, vaginal bleeding and general
discomfort were all perceived within gynaecology as correctable
pathologies,^ and the removal of reproductive organs was practised on an
' R. Paterson wrote a 'special article' in 1942 drawing attention to the way
in which the Cancer Act had emphasised the clinical observation of the
cervix as a case for special consideration. Lancet 12 September, 1942:319
2 A reading of Lancet from the nineteenth century provides discussion of
surgical techniques such as cervical amputation and the removal of
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experimental basis as an aspect of gynaecology's bid for specialist status
(Moscucci, 1990).
By the end of the nineteenth century, gynaecologists had begun to
clinically observe the cervix and by 1884, it was technically possible to
examine the cervix microscopically.3 In the 1880s, the British Medical
Association acknowledged the importance of microscopy in the
observation and diagnosis of disease, and its potential for cancer detection,
in order to provide treatment, was endorsed by the Medical Society of
London, an organisation which also lent its support to the specialisation of
both pathology and gynaecology. These two specialisms were already
linked in particular places, such as Birmingham, London, Manchester and
Edinburgh, through professional networks organised around Local
Authority and University laboratories.4 The Edinburgh Obstetrical
Society, in 1905, further highlighted the value of early diagnosis of
cervical malignancy through curettage and microscopy.3 By the end of
the nineteenth century the 'frequency' of cervical disease was of
particular concern for gynaecologists,6 and by the 1920s, the microscope
was increasingly favoured in gynaecological practice for observation of
the cervix and case-finding. In contrast, during this period in North
America, gynaecologists were explicitly urged to develop knowledge about
the cervix and to develop a preventive agenda. A paper in the American
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, suggested:
'We have entered the stage of prevention and it marks a new
era in the progress of scientific medicine...[it is] important
for every practitioner to acquaint himself with what a
normal cervix is, so that he may appreciate the deviations
from the normal and cure the cancer before it starts.
'diseased' reproductive organs (see for instance, Lancet 18 August 1826,
12(207):609)
3 Reported in Lancet 31 March, 1928:652
4 Tait (1974) draws attention to the relationship between Municipal
Hospitals in Scotland and Local Authority laboratories. Close professional
networks also allowed collaboration between gynaecologists and
pathologists in parts of England.
3 Reported in Lancet 27 May, 1905:1427
6 This was noted by Professor Redfern in his address to the British Medical
Association in 1884 and reported in Lancet 2 August, 1884: 201.
7 Huggins, R. R. 1922 'Precancerous conditions of the cervix uteri'
American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (4):552
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Treatment for cervical disease, was however, limited. The Lancet reported
on surgical practice in relation to cancer of the cervix and illustrates the
range of surgical techniques employed to combat cervical disease from at
least the 1860s. These included vaginal hysterectomy;^ hysterectomy
followed by the injection of 'anti-cancerous serum',9 and radium
treatment from around 1910. An early procedure introduced in Vienna, in
the 1860s, and discussed by London gynaecologists was also described in
Lancet as an operation for detaching the cervix from the uterus using a
'galvano-caustic' wire.1® This procedure involved 'seizing the cervix' and
pulling it with 'forceps and a sharp hook'. Thus in a number of ways, by
the 1920s, the removal of the cervix on the basis of microscopically
observed changes, was a standard surgical procedure in women's hospitals
for the treatment of cervical disease. The self-retaining speculum,
introduced in 1935,11 made the cervix more accessible to gynaecologists.
This accessibility was important for two main reasons. First, cancer was a
focus for general professional discussion and cancer of the cervix was a
particular focus for gynaecology. Second, in the 1930s, a number of texts
and research publications suggested that cancer could be identified not
only through clinical observation or histology, which examines a wedge
of tissue, but also through the cytological examination of cells. These two
concerns set the context for professional debate in gynaecology and
pathology, around the nature of knowledge and the organisation of
medical practice.
Cancer and Cytology
A key debate within gynaecology in the early years of the twentieth
century was in relation to the natural history of cancer. It was recognised
that early identification of cancerous tissue was important for effective
treatment, which invariably involved surgical intervention and radium
° A version of hysterectomy was commonly performed by the 1880s and
was institutionalised in 1905 in the Wertheims's procedure by Victor
Bonney. He was a prominent figure in the Royal College of Obstetricianas
and Gynaecologists, was appointed to the Chelsea Hospital for Women in
the late 1890s (Moscucci, 1990). He collaborated with Commyns Berkely
over the development of Wertheims specifically for the treatment of
cervical cancer.
® This technique was reported as 'Doyen's Anti-Cancerous Serum for
Cervical Cancer' Lancet 25 March, 1905: 798
111 Lancet 2 August, 1884:201
1 1 Reported in Lancet 24 June, 1937:226
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treatment. Radium treatment, introduced around 1906, was controversial
in the early years of the twentieth century, therefore those who advocated
its place in the treatment of gynaecological cancer were keen to
demonstrate its efficacy. However, in relation to cancer of the cervix,
there was considerable diversity of professional opinion around the basis
on which any classification of cancer could be made. Correspondence in
Lancet in the early 1930s reveals the potential for confusion amongst
practitioners in the variety of terms used to identify cervical cancer.
These included squamous celled carcinoma, basal cell carcinoma,
squamous epithelioma, metaplasia^ The identification of cancer was a
focus of attention because of the implications for treatment and the
influence over results which the stage of intervention could produce. Of
critical and lasting significance for participants of this debate was the
way in which the rules for staging cancer could be interpreted
differently by different observers.Therefore professional discussion in
the 1930s and 1940s focussed on the rules for staging cancer and initially
attended to the perceived distinction between p remali gnancy and
malignancy, cell typology and the causes and cures of cancer.1 4
12 Correspondents included T. Stevens and A. Krompecher in Lancet 14
November, 1931: 965; 1104.
A 'special article' in Lancet draws attention to this problem in a report
from the 1929 Radiological Sub-Commission of the Cancer Commission of
the League of Nations which proposed revised rules for the allocation to
clinical stages of cancer of the cervix. Lancet 1 October, 1938: 793
14 Of particular note is the division in this debate between those who
advocated the dissemination of information to the public about cancer and
those who did not. In 1937 the International Congress of Medical Women
met in Edinburgh to discuss 'Cancer in Women' and identified the origins
of cancer in trauma; hormones; marriage; children and inheritance. Dr.
Elizabeth Hurdon of the Marie Curie Hospital in London co-ordinated the
discussion which highlighted the way in which knowledge about cancer
should be seen as incomplete. European medical women were seen to be
partly in favour of 'anti-cancer propaganda' and in parts of Europe, there
was support for highlighting the 'curability of cancer' on the
understanding the such action would encourage people to present
themselves earlier for treatment (Health Organisation of the League of
Nations, 1939, A Report on the Publications of Health and Medical Subjects ,
London: 1931 No. 66/1939 No. 89). In contrast, British medical women at
this meeting were unanimous in their thinking that only doctors and
nurses should hold information about cancer. It was believed by this
group that information about cancer should not be incorporated into
hygiene classes for young women nor should social workers be informed
about cancer. In particular, regular gynaecological examinations were
seen as undesirable because of their financial cost, the perceived dubiety
of results and the false sense of security which such examinations were
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The distinction between premalignancy and malignancy became a focus
for discussion in the late 1930s because of the growth of cytology, as a sub-
specialism within pathology. In contrast to histology, cytology had the
potential to examine many kinds of cells in themselves, such as liver and
lung cells, and provided a means of observing changes in the shape,
contour and movement of cells. In particular, cytology provided a means
of observing cervical cells and was introduced into gynaecological and
pathological practice through the work of Georges Papanicolaou.
Papanicolaou's research, involving a series of studies in the 1920s, in the
United States, focused on the oestral cycle of guinea pigs, as a means of
gathering data regarding human reproduction. He developed a technique
for gathering vaginal secretions with a curved tube and glass bulb, which
he then examined for cellular changes related to ovulation, oestrin levels
and the onset of menopause.^ The technique he developed to fix and
stain the vaginal and cervical cells became known as the Pap smear.
In North America, gynaecologists primarily foresaw the eugenic
implications of this work. In his inaugural address to the American
Gynaecological Society in 1920, for instance, the president suggested that
smear-taking would provide their specialty with the means with which to
predict women suitable for childbearing and childrearing (my italics).1 "
There is less evidence of eugenic concern and fertility prediction as the
key aspect of vaginal smear applicability in British medical debate. The
emphasis here was more clearly linked to the potential for disease
classification and drew directly on Papanicolaou's work on menopause.1 7
seen to provide. This latter issue was significant for doctors because of the
way in which the provision of information could delay patients' advice
seeking. It is worth noting that this has been a recurrent issue in
professional discussion of cervical screening. I will return to this issue
later in Chapter Three and again in Chapter Four.
1 ^ Stockard, C. R. and Papanicolaou, G. N. 1917 'Dioestrons cycle in the
Guinea Pig' American Journal of Anatomy 22:225. It is worth noting that
Papanicolaou and his colleagues created their own human guinea pigs by
conducting research on healthy hospital personnel (Papanicolaou, G. N.
1933 'The Sexual Cycle in the Human Female as Revealed by Vaginal
Smears' American Journal of Anatomy 52: 519) and as Clarke and Caspar
(1991a) note, even Papanicolaou's own wife provided vaginal smears on a
number of occasions.
1 ^ Dickinson, R. L. 1920 'A Program for American Gynaecology'
Presidential Address read at the 45th Annual Meeting to the American
Gynaecological Society, on 24-26 May, Chicago
17 Papanicolaou, G. N. and Shorr, E. 1936 'The Action of Ovarian Follicular
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Collecting vaginal smears allowed him to draw up a table of classificatory
changes in cervical cells which others used in their work on cervical
disease. Papanicolaou made two points about his work which became key
features of debate in British gynaecology and pathology. First, he asked
the women in his study to take their own smears daily and observed that
the vaginal smear was a simple procedure without 'inconvenience' or
'trauma' to the patient. Whilst this notion of simplicity has become an
orthodoxy in professional and lay discussion of cervical screening, it is
worth noting that women are not encouraged to take their own smears.
Second, Papanicolaou and Shorr noted that whilst there was considerable
potential for observer variability in smear interpretation, this could be
mitigated by training. They said:
'..considerable experience is necessary to evaluate the
morphologic changes in the vaginal secretion, which occur
in the normal menstrual cycle and in menstrual
disturbances, the alterations which we have described in this
study are uniform and should be easily recognised by those
trained in microscopic work.'1 8
Other researchers in the 1930s desribed how they collected vaginal smears
to study the 'impenetrability of cervical mucosa' and its applications for
sterility and artificial insemination,19 or for 'recognition of the oestrin
reponse in women', 2° but the most significant application of vaginal
smears and Papanicolaou's method of fixing and staining lay in the
cytological examination of cervical cells for the detection of cancer. This
method began to be used to identify cancerous cells and create a means of
creating cell typologies and staging cancer.21 For instance, Lancet
reported in 1941 on the different kinds of cells which could be found in
Hormone in the Menopause, as Indicated by Vaginal Smears' American
Journal of Obsterics and Gynaecology 31: 806
1 8 Papanicolaou and Shorr, 1936, ibid., p822
19Lamar, J. K., Skettles, L. B. and Delfs, E. 1940 American Journal of
Physiology 129: 234
211 Ucko, H. 1938 'Staining of Vaginal Smears' Clinical and Laboratory Notes
in Lancet 17 December, 1938: 1413
21 Recruits for these studies were invariably women attending ante and
post-natal clincs, gynaecological clinics, state psychiatric hospitals in
North America and women who were inpatients for a variety of
reproductive and gynaecological disorders. These early studies were non-
randomised and subject to a great deal of criticism within British
gynaecology because of the perceived difficulties of interpreting the
results of cytology.
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the cervix and vagina and drew attention to the ways in which cells could
migrate from one part of the cervix to another.22 The significance
attributed to the observation of cell migration was the way in which this
process could simulate localised cancer. This was interpreted by some as
evidence that premalignancy or precancer did not exist, but that the
discovery of cells from one part of the cervix in another could be
identified as localised metaplasia. The introduction and expansion of
cytology therefore sharpened debate in relation to cancer staging by
dividing opinion between those who argued for a relative distinction
between a precancer complex and carinoma- in-situ, in recognition of
what was increasingly understood as a disease process, and those who
argued for an absolute classification system which would acknowledge the
distinction between localised disease and more widespread cancer. The
key distinction here was between a disease in place, as localised malignant
growth, or cells in transition across both space and time, which alluded to
a disease process.
A second major and recurring concern within both pathology and
gynaecology was around the reliability of cervical specimens. As early as
1925, one pathologist warned his colleagues in the Lancet of the potential
for misinterpretation. He said:
'At the same time, it is well to bear in mind that this
resemblance to...carcinoma of tissue cultures...is merely
morphological and may be no more that the manifestation of
growth under abnormal conditions. It may, in fact, bear the
same relation to cancer as the noise and clatter of a passing
train has to the electricity that moves it.' 2 2
Later commentators, in the 1940s, who took vaginal smears and used them
to identify cancer cells, noted that differences of opinion about the
identification and staging of disease might reflect differences in the skills
of observers. For instance, an anonymous author in Lancet observed that:
22 Reported as an 'Annotation' in Lancet on 'The Significance of Cervical
Metaplasia' 12 April, 1941: 486
22 Dr. R.J. Ludford described nuclear changes in the fibroblasts of rats
which may be associated with abnormal conditions of growth and
nutrition, such as cancer. Lancet, 24 October, 1925:876.
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'vaginal smear studies are in vogue but are extremely
difficult to interpret; even the few experts with adequate
experience admit a comparatively high percentage of errors
in diagnosis.'2 4
These two issues were highlighted in 1941 with the publication of
Papanicolaou and Traut's classic text on vaginal smears in uterine
cancer.25 First, the authors highlighted the vaginal smear, which
denoted both the technique of collecting secretions and cells and the
method of fixing and staining the specimen, as a simple method of
diagnosing malignancy before lesions became detectable by biopsy (that
is, cervical cancer as process). The crucial distinction made by the
authors here was that the Pap smear allowed clinicians to identify cancer
at the level of the cell rather than at the level of tissue examination
through histology. Second, Papanicolaou and Traut acknowledged the
potential for interpretive discrepancies, but argued that a high degree of
microscopic skill would reduce this, thus ensuring a specialist function
for cytologists. Finally, they further drew attention to the role of error,
particularly that of 'false' negatives, by pointing out that one negative
smear should never be taken as a definitive indication of the absence of
malignancy, thus reinforcing the potential for flexible disease
classification.
Similarly, Gates and Warren (1948) pointed out in their Handbook for the
Diagnosis of Cancer of the Uterus by use of Vaginal Smears, that:
'good, bad and indifferent results may be obtained by
different people following the same directions: each worker
must set up his own criteria.'2 6
These authors noted first that subjective knowledge played its part in the
the identification of malignant cells. Second, they noted that malignant
cells could more easily be identified in cervical cells than in histology, but
24 'Annotations' in Lancet 13 November, 1948:486
25 Papanicolaou, G. N. and Traut, H. F. 1941 'The Diagnostic Value of
Vaginal Smears in Carcinoma of the Uterus' American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 42(2): 193
26 The Gates and Warren text reproduced here is cited by Kraushaar, O. F.,
Bradbury, J. T. and Brown, W. E. 1949 'The Vaginal Smear in Population
Screening for Uterine Cancer' American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 1949 (58):519
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that 'misleading' smears could be repeated, hence incorporating an
implied culture of surveillance, albeit in relation to hospital populations.
They argued that the malignancy potential of cells could be identified by
'relative rather than absolute changes in structure', therefore
establishing a more flexible notion of disease classification which
acknowledged intersubjective variability and uncertainty in cancer cell
identification.
Scholars have described elsewhere (Davidson, 1993), how the professional
expansion of medicine in the interwar period, through specialisation,
became the means through which resources could be claimed, boundaries
established, and new methods of practice consolidated (Freidson, 1970).
Classificatory systems were an integral aspect of professional criteria as a
basis for medical practice and diagnosis (Armstrong, 1983) and expressed
distinctions between clinical and laboratory medicine. Therefore
concerns about smear reliability and validity expressed conflict between
pathology and gynaecology around divisions of labour in the collection
and interpretation of cervical cells and judgement about therapy. Who
was best placed to collect and interpret cells, and ultimately act on the
information they provided? Furthermore, such debates reflected more
general concerns about the validity of medical knowledge and the
relationship between bedside medicine and laboratory science (Sturdy,
1992). Gynaecologists and pathologists perceived gaps in what their
techniques could provide, and focused largely on identifying typologies of
cells which formed the most common types of cancer, mostly using the
Papanicolaou classification. However, there was no consensual
classificatory system to establish clear boundaries between non-
malignant and malignant cells, therefore knowledge about cell typology
was, presumably, embodied in particular persons in local laboratories.27
On the one hand, there were those in gynaecology who emphasised the
importance of clinical observation and who therefore perceived
collaboration between gynaecology and pathology, or the scientific
27 MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995) describe a general process of knowledge
embodied in local persons in relation to the nuclear weapons industry.
More significantly, Shapin (1994) outlines the embodiment of knowledge
in particular persons in the context of science-making in laboratory
contexts.
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validation of clinical observation, as a threat to their clinical autonomy.
As Sturdy (1992) notes, many clinicians were sceptical of laboratory
science in general because of the perception that laboratory medicine
would undermine or be prejudicial to 'good', or bedside, practice. On the
other hand, there were gynaecologists who perceived that specialist
status, distinct from obstetrics, could be supported by exploiting the
institutional links and personal networks between gynaecologists and
pathologists which smear-taking could provide. In common with the
evolution of other medical specialisms, those who took the latter view saw
the laboratory as a resource for investment and the production of
knowledge (Sturdy, 1992) and furthermore, saw gynaecology as a surgical
field based on a scientific approach to the body. For instance, the second
edition of Diseases of Women in 1931,2 8 made clear that 'clinical
knowledge' could only develop on the basis of interaction between clinical
and interpretive observations, hence between hospital and laboratory
medicine.
Those who took the latter view, in hospitals such as the Chelsea Hospital
for Women or the Royal Cancer Hospital, enshrined smear taking as part
of their routine gynaecological practice. This was largely linked to the
way in which cervical cytology was used to evaluate surgical intervention
and radium treatment for gynaecological cancers. By the 1940s
Wertheim's hysterectomy and radiotherapy were the standard forms of
treatment for cervical and other forms of gynaecological disease, and
vaginal smear-taking provided a means of both case-finding and
treatment evaluation. Indeed, smear-taking and cervical cytology were
central to debates between the relative value of Wertheim's hysterectomy
and radiotherapy in the treatment of cervical cancer,and were
employed to confirm the success of these techniques.
However, key figures in the debate between surgery and radiotherapy,
who relied on smear-taking as a way of demonstrating success, also voiced
28 The first edition of Diseases of Women was published in 1902 and linked
gynaecology to pathology and therefore to scientific medicine.
29 The Conference on Gynaecological Cancer at the Royal Victoria
Infirmary in Newcastle, drew attention to a particular discussion of the
relative merits of surgery and radiotherapy. Reported in Lancet 16 April,
1949: 665.
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criticisms about the accuracy of disease staging afforded through
cytology, and the lack of consensus between clinicians around disease
classifications, on the grounds that this confused the issue of whether or
not surgery was required, and when. Hence, whilst smear-taking entered
routine gynaecological practice in centres which sought to establish the
relative merits of surgery and radiotherapy in the treatment of cervical
and uterine disease, and where cytology was possible because of
established links between gynaecology and pathology, there continued to
be considerable debate around both staging and interpretation in the
1940s and indeed the 1950s. Furthermore, cytology was rarely employed as
a sole means of disease identification and histology continued to play an
important role, through the biopsy. Consequently, the 'pathological gaze'
was given a means to develop, through the expansion of cytology, but
clinical judgement in gynaecology was also retained (Clarke and Caspar,
1991a), since cytological results could never be taken as definitive, and
therefore expressed areas of contested knowledge.
Knowledge, Interpretation and the Genesis of Screening
With the publication of work on 'The diagnostic value of vaginal smears in
carcinoma of the uterus' in 1941,30 Papanicolaou and Traut pushed
forward debate around cancer detection and smear-taking. The authors
highlighted the perception of high rates of mortality from uterine cancer
since the 1920s and noted the arguments for early diagnosis, in order to
enhance treatment, which gynaecologists had articulated during this
period. The paper graphically presented the characteristics of cancerous
cervical cells and Papanicolaou and Traut identified the mass applicability
of vaginal smears for cancer diagnosis. They certainly foresaw the
elimination of more traumatic diagnostic methods, such as tissue biopsy.
However, at this point in time, they also drew attention to the limits of
vaginal smears, both in relation to the difficulties of interpreting
cancerous cells 'out of context' and by recommending vaginal smears as a
preliminary sorting procedure, rather than as a means of ultimate
diagnosis.
Other studies of the applicability of vaginal smear taking followed,
drawing sample populations from University hospital inpatients, women
30 Papanicolaou and Traut, 1941 op. cit., p 193
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inmates of psychiatric insitutions and occasionally, 'volunteers'. These
studies intensifed controversy over whether this technique was more
valuable as a screening or sorting procedure or as a diagnostic tool. The
key issue here lay in the status of tissue biopsy and the extent to which
vaginal smears would replace the biopsy as a diagnostic tool. This issue
again reflected concerns about the validity of smears and those more
equivocal about its value as a diagnostic technique highlighted their
unreliability, pointing to the high rates of 'false' positives and negatives
produced in published studies.31 However, those who supported the value
of smear-taking tended to highlight its value as a preliminary sorting
procedure which was not oriented towards diagnosis, but rather
screening. For instance, Gates and Warren, again, in support of the
position of Papanicolaou and Traut, argued:
'Overemphasis on the statistical accuracy seems to put the
stress in the wrong place. If the method is to be used as a
preliminary or sorting procedure, the degree of accuracy is
unimportant within reasonable limits. The thing that
matters is whether the method will discover cancer and
initiate treatment earlier than would otherwise be done.'32
Hence the work of Papanicolaou and Traut established the principle of
smear-taking as a screening procedure which could operate in tandem
with other methods of cancer diagnosis. Smear-taking at this point was
not intended as a replacement for biopsy or clinical observation but
promoted on the assumption that its use in any context would require
other examinations and investigations. Furthermore, such a position
reinforced controversy over the processes and organisation of
interpretation. A potential solution to the difficulty of interpretation was
the:
'...intimate and critical knowledge of cytology required for a
correct interpretation.'3 3
31 Kraushaar, O. F., Bradbury, J. T. and Brown, W. E. 1949 highlight this
controversy in their paper 'The Vaginal Smear in Population Screening
for Uterine Cancer' American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology
(5 8):5 19
32 Quoted from Gates and Warren, 1948, cited by Kraushaar, O. F., Bradbury,
J. T. and Brown, W. E. 1949, ibid., p519
33 Papanicolaou, G. 1945 'A general survey of the vaginal smear and its use
in research and diagnosis' American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 51: 315
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In other words, interpretation would cease to be a problem if cytology was
enabled to develop professional and disciplinary expertise. Therefore,
throughout the 1950s, in both North America and Britain, debate on the
gynaecological application of vaginal smear-taking focused on
establishing the reliability and validity of smear-taking, not as a
diagnostic tool, but rather towards establishing its value as a screening
procedure. This centred on both the interpretation of cervical and
vaginal smears as well as the technique of smear-taking itself. For
instance, research in North America compared different methods of
smear-taking,34 an(j the work of J. Ernest Ayre, to a great exent resolved
differences of opinion around the technique of smear-taking and
illustrated the extent to which cytology itself had grown as a specialty
during the 1940s.35 However, in a review of Ayre's book, an anonymous
author in Lancet highlighted the sustained contention embedded within
the discussion and practice of smear-taking. In particular, the author
drew attention to the persistently debated distinction between a precancer
complex and other definitions of cancer, and the inability of cytology to
make this distinction. Nevertheless, Ayre's method of smear-taking
became a more acceptable procedure to many gynaecologists but remained
controversial to those outside the enclave engaged in routine smear-
taking.
The opposition of laboratory knowledge to clinical practice, and the issue
of how adequacy in smear interpretation was constituted, continued to
characterise debate in the 1950s. Gynaecological research in Britain
continued to focus on the classification and staging of cervical disease, but
increasingly in the 1950s, on the reliability of the cervical smear as a
diagnostic technique. Whilst debate in North America crystallised around
the applicability of smear-taking as a screening procedure, in Britain,
concern in the early 1950s tended to centre on issues of interpretation in
relation to diagnosis. In Britain, gynaecologists remained the main users
of smear-taking as a means of case-finding. Smear-taking was perceived
as a critical means through which women with cervical disease could be
^^Hyams, M. N., Hyams, R. G. and Wainess, E. 1950 'Direct Contact Vaginal
Cytology Smear Technique' American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology (59): 445
35 Ayre, J. 1953 Cancer Cytology of the Uterus reviewed in Lancet 31
January, p225
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identified for surgery, although there continued to be considerable debate
around what constituted 'successful' surgery, prompting the Royal College
of Obstericians and Gynaecologists to set up a clinical cancer research
committee, which in part, entailed scrutiny of smear-taking.3 6
Consequently, studies carried out in gynaecology centres, for instance in
Birmingham and Manchester, continued to triangulate the use of vaginal
and cervical smears with biopsies for the histological examination of
cervical tissue.
During the 1950s British gynaecological debate continued to focus on
issues of interpretation, acknowledging the problem of subjectivity and
the problem of relative as opposed to absolute cells changes. In addition,
debate focussed on disease staging and classification; on whether
precancerous cells or carcinoma-in-situ existed at all and whether this
could be identified through cytological examination. A number of studies
were carried out in hospitals in England with the purpose of clarifying
this distinction.-57 Much of this work was equivocal, despite extensive
applicability of smear-taking during the course of related research.
Results from this corpus of research was therefore subject to sustained
debate. Some advocated a cautious approach to the value of cytology for
either diagnosis or screening. Lancet took the view, early in 1960, that
cytology could reveal some cervical cancer but would also miss cases,
suggest its presence when it did not exist and therefore should not be used
as a routine screening procedure.3*5 This view was underpinned by the
publication of a case study,39 which recounted the story of three sisters
36 12th British Congress of Obsterics and Gynaecology reported in Lancet
23 June, 1949: 166
37 Papers published in Lancet provide evidence of these studies. Blaikley,
J. B., Lederman, M. and Lewis, T.L.T. 1952 'Results of Treatment of Cancer of
the Cervix' Lancet 15 November p950; British Journal of Cancer
'Annotation' 1949 (3):433; Heyman, J. (ed) 1949 V Volume of Annual
Reports on Results of Radiotherapy in Cancer of the Uterine Cervix ;
Blaikley, J. B. , Lederman, M. , Simmons, C.A. 1957 'Carcinoma of the Cervix
and the Chelsea Hospital for Women 1933-56' Lancet 28 December, pl329
38 'Setting a Whale to Catch a Sprat' Lancet 3 December, 1960: 1239
presented an assessment of published research which compared clinical
findings in 8522 gynaecological cases with microscopic examination of
10,000 smears and biopsies (cited from Boddington, M. 1960 in British
Journal of Cancer (14): 151)
39 Way, S., Hetherington J.,M Galloway, D.C. 'Simultaneous Cytological
Dia gnosis of Cervical Cancer in Three Sisters' Lancet 21 November, 1959:
890
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who were all found to have cervical cancer. The first sister presented
with backache, had a positive (or abnormal) smear and subsequently had a
radical hysterectomy (which involved the removal of her uterus, ovaries,
upper third of her vagina and inner half of parametrium).
Simultaneously, a second sister presented with persistent bleeding, had an
abnormal smear and subsequently a vaginal hysterectomy. The third
sister, solicited by the consultant reporting the case, had no symptoms, but
had a positive smear and a hysterectomy was duly performed. In all three
cases, invasive cancer was not confirmed, therefore highlighting the
interpretive difficulties involved for a general medical audience, and
highlighting clearly, an emerging ethical issue around surgical
intervention in the case of young women with suspected cervical disease.
However, other published research was unequivocal about the value of
screening despite less than certain results. For instance, a report from a
team at the Birmingham and Midland Hospital for Women discussed how
smear-taking had been part of routine gynaecological practice of
outpatients. Cytological reports were triangulated with histology,4® and
clinical examination to investigate the accuracy of cytology. The authors
argued that cytology failed to pick up all carcinoma-in-situ identified in
the study. Nevertheless, they suggested that while :
'cytology may be of value to the clinician in the diagnosis of
invasive cancer of the uterus, our experience suggests that
only rarely will the technique discover an unsuspected
lesion. The most important use of cytology lies in its ability
to lead the clinican to a diagnosis of carcinoma-in-situ in the
clinically normal cervix.'4 1
Therefore the results of this study further supported the use of cytology as
a screening or sorting procedure, rather than as a diagnostic tool, a view
which was increasingly endorsed by other experts with an interest in
cancer detection.4^ This reflected the extent to which distinctions
4® McLaren, H.C., Taylor, C.W, Attwood, M.H. 1958 'Cytological Diagnosis in
Gynaecological Practice' Lancet 22 February, p398 Histological
triangulation meant that all 4250 women in the study were subjected to
ring biopsies. The authors also report that these women also had diletation
and curettage.
41 McLaren et al 1958 ibid., p398
4^For instance, the VII International Cancer Congress met in London and
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between carcinoma-in-situ as disease in place and cells in transition were
unresolved, yet paradoxically, provided a means of resolving debate. By
designating cytology as a screening procedure, cervical disease was
effectively designated a trajectory, or a continuous disease process, along
which intervention could potentially occur at a number of points (Clarke
and Caspar, 1991b).
The impossibilities of diagnostic certainty shifted debates in the use of
cytology towards a more explicit focus on screening non-clinic
populations. Screening within gynaecology was increasingly seen as a
feasible sorting procedure within clinic populations and in some centres
had becwne, routine as a means of surgical case-finding. In 1962,
gynaecologists, pathologists and cytologists formed the British Society for
Cervical Cytology to increase the visibility of cytology and advocate,
controversially, screening of all healthy women. The First International
Congress of Exfoliative Cytology which took place in Vienna, sponsored by
the International Academy of Gynaecological Cytology, argued that:
'...carcinoma of the cervix must now be accepted as a
preventable disease, at least in women who are willing to
submit regularly to cytological tests' [my emphasis] .4 3
Further, the British Society of Cytologists, argued that:
'...the value of exfoliative cytology in detecting accessible
cancers, especially in the cervix uteri, has been
demonstrated beyond cavil.'4 4
Nevertheless, debate persisted on interpretive issues, as before, but also,
increasingly, turned to issues of cost and organisation. The BSCC in
particular were keen to demonstrate that scepticism around screening was
much more the consequence of inadequate investment and funding than
about the knowledge base of pathology and cytology. This new turn
signalled the entry of general practice into debates around cytology,
through the notion of prevention.
discussed the value of cervical cytology as a screening method to find
cancer cases, reported in Lancet 19 July, 1958: 139
43 Reported in British Medical Journal 7 October, 1961: 453
44 Wilson, J.M.G. and Cantab, M.B. 1963 'Multiple Screening' Lancet, 13
July, p51-54
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The Pap Smear Test: From Gynaecology to General Practice
In the 1940s and 1950s, smear-taking was confined to clinic and hospital
populations. During this time in North America, smear-taking began to be
seen, not as a sorting procedure for women with clinical signs of
gynaecological disease, but rather, as a means of screening the general
population for signs of pre-clinical disease. Whilst this new perception
emerged within Public Health in North America, in Britain, it did so,
though not without contest, within general practice. The growth of
hospital facilities in the 1950s, such as diagnostic laboratories, presented
opportunities for community physicians to liaise and communicate with
the growing acute sector and also, crucially, link general practitioners to
wider specialist networks. There were regional differences in these
relationships. In North-East Scotland for instance, the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the Family Planning Clinic and general
practice were well networked from around 1958 and had access to hospital
pathology laboratories. This network was further strengthened because
of the way in which the practice of testing for venereal disease in the
interwar period ensured general practice access to diagnostic laboratories
(Tait, 1974), in ways which also provided a structure through which to
develop screening. Published work in 1963 'proved' the diagnostic value
of cytology in the general population and advocated more extensive
population coverage to detect pre-clincal signs of disease.45 This view
was upheld by the editorial of the British Medical Journal which drew
attention to a pilot study funded by the British Empire Cancer Campaign.
This supported the evaluation of screening as a method of detecting pre-
clincal signs of cervical disease in Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow.46
A cytological service was initiated in Edinburgh in 1949 and in Glasgow in
1955, linking hospital laboratories, with University and public health
doctors.47 Other regions, such as Manchester, utilised similar networks.4^
45 MacGregor, J.E. and Baird, D. 1963 'Detection of Cervical Carcinoma in
the General Population' British Medical Journal 22 June, 1963: 1631
46 Leader 'Preventing Cancer of the Uterine Cervix' British Medical
Journal 30 July, 1962: 1818
47 Grant, M.P.S. 1961 'Cytology Prevention of Cancer of the Cervix' British
Medical Journal 22 June: 1637
4^ 'Cytological Screening for Cancer of the Cervix' leader in British
Medical Journal 22 June, 1963: 1625, reported on the relationship between
Manchester Hospital Board and general practice in developing cervical
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In the 1960s, the Scottish Health Department enlisted the cooperation of
Local Authorities to expand this service, by providing clinical teams to
carry out cervical screening of non-clinic populations. Hospitals were
encouraged to provide the hospital facilities and required to process
smears which were collected. This linkage of networks provided a means
of analysing smears taken within the community, rather than within
hospitals and established 'the cervix' as an entity to be scrutinised within
a community setting. Furthermore, the introduction of screening
produced an illusion of 'background prevalence' in the community which
was never completely justified.49 Nevertheless, it was assumed that levels
of cervical disease in the community would match those of hospital
populations, and indeed, the presumed detection of high background
prevalence was central to the argument about the validity of the Pap
smear test as an efficacious and valid screening tool. This perception
fuelled a number of trials and studies, which, like other studies in relation
to disease classification and cytology interpretation, were equivocal.
However, in Scotland, the publication of results from one particular
survey within general practice set a precedent for the routinised
screening of women in the community.5° This research focussed on a
sample of 1000 women who attended post-natal and family planning
clinics, had menopausal symptoms and had any kind of pelvic
examination. Of these 1000 women, fifteen women were found to have
unsuspected cervical cancer in an otherwise clinically normal cervix. All
of these women were then subjected to ring biopsy to confirm a diagnosis
of cancer. Four women had cervical amputation and six had hysterectomy.
Although high background prevalence was not identified in this study,
the report highlighted the fact that the numbers of cancer detected were
higher than in published reports of other studies on hospital populations.
This point alone was used to argue that smear taking could and should
become a routine feature within general practice.
However, the measurement of background prevalence was contentious
screening
49 i draw this insight from Davidson (1993), who argues that the
introduction of syphilis testing in the postwar period heightened
awareness of the potential for disease.
5^A report by the South-East Scotland Faculty of the College of General
Practitioners 'Cytological Screening of 1000 Women for Cervical Cancer'
Lancet 1958, ii: 895
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within general practice because of the perceived unreliability and
invalidity of the Pap smear, especially in terms of 'false' positives. This
contention focused largely on the dangers of asking healthy women to
submit to a test which could result in partial removal of the cervix or
hysterectomy.51 Sceptics focused on the absence of clear treatment for
carcinoma-in-situ and variations in treatment from clinic to clinic.
Furthermore, criticism of the idea of more widespread screening focused
on absence of clarity around the staging of disease, drawing attention to
the enduring and unresolved distinction between abnormal cells as cells in
transition, which could regress to normal and therefore never develop
into cancer, or cells in a premalignant stage.
For those less supportive of routine screening, a significant factor was that
some treatment would be unnecessary and therefore effectively sterilise
young healthy women. Such criticism argued that research should focus
instead on the stage at which treatment was necessary rather than the
introduction of mass screening.52 Supporters, in contrast, argued that
carcinoma-in-situ could be identified through routine screening and
should be brought to the attention of gynaecologists for surgical
removal.53 This position effectively shored up the case-finding strategy
adopted within gynaecology. Therefore debate was characterised by
either conservatism or radical interventionism and turned increasingly
in the 1960s to discussion of facility provision and organisation. It was not
thought that the idea of screening should be abandoned altogether, but
that screening ought to be better targetted in order to find as high a
number of abnormal cases as possible.
As practitioners joined gynaecologists in smear-taking, pressure on
laboratories began to rise and thus debates ensued in the medical press
about the need to train and increase technicians to interpret and process
cytology slides. The British Society for Cervical Cytology too, joined m
Correspondence between Elliot, R.I.K and MacLaren, H. 1963 in the
British Medical Journal illustrates the force of this contention 3 August,
p3 1 8
52 a selection of criticisms was found in Howe, R.H. 1950 Obstetrics and
Gynaecology Survey (5):621; Fennell, R.H., Castleman, B. 1955 New England
Journal of Medicine (252): 985; Dilwarth, F.E., Maxwell, G.E. 1962 AJOG (84):
83.
55 Boyes, D.A., Fidler, H.K., Lock, D.R. 1962 British Medical Journal (i): 203
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general expression of these concerns. The absence of facilities for
diagnostic cytology and the need for training surfaced as a key concern,
in particular, whether cytology technicians should be 'all round'
laboratory technicians or whether specialist training should be provided.
These debates recognised the subjective nature of the work and stressed
the importance of professional competence through examination and
credentialism. Intraobserver variability emerged as a signficant,
unresolved, issue which reflected professional anxieties about the
scientific nature of cytology and a perceived inability to reproduce
intepretations across different laboratories and different groups of
workers.The unresolved nature of these anxieties, shored up the
arguments of those who advocated routine screening as a basis for further
investigation, as an entry into close and constant observation, or
surveillance.5 5
A means of managing professional anxieties about interpretive ambiguity,
was selective screening, and in part, this also reflected uncertainties
about general practice and its position within emergent National Health
Service organisation. General practice was experiencing its own
restructuring in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in response to perceived
deskilling as a consequence of the entrenchment of the District General
Hospital. General practice was seen, from within, as potentially losing
skills, and screening was seen as an opportunity to expand practice and
feed into specialisation. This was reflected in the discussion of prevention
within general practice which specifically drew attention to the
possibilities of being reorganised around cervical screening.5^ Some
argued that the division of labour around screening could favour general
practice as the principle smear-takers, but also general practice could re¬
establish technical expertise by having open access to hospital pathology
laboratories.5 '
54corresponence between Vickers, H.E.; Philps, F.R.; and Lederer, H. draws
attention to these anxieties in British Medical Journal 22 September, 1962:
601-608
55 Donaldson, M. writing in British Medical Journal 6 October, 1962: 723
56 See The General Practitioner and Preventive Medicine 1966 Report of
the Joint Meeting of the Royal Society of Health and the College of General
Practitioners on the Role of the GP in Preventive Medicine
5 7 Leading article 'Screening' Lancet November 9, 1963:987-988
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The Royal College of General Practitioners expressed this potential in their
1966 report.
'Another important preventive field in which the GP and the
hospital (and sometimes the Local Health Authority) will
increasingly combine is that of presymptomatic diagnosis.
Cytology to detect premalignant changes in the- cervix, the
early detection of anaemia, of phenylketonuria, of diabetes
and of glaucoma all come more and more within the ambit of
the GP backed by the appropriate hospital department.'5 8
It was argued that prevention ought to be located within general practice
as a means of sophisticated community surveillance, in which the general
practitioner would play a pivotal leadership role. Professional anxieties
over the future role of general practice, in the light of the development of
social medicine, and the ambiguous role of public health, by mid-century,
provided the context in which debates around screening were carried out
(see Lewis, 1986; Webster, 1988 for elaboration of the changing role of
general practice and the re-organisation of the health services).
Concerns around the institutional location of patients certainly raised
issues around the boundaries between wellness and disease, but these
boundaries were further embedded within professional boundaries.
General practice saw prevention in general, and screening in particular,
as a way of consolidating its position within the emergent organisation of
health care. There were sceptics however, since some practitioners
perceived smear testing as a way of decreasing their clinical autonomy,5 9
by replacing clinical examination with screening tests which pathology
would judge and gynaecology would treat. This view stressed the
importance of retaining clinical decision-making for patients within
general practice and not having to carry out treatment on the basis of
other professional decisions. There are parallels here of course to earlier
concerns within gynaecology and Freidson (1970) has documented how
this position is more generally reflected in the development of medicine
as a professional group. Other practitioners cautioned that idealism
within general practice obscured the real I ties which routine screening
58 RCGP, 1966, op.cit. p24
59 Lancet 20 July, 1963; 'The Report of the 113th Session of the Edinburgh
Obstetrical Society' also expressed this view in Scottish Medical Journal
1960 (5): 185
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would entail.60 Nevertheless, despite anxieties about professional
boundaries, the British Medical Association tried to encourage general
practitioners to see the professional payoff in adopting screening. A
leading article in the Lancet further suggested that mass screening would
link general practitioners more firmly to obstetrics and gynaecology.
Where the emphasis within gynaecology was placed on diagnosing
cervical cancer with a view to treating the diagnosis surgically or by
means of radiation, within general practice there emerged a view that the
cervical smear test could be linked to the new, growing epidemiology and
applied selectively to targetted groups of women. This emerging discourse
within general practice was linked to social medicine and more concerned
with defining specific populations than with case-finding, in part as a
means of managing limited resources. The smear test, therefore,
increasingly began to operate as a mechanism for linking general
practice and gynaecology, and a mechanism through which referrals
might be institutionalised.6 1
By the early 1960s smear-taking had become increasingly routine in both
gynaecology and general practice. Furthermore, debates about cervical
screening had shifted and were no longer only between pathologists and
gynaecologists, but were also increasingly engaged in by those with an
interest in public health, general practice and social medicine. This shift
reflected the scientific acceptability of the Pap smear in North America
where its screening potential had been widely accepted earlier.
Population screening trials had been initiated by several public health
departments on an experimental basis.0 ^ Multiple screening, in
particular, was seen as a solution to the chronic disease in ageing Western
populations, such as diabetes, arteriosclerosis, glaucoma and 'accessible'
cancers. This recognition further supported the development of cervical
60 Allday, R.K. writing in British Medical Journal 20 July, 1963
Clarke and Caspar (1991b) argue that the Pap smear test should be seen
as a boundary object because of the way in which it operates in different
social worlds and networks. Whilst I am not using the term because of the
signifance it attaches to the object as technology, rather than the social
context and relations in which the object is used (see Banta, 1983), it is
nevertheless valuable as a way of observing how different social groups
adopt the same technology in a variety of ways.
°2 'Cytology of the Cervix' leading article Lancet March 2, 1963
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screening. Its focus however, was on women of childbearing age rather
than on an ageing population.
Multiple screening, as a public health measure, was developed in the form
of experimental schemes, with the financial support of the United States
Public Health Service in the late 1940s. Screening was institutionally and
conceptually located within public health departments and, in theory,
oriented towards two key objectives. First, it was committed to the idea of
detecting pre-symptomatic disease. Second, the economic incentives to do
this were considered vast. Multiple screening was clearly perceived
within public health as a cost reduction exercise and screening for signs
of pre-clinical disease was seen as a way of reducing time invested in
medical examinations, laboratory investigations and follow-up
examinations. A third, implicit, objective, may have been, in the North
American context, in relation to providing medical care for a 'medically
underprivileged' community.6 3
There are distinctions to be made between the development of screening
in the USA and Britain, particularly with reference to the organisation of
medical practice. By 1963, screening in the USA was already part of a
wider public health apparatus, organised through public health
departments as experimental programmes with financial support from
sources such as the U.S. Public Health Service and Chronic Diseases
Division of State Services. It is worth noting that mass screening in North
America was also feasible because it addressed relatively accessible
populations through public health departments which, by and large, dealt
with populations characterised by poverty. Furthermore, cervical
screening was not initiated as a discrete measure but was part of a wider
exercise designed to screen for a number of maladies, in contrast to
diagnostic testing in Britain which was concentrated upon cervical
screening.
However, there were voices of opposition to mass screening in North
America which were mirrored in Britain. Late in the 1950s, a growing
voice of opposition to screening emerged within American medicine,
articulating three key concerns. First, the need for an integrated
63 Wilson, J.M.G. and Cantab, M.B. 1963 op. cit., p51-52
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programme of diagnosis, follow-up and treatment was seen as
paramount.64 In Britain, in the mid 1960s, concerns centred on both the
organisation of screening and the provision of diagnostic facilities. By
1964, setting the context in which the Piatt Committee could identify
screening as a way of incorporating prevention into general practice
agenda, the British Medical Association was urging general practitioners
to practice Pap smears.65 Furthermore, the Ministry of Health issued a
memorandum agreeing in principle that routine screening for cervical
cancer ought to be available in general practice and subsequently set up
five cytological training centres.66
Second, there were recurring and persistent concerns over the validity of
certain screening procedures. Third, significantly, others raised the issue
of:
'the risk of regarding the population with negative
screening tests as necesarily healthy, and not in need of
medical care.'6?
Embedded within such statements, is a collapsing of boundaries between
notions of the normal and the abnormal, substituting them with a
continuum of abnormality along which individuals might require medical
surveillance and intervention.
General Practice and Professional-Client Concerns
Medical debate in the late 1950s and early 1960s, on the issue of pre-
symptomatic screening, was sharply aware of the potential for reshaping
boundaries between health, illness and disease. During the early 1960s
many debates around screening in general were crystallised in a way
which opened up the possibilities for cervical screening in particular.
One such concern emerged around the institutional location of patients.
Both the Royal Society for Health and the Royal College of General
Practitioners identified general practice as the logical co-ordinator of all
64 Mountin, J.W. 1950 Publ. Hlth. Rep. 42:1359 cited in Wilson and Cantab
ibid., p52
65 BMA Annual Meeting 'Medicine in the Sixties' reported in British
Medical Journal 1 August, 1964: 302
66British Medical Journal 10 October, 1964: 956
6? Smillie, 1952, cited in Wilson and Cantab, op. cit.,1963 p52
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local authority services. This was a view endorsed by the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologist, who argued that family practitioners
should liaise between women, gynaecologists and pathologists.68 In order
to develop a central preventive role, general practice perceived that it
would have to be able to make claims on other health services. The
incorporation of hospital laboratories, in particular, were seen crucial to
the development of screening and for the identitification of specific and
identifable populations.
However, general practice also perceived potential problems of access to
diagnostic laboratories and argued:
'The general practitioner must receive unrestricted help
with diagnostic facilities in order to achieve success in this
field.'69
This was acknowledged by a Lancet editorial which highlighted the need
for general practice to appropriate screening as one of its functions in
collaboration with hospital laboratories and local health authorities.79 In
this way, screening as a case-finding exercise could be managed by health
authorities and could serve as a feeder for specialists within hospitals.
Importantly within this recognition of the cervix as an object of scrutiny
within general practice, there was also flexibility concerning what to do
about a cervix which presented no signs of abnormality.
There were also concerns within medicine that negative screening tests
would mark a given population as healthy and therefore not in need of
medical care. It was in an effort to get around this problem which
directed arguments about who should have cervical smears. Within
general practice there was an emerging tension between a desire to
initiate a more widespread practice than already existed and concerns
about ensuring compliance amongst women. One problem for general
practice was the question of how to expand routine screening with limited
resources. A compromise solution to this and to the issue of compliance,
68 'Eliminating Cervical Cancer' leading article in British Medical Journal
5 December, 1964: 1409
69 RCGP, 1966, op.cit., p24
79 Editorial 'Screening' Lancet 9 November, 1963: 987-988
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was to focus screening on selective populations, on women who were
thought to be at some kind of risk. Although risk was at this point an
undefined category, general practice was clear that the new epidemiology
would be capable of supplying answers to the question of 'which
women?'." Gynaecology and pathology laboratories were already
targetting women attending clinics, and for general practice these women
signified women at risk. The very fact of their location within clinic
boundaries underpinned their risk. Therefore, the same criteria were
applied within general practice, and women seeking any kind of medical
attention became by definition, women at risk.
However, practitioners were also concerned about the potential impact on
the doctor-patient relationship which the screening of otherwise healthy
women might produce. Wilson and Cantab, for instance, pointed out:
'Where a patient consults his own personal doctor, for
whatever reason, it is easy for the doctor to make an
investigation - e.g., take the blood-pressure - and keep his
own counsel on what he finds. But if a "non-patient" is
invited to attend for examination which he himself (not
feeling ill) does not initiate, responsibility is incurred by the
authority which has invited him and which finds something
wrong. This responsibility may be transferred to the
personal doctor in the form of a letter; the "non-patient" is
asked to attend his doctor, and he now becomes a "patient".
The s ituation will remain in hand so long as the doctor then
knows what to tell his patient; but this may be very difficult
in the case of some of the chronic diseases, of which border¬
line hypertension, diabetes, chronic glaucoma, and
ischaemic heart disease have already been mentioned.'7 2
It is worth noting the gendered nature of the language used here given
that much of the active screening was directed towards women. The
emphasis in this extract is on the nature of the doctor-patient relationship
and the nature of the relations which connect them. First, where
individuals initiate contact with their doctor, this was seen to support
professional autonomy and preserve clinical judgement. Such contact
entitled practitioners to a:
71 Freeman (1992) points to epidemiology as the 'toolmakers' of
prevention.
72 Wilson and Cantab, 1963, op. cit., p52
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'complete confidential access to a patient's person and
private history.'7 3
Such initiation assumes a degree of self-recognition of sickness, in classic
Parsonian fashion (Parsons, 1951).
Second, there is an assumption of trust in this extract, in the sense that
the doctor will have the appropriate knowledge and ability to deal with the
problem identified by the patient, in the first instance. This could be seen
as an expression of paternalism in the client-professional relationship but
also an acknowledgement of uncertainty in the process of examination
and interpretation. Where a patient does not initiate the contact
him/herself, and where the individual is invited to make contact with the
doctor, or health professional, boundaries of responsibility begin to shift.
Where disease, or signs of pre-clinical disease, is detected, obligation is
incurred by the authority, although this obligation may be 'transferred' to
the personal doctor, bringing the relationship back into line, as the
individual is reconstituted as a patient. This could be viewed as an
expression of ambivalence over professional responsibilities and as an
expression of anxieties about changes in the client-professional
relationship. This is more fully articulated through the sense that the
doctor may have little knowledge to pass to the patient about absence or
presence of disease, particularly where the boundaries between absence
and presence were contested boundaries. As the nature of 'expert'
knowledge is undermined by diagnostic uncertainties space is opened up
for questions by the patient, as the following extract suggests:
'Before populations are screened to find new patients, we
ought to be clearer on what we can offer those who are
found.'7 4
Hence here is a perception of a shift in the client-professional
relationship.
This view draws attention to tensions between prevention and
intervention. On the one hand, increasingly screening was perceived as a
73 RCGP 1966, op.cit.
74 Wilson and Cantab, 1963, op. cit. p53
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measure of preventing disease in-tPe community. On the other, there were
few ways of dealing with precancerous changes which did not involve
unequivocal surgical interventions. Furthermore, screening which
originated within gynaeoclogy had the advantage of linking women
immediately to a specialist with access to resources and hospital treatment
facilities. Screening initiated by general practitioners simply served the
purpose of demonstrating that abnormalities could be picked up with no
immediate means of addressing them. Critics in gynaecology and within
nursing focused on the absence of treatment and the potential
sterilisation of young women and expressed concern about the unknown
link between the effects of current forms of treatment and future
fertility. Criticism also drew attention to the absence of information about
the impact of screening on women and the absence of follow-up studies.
Diagnostic testing for cervical disease initially emerged in hospital space
and targetted clinic populations already under investigation and follow-up
tests were rarely carried out. Where follow-up occurred, practitioners
found it consistently difficult to persuade women to return for repeat
smears,75 and many women who were asked to return for follow-up
smears, simply did not. This offended medical sensibilities and further
raised issues of compliance, which had became a major focus in the inter-
war period (Davidson, 1993). Non-compliance, or default from medical
care and treatment was increasingly seen as a waste of public funds and a
practice which compromised efforts to deal with threats to womens'
health, particularly those initiatives, such as screening, which were
associated with cost reduction.
Risk and Recruitment
Medical debates in a range of journals suggest that a key problem which
practitioners identitified was that it would be difficult to mobilise people
who thought themselves to be well, to submit to a diagnostic test which
75For instance, one study observed that of 67,071 smears taken from
women in Jefferson County, Kentucky, 776 smears were unsatisfactory and
253 women were known to have previously diagnosed carcinoma of the
cervix. Of the 66,043 women remaining in the study, 883 required biopsy
after the smear report (13%). After one year, only 26,913 women returned
for screening (40% of the entry group). This was apparently in spite of
"an intensive propaganda programme". Christopherson, W.M., Parker, J.E.,
Drye, J.C. 1962 J. Amer. Med. Ass. cited in 'Cytology of the Cervix' Lancet 2
March, 1963: 482-483
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might reveal otherwise. This perception was bolstered by the knowledge
ambiguities embedded within interpretive debates, which, if presented to
patients, would deter rather than secure compliance. A critical issue, not
peculiar to cervical screening (see also Arney and Bergen 1984), was,
therefore, the problem of how to instil the notion in healthy women that
they would not remain healthy if they did not comply with an emerging
regime of surveillance. One counter strategy to minimise this problem,
was the identification of specific populations whom, it was thought, would
respond obligingly to screening and yield justificatory results.
Epidemiology played a crucial role here, as in other cases of prevention,
in the identification of such populations. Therefore the medical
establishment were reluctant, early in 1963, to straightforwardly sanction
widespread use of diagnostic testing as a form of general population
screening. However, later in 1963, a leading article in Lancet more
clearly advocated the development of screening for 'certain specific
abnormalities'.76 In part, this was associated with the way in which,
during the mid to late 1950s and early 1960s, professional discussion began
to focus on the causes of cervical disease. Prior to this, public discussion
in the pages of journals such as Lancet, American Journal of Obstetrics
and Gynaecology and the British Medical Journal were seldom around the
causes of cancer.
Whilst it was still acknowledged that individuals usually became patients
by initiating contact with doctors themselves, on the basis of self-
recognition of sickness, a more blurred distinction between wellness and
sickness was acknowledged. There was, at this point, a sharper sense that
individuals may be unable, in a variety of circumstances, to make this
judgement themselves. Therefore, there emerged an urgency to the
debate around screening, which mobilised a need to eliminate self-
recognition and judgement as the basis for the initiation of contact
between individuals and professionals. Prevention, and the detection of
pre-symptomatic disease, played a crucial role in this gesture toward
elimination.
There were available repertoires for targetting selected populations for
76 Editorial 'Screening' Lancet 9 November, 1963:987-988
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screening. 77 Syphilis testing had become routinely practised in the
interwar period amongst those women who were mothers, through
routine ante-natal testing for syphilis (Tait, 1974; Davidson, 1993). The
targetting of women in the context of motherhood was therefore already
an available repertoire in the emerging preventive discourse (Graham,
1979). Furthermore, targetting selected populations for the detection and
treatment of disease was becoming routinised through other techniques
such as mobile X-ray vans and BCG vaccination schemes in the 1950s.
Women were recruited for smear-taking in other ways: through hospital
clinics which had the effect of recruiting reproductive women between
the ages of 15 and 24 who participated in ante-natal care. More explicit
recruitment drives in local communities, such as in studies funded by the
British Empire Cancer Campaign and through general practice also
generated recruits. In Edinburgh, women attending gynaecology and
ante-natal clinics were subjected to a cervical smear along with the other
examinations and investigations being carried out (Tait, 1974).
Recruitment drives focused on local communities and enlisted the support
of women to persuade other women to participate in screening.
Women were often drafted into an army of field workers (Patterson, 1987),
who might enlist other women and persuade them to submit to a smear
test. In Scotland, women were identified by Health Visitors in the 1950s,
through school children, or by trained fieldworkers who were prepared to
persuade other women to participate in diagnostic testing. Similarly, in
1952, the Mother's Welfare Clinic in Edinburgh, in collaboration with the
university department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, undertook cytology
testing of smears taken from all women attending their clinics (Tait, 1974,
p 167). Nurses and health visitors were identified as professionals who
might legitimately enter the homes of women as a way in reducing the
costs of screening and acquiring access to working class women in
77 Tilley (1984) refers to repertoires of social action in relation to
twentieth century collective action. I suggest here that the concept is a
useful way of thinking about the management of screening by targetting
selected populations. Although many general practitioners and
gynaecologists favoured widespread population screening, resources and
organisation prevented this. Practitioners were, however, able to draw on
readily available repertoires which had been deployed in relation to other
kinds of screening, also oriented towards women, and which could be
directed towards specific groups.
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particular. Working class women were seen by some general
practitioners as inarticulate and resistant to medical intervention and
therefore unlikely to attend for screening.78 Other means of recruitment
included the possibility of distributing cyto-pipettes to every home with
instructions for use. The British Medical Journal observed that the Davis
cyto-pipette could be distributed to the homes of women who would not
attend their general practitioners for screening in order to increase
compliance. However, this was also perceived as radical and as
undermining the role of general practice,79 in contrast to Papanicolaou
who had encouraged women to take their own smears, albeit under
hospital jurisdiction.
Although smears were principally taken from women attending clinics in
the 1940s and 1950s, risk categories were also developing and expanding.
Women were seen as biologically at risk of cervical disease in the 1940s
and the female body was, in certain instances, seen as predisposed to
'exciting' factors, such as injury, oestrogen or infection, which was seen
to produce cervical cancer. Similarly, ideas about selected populations, or
populations at risk, were already in circulation in relation to age and
parity. Older women and women with a number of pregnancies were
initially identified as being at risk from developing cancer, although this
identification was not initially linked to sexual activity. However, in the
1950s, risk was increasingly associated with marriage and fertility, which
implied sexual activity, as published work observed a higher number of
cases of cervical cancer, and higher mortality rates, amongst married
women.80 In 1953, F. W. Gagnon demonstrated the absence of cervical
cancer amongst a sample of 222 Canadian nuns over a twenty five year
period,81 a finding which was further underpinned by a statistical
association between recurrent 'instability' of cervical epithelium, early
marriage and multiple pregnancies. During the early 1960s, a number of
papers developed these observations and pointed to the relationship
78 MacGregor and Baird, 1963, op. cit.
79 Leading article 'Cervical Cancer: Early Diagnosis or Prevention?'
British Medical Journal 22 May, 1965: 1327
80 Logan, W.P.D. 'Marriage and Childbearing in Relation to Cancer of the
Breast and Uterus' Lancet 5 December, 1953: 1199
81 Reported at the Conference for Clinical Pathology and Geographical
Pathology in Lancet 25 September, 1954: 653
101
between cervical cancer and coitus,82 in particular, 'early age of first
coitus', 'extramarital relations', and 'frequent coitus at all ages'. A range
of other possibilities which such work identified, included, a virus and
penile hygiene.83 Therefore medical debate increasingly pointed to the
need for 'targetted screening' of those 'at risk'.
A number of contributing factors to the development of cervical cancer
were identified. These included social class, ethnicity, marital status, age
at marriage, the number of sexual partners, the form of contraception,
smegma and circumcision. These factors were reflected in Scottish
practice which, in theory, extended screening to all women in 1965 but
prioritised married women and women given vaginal examinations as
high risk categories. For instance, a Lancet editorial declared:
'...if a girl is old enough to have a vaginal examination she is
old enough to have a cervical cytological examination.'8 4
Because of the issues raised around responsibility for patients, those
supporting screening within general practice were keen to limit
screening to certain categories of women for whom it was thought a risk
of developing cervical cancer might be greater (and presumably the
possiblities of detecting abnormalities might be greater). Furthermore,
the creation of risk groups, principally around marital status and age,
could be interpreted as a way of controlling resources, and expanding
surveillance. The primary problem was getting around the problem of
ensuring that women who considered themselves well, as potentially
diseased.
Definitions of sickness became increasingly problematic for medicine and
differentials in the point at which people recognise a need for medical
attention were recognised as limitations in relation to presymptomatic
investigations. How could medicine get around the problem of getting
82 A number of studies are identified in Lancet 28 November, 1961: 211,
but of particular importance is that by Terris, M., Oalmann, M. 1960 'Coitus
as likely cause of cervical cancer' Journal of American Medical
Association (174): 1847
83 Discussed at the Third World Congress of the International Federation of
Gynaecology and Obstetrics in Vienna, 30 September, 1961.
84 Reported in Lancet 2 March, 1963: 483
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people who felt healthy to surrender to periodic health checks and
screening tests? Here we find a more or less explicit focus on the puzzling
issue of compliance. How could medicine persuade the population that it
might be valuable in personal terms to have latent disease detected and
corrected? At the same time, it was clear that medical discourse
acknowledged the irrationality of seeking attention when feeling well.
This conundrum, of finding a way to institutionalise screening and
rationalise seeking attention when well, was, to a degree resolved through
risk categorisations and the mobilisation of social duty, in which women
were incorporated into the surveillance of other women.
Conclusion
The material I have presented in this chapter reflects professional debate
on changes in medical culture and highlights professional discussion of
local practices. It is therefore limited in the extent to which it can be used
to develop a social history of screening or indeed, a sociology of scientific
knowledge in relation to screening. Nevertheless, I suggest it has
sociological value. I have used the material to highlight discursive shifts,
and their continuities and disruptions, to suggest that prevention, as a
form of surveillance, was initially underpinned by diagnostic testing and
the detection of disease in acute specialisms such as gynaecology. The
movement of screening into general practice and community medicine,
was accompanied and shored up by a discourse of prevention, in which
the notion of pre-symptomatic disease became increasingly significant.
The detection of cervical disease, was first oriented towards clinic
populations, through the specialism of gynaecology. Those who supported
smear-taking did so on the grounds of its utility for case-finding, whilst
those who rejected its utility did so on the assumption that dependence on
laboratory medicine would undermine clinical autonomy. The smear and
the practice of smear-taking henceforth developed as an entry point into
a wider network of surveillance. As smear techniques were refined, and
classification systems developed, which identified cervical disease as a
complex, non-linear process (Clarke and Caspar, 1991a), smear-taking
expanded into community populations. Perceptions of background
prevalence, the institutionalisation of multiple screening in American
public health and the increased potential for case-finding, further
103
underpinned this expansion in British medicine. Cervical screening has
become entrenched as a practice which eradicates normal and abnormal
cells. The relaxation of pathological criteria and changes in classification
have underpinned the growth of particular forms of therapeutic
intervention, such as colposcopy.
However, the expansion of cervical screening, as an instance of
surveillance, has not occurred through the exercise of sovereign power.
On the contrary, the power relations governing this expansion have been
incorporative in the way that other professional groups have been drawn
into the rubric of screening. However, the expansion of smear-taking and
its redefinition as screening, generated new concerns around the
institutional location of patients and recruitment. General practice
focused upon recruitment as a critical issue to ensure its own relationship
to other institutions, such as local authorities and the acute sector, as well
as to shore up compliance.
Recruitment into cervical screening began to deploy the language of risk,
in which particular categories of women were specified and identified,
many of whom were already part of a clinic population. Women attending
ante and post-natal clinics; women recruited through other professional
groups such as health vistors and nurses or through mother and child
clinics, were seen to embody compliance. As screening became an
increasingly routine aspect of general practice, sexual status and activity
became the focus for the development of risk categories. These have
expanded to include not only women who are identified as members of
particular categories (married women) but all women who are identified
as (hetero)sexually active, to which I return in the following chapter.
Hence the identification of risk categories was perceived, to some extent at
least, as a solution to the problem of compliance, and we can therefore see
knowledges of risk as a product of surveillance.
The generation of compliance, the engendering of risk and their
relationship to issues of knowledge and interpretation are recurring
themes within the story of cervical screening. Therefore, the expansion
of cervical screening must be seen in a context of an increasing emphasis
on diagnostic testing and its transformation into prevention; the
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development of services for particular populations, such as women; and
the extension of health throughout the population with the emergence of
the welfare state. I have argued, however, that the female body has been
identified as a particular object of scrutiny for the presence of disease,
and the development of screening should, therefore, also be seen as a
gendered project, which I will now discuss in more detail in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CERVICAL SCREENING, HEALTH AND CITIZENSHIP
The Prevention Paradox
Introduction
In this chapter I place cervical screening in the contemporary context of
prevention and pick up on themes of cervical screening described in the
prologue. I will do this, first, by conceptually locating cervical screening
through a discussion of the connections between prevention, health and
citizenship. Second, I will introduce the ways in which screening is
represented and how such representations address women. Finally, I will
outline current policy issues and the ways in which social science has
addressed screening, in order to illustrate its status as part of the
'prevention paradox' (Rose, 1985).
With few exceptions (Burrows, Nettleton and Bunton, 1995; Scott and
Freeman, 1995), sociology has yet to critically address the power of
prevention and the contradictions and interventionist strategies which
calls for prevention demand (Turner, 1987). Furthermore, whilst there is
a more critical literature adressing issues of prevention and HIV, there
has been little more than passing reference to prevention in relation to
cervical screening (Armstrong, 1995; McKie, 1996). Prevention has been a
key theme within twentieth century medicine, linked, importantly, to
power and state legitimation. In turn, the state has supported the role of
medicine in policing a social and moral order through public health and
social medicine (Wear, 1992). Prevention is, however, somewhat
paradoxical and reveals the complexity of relations between the body,
gender and health.
Prevention emerged as a dominant theme governing the development of
general practice and primary care in the 1960s (Davies, 1984) and was
consolidated as a key policy strategy in the 1980s. The shift towards
prevention has increasingly been an aspect of health policy, not only in
Britain, but also in Western Europe (Allsop and Freeman, 1993).
Government white papers and consultative documents such as Prevention
and Health: everybody's business (DHSS, 1976), Promoting Better Health
(DHSS, 1987), Working for Patients (DoH, 1989a) and General Practice in
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the National Health Service: the 1990 Contract (DoH, 1989b) bear witness to
the ways in which prevention has been formulated within health policies
and has come to be central to the practice of both health education and
promotion.
Prevention has been identified as a symbolic goal, embodying the notion
of social citizenship (Freeman, 1992), and as a means of rationalising
resources (Murcott, 1979; Taylor, 1982), in response to shifts in
epidemiological patterns of disease and demographic changes, in which
industrial societies are characterised by long-term chronic diseases and
increased life expectancy (McKeown, 1968). Prevention can be also be
understood as a gendered form of work, undertaken in private (Graham,
1979) and as part of a wider apparatus of social control (Lewis, 1986),
particularly through population screening, in which the role of the state
has expanded. Preventive strategies, such as those embodied by cervical
screening, illustrate the following paradoxes of citizenship.
The notion of personal choice, lifestyle and responsibility has been the
dominant focus of attention for sociology in relation to prevention. The
focus of prevention and screening on well-being requires continuous
intervention in populations which have not been defined as sick.
Individuals are increasingly encouraged to take responsibility for the
maintenance of their own health through procedures such as blood
pressure monitoring and cervical screening, institutionalised as 'well
man' or 'well woman' check-ups. Screening is, thus, located within
explicit and implicit agendas of individualised care which potentially
shifts responsibility for the production and maintenance of health from
the state to the individual (see, for instance, Bunton, 1992). The labour
market is also a context for screening practices and some employers, such
as the Post Office in the late 1980s,1 and retail firms such as Marks and
Spencer, offer a variety of screening tests as part of a package of benefits.
A prevention paradox can be seen in this example. Screening procedures
in the context of employment, may offer protection for individuals as
workers, but monitoring the workforce can also be seen as a form of
1 A new employee initiative was reported in the Daily Mail 4 August, 1988,
p9, in which women employees were offered cervical screening by an all
woman team.
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protection for employers (Lupton, 1994). Whilst such screening is rarely
compulsory, in that it is left to personal choice, it is, nonetheless, tacitly
assumed that individuals will comply (Greco, 1993).
In addition, prevention has been introduced into public discussion of the
individual management of health. Both the broadcast and print media
regularly run articles which address ways in which individuals
themselves can contribute to the prevention of disease and ill-health
through behaviour and attitude modification. The media havfe. claimed a
particularly influential role in the dissemination of information, which
health agencies deploy in an attempt to utilise popular culture (Backett
and Davidson, 1992). In 1995, for instance, the Health Education Board for
Scotland, employed a strategy of billboard advertising in a campaign
designed to advocate fruit as a healthy snack, in place of sugar laden foods.
As is increasingly recognised in academic and non-academic contexts, the
media has a significant role in rendering health issues socially visible,
and, more importantly, as amenable to personal choice.
Hence the experience of health in late modernity is mediated not only
through medical practices and knowledge, but also through initiatives
which are endorsed and underwitten by both the state and the market.
The latter are often couched in terms which draw on notions of choice and
consumption opportunities, and are represented as offering the individual
more control over his or her life in relation to health, through knowledge
and information sharing. Indeed, individuals may have access to more
information about their health, in the context of screening. In this way,
individuals may be able to exercise choices over treatment and
interventions, and be encouraged to participate in decision-making
processes in relation to such interventions. Access to information
potentially underwrites the possibility of critical engagement with the
management of one's own body and health.
Yet, screening may also contribute to the creation of knowledge
uncertainties, or provide individuals with more information than they are
able to process. Screening data, for blood pressure or cervical disease,
produces and records data for laboratories to process; for general
practitioners and specialists to make judgements upon; and for individuals
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to assimilate, comply with or challenge. Similarly, practitioners have
raised concerns around the ethics of screening and the implications of
quotas for general practice.3 For example, debates in the medical press
have focused on the coercion implicit in the quota system to which
cervical screening is pegged and the ways in which this may lead some
practitioners to remove those women from their lists, who are thought
unlikely to participate in screening.3 Other aspects of such debate have
focused on the issue of screening particular categories of women, such as
those with learning difficulties,4 where the tension between choice and
care is at its most acute. Hence, within the expansion and experience of
screening, as a key procedure in the prevention of disease, issues are
raised about the potential for tension between citizenship and
surveillance, and the different ways, individual and/or collective, in
which these are embodied.
The prevention paradox is perhaps most clearly embedded within cervical
screening. The routine examination of the cervix, to detect cell changes
indicative of malignancy, has been an implicit aspect of health care in
many European and Nordic countries, as well as North America, since the
mid 1960s. This kind of extensive observation produces and accum1 .ulates
knowledge concerning the bodies of individuals. Routine screening
programmes require central coordination through computerised
databanks to provide access to increasingly expansive categories of
women. The centralisation of such data, though aiding the call and recall
of women for cervical smears, normalises screening participation, but in
doing so, underpins claims to social citizenship. Paradoxically it yields
greater intervention on the part of medicine, institutionalises expert
observation over women's lives, and arguably expands indirect control
over the linguistic and metaphorical bases on which knowledge and
experience of the body rests (Posner, 1991). This raises questions about
the implications for the status of knowledge in women's lives.
2 This point is made by the General Medical Services Council 1989 Report
to a Special Conference of Representatives of Local Medical Committees on
27 April London: British Medical Association
3 Chisolm, J.W. 1990 Comment British Medical Journal 300: 853
4 Haire, A.R., Bambrick, M., Jones, J. 1992 'Cervical Screening for women
with a mental handicap' British Journal of Family Planning (17): 120-121
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Within neo-liberal conceptions of citizenship, individuals are expected, as
citizens, to exercise choices in ways which will affirm their responsibility
for their own lives and well-being. The market has a key role here in the
provision of a range of 'lifestyle checks' which imply a degree of choice
for individuals. Whilst the state is not formally expected to intervene to
ensure such well-being, preventive strategies such as cervical screening,
are associated with quotas and targets which those who are responsible for
their delivery must fill, in order to attain their own remuneration. Hence
within the neo-liberal version of citizenship embedded within
prevention, the boundaries between the market and the state are blurred,
since indirect coercion in the form of quotas is articulated through a
discourse of individual 'choice'. In contrast, social democratic versions of
citizenship emphasise the role of the state in ensuring well-being and
place emphasis on collective responsibility for the control of disease. At
the same time, however, the social democratic approach embedded within
a preventive strategy such as cervical screening, engenders greater
degrees of self-surveillance in the maintenance of individual well-being
in ways which obscure the social origins of disease. Therefore a paradox
arises from these different notions of citizenship, traces of which can be
found within the project of prevention, and hence cervical screening.
Prevention, feminism and citizenship
There are close links to be made between citizenship, prevention and
feminism. The social democratic model of citizenship associated with T.H.
Marshall (1963), whilst criticised for its gender blindness (Lister, 1990), its
ethnocentricity (Solomos, 1989) and its failure to identify the historically
uneven development of citizenship (Mann, 1987), has, nevertheless, been
critical to sociological understandings of contemporary rights and
obligations. Furthermore, Marshall acknowledged the extension of rights
and obligations to women as part of the more general expansion of
citizenship pertaining to his model. This 'extension' has been nowhere
more critically engendered than within the development of the welfare
state.
In Britain, liberal feminism has been implicitly critical of the welfare
state and the intervention into personal lives on which it is premised,
through agencies such as medicine and social work, placing emphasis
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instead, on autonomy, self-determination and choice. Yet, women have
been both integral and instrumental to the development of the welfare
state (Wilson, 1977) although the experience of being welfare citizens may
be both different and contradictory (Marshall, 1994, pi34). As Hemes
(1987) has argued in relation to the Scandinavian model of welfare state
citizenship, even where women have not been the 'power brokers' in the
development of citizenship, nevertheless, gender has been central to its
development. Hence, the welfare state can also be understood as a feminist
project, as the guarantor of social rights in the public sphere or at least, as
a 'feminised' project in which principles of 'care' are embedded (Gilligan,
1982; Holmwood, 1993; see also Walby, 1995, for a recent critique of the
shift from private to public patriarchy and the role of the 'feminised'
welfare state in this shift). Hence, the development of social citizenship
and feminism can be seen to be closely linked through the expansion of
welfare and the provision of health care.
This link is further integrated through prevention. Many preventive
strategies developed since the mid-twentieth century have both directly
and indirectly addressed female subjects, in ways which express the moral
project of the state (Marshall, 1994). As Pateman (1988) suggests, women
have been incorporated into citizenship in different ways, and within the
expansion of prevention, women have been identified as particular
subjects. In relation to issues of health, the liberal state is most often seen
as the guarantor of entitlements in terms of access to care and the
provision of information. Within and through prevention, women are
differentially marked out as mothers and guardians (Graham, 1979;
Nettleton, 1992), and as carers in the community (Armstrong, 1983; Finch
and Groves, 1983). Moreover, women are addressed as watchers over both
themselves and others (Stacey, 1988).
Therefore, the welfare model of citizenship which has prevailed in Britain
has been a gendered model, in the sense that whilst citizenship has been
clearly expressed through social rights for women, at the same time, the
social contract implied within the welfare model of citizenship has placed
emphasis on obligations which express bonds of membership. As Turner
(1990) has observed, this relationship raises questions about the nature of
entitlement in relation to gender. On the one hand, the welfare model has
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articulated a material basis to citizenship, through rights of access for
women to the provision of health care. On the other, the state has
implicitly addressed female citizens as informal providers of care, and
placed emphasis on their social obligations to do so. Through this
identification as care providers, women potentially experience greater
regulation and therapeutic surveillance, through preventive
programmes, for instance.^
It is against this that the notion of empowerment has often been mobilised
in both theoretical and substantive areas of feminist debate.
Empowerment is mobilised in feminist argument as a resource on which
women may draw in order to challenge medical knowledge or state
interventions. Embodied experience is often drawn upon here as the
source of empowerment, which is most clearly articulated within a liberal
discourse of rights (Morgan and Scott, 1993). Within a liberal version of
citizenship, empowerment is often equated with the 'right to choose1 in
ways which position women as informed consumers. However, the notion
of empowerment, and the language of choice upon which it draws, also
assumes a consensus around the social good of preventive strategies such
as those embodied by cervical screening. Here, opting into prevention
would be seen as empowerment, as exercising entitlements, in contrast to
other ways of interacting with prevention, such as opting out.
The provision of information has been seen as crucial for female
empowerment, as a way of enabling women to challenge conventional
medical wisdoms and make 'informed' choices about the kinds of health
care they desire. The development of well woman clinics in the late 1970s
and health promotion in the early 1980s is a critical moment which
signals the move to a liberal empowerment model within the provision of
health care. Such a move was in part, as feminists have argued and as I
reviewed in Chapter Two, a resistance to medicalisation and a commitment
to redefining health in terms which also took into account the division of
labour in which female embodied experience is located. However, such a
move also highlights the importance of social position and the
5 It is interesting to note how recent screening initiatives directed
towards men mobilise a language of care. For instance, 'health check-ups'
and 'MOTs' offered within private medicine utilise a notion of care, which
is, significantly, located within the public domain.
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relationship of the body to social position. As Crawford (1980) and
Ehrenreich (1983) suggest, such a move can also be seen as a mechanism
through which the new urban classes were able to feel empowered in the
arena of health, where power was absent in other dimensions of political
activity. As individual participation in the broader political process has
become increasingly difficult, and in which the body has been subject to
privatisation and compartmentalisation, an unintended consequence has
been the shift to 'healthism' (Crawford, 1980). In such a shift, whilst
people become producers of their own and others' health (Stacey, 1988), in
ways which preserve the liberational possibilities inherent within the
discourse of 'empowerment', they also do so in ways which might be read
as expressions of internalised surveillance. Paradoxically, therefore,
welfare states both regulate social life, through the production of certain
obligations for instance, and provide the material basis for social
citizenship.
Cervical screening, as an aspect of prevention, can be located within this
set of arguments about gender, health and citizenship. The development
of screening should be set in a wider context of an historical
transformation in professional-client relationships, which, in turn,
charts the birth of the welfare state. From the mid-nineteenth century to
the inter-war years of the twentieth century, such relationships were
governed by trust, paternalism and compliance. The early development of
cervical screening, outlined in Chapter Three, illustrates these
assumptions, now institutionalised in the 1990s by the state, through the
recent introduction of quotas and target setting within general practice.
They are further underpinned in critical feminist discussion of cervical
screening which upholds a commitment to the project of screening.
Feminist discussion implies a relationship between empowerment and
participation and fails to ackpwledge both non-participation as agency
and other expressions of agency within participation.
In part, this arises because the perceived simplicity of cervical screening
may be sustained through relations of trust (Giddens, 1990), in which
women are positioned as clients within a professional/client model of
relationship. As Parsons (1951) argued, within this relationship, trust
enables clients to permit professionals to do whatever is necessary to
113
restore them to health and to enable them to meet their social obligations.
A key difference in this relationship, however, is that in the case of
cervical screening, as practitioners themselves acknowledged in the 1960s
and to which I drew attention in Chapter Three, clients do not
autonomously seek out medical practitioners in response to bodily
ailments or change. Rather, clients may or may not respond to requests
from practitioners to participate in examinations and investigations
which are premised on identifying indicators of disease. That is,
individuals are invited to participate in the production of knowledge
around their own health status. Furthermore, through the introduction of
market principles into health care, citizens are encouraged to seek out
information and exercise choice over health related behaviours and
practices. As Sontag (1989) has noted in relation to HIV antibody testing,
such practices raise the possibility of a new class of the 'future ill'. There
is, therefore, a fundamental tension here in preventive discourse,
between neo-liberal and social democratic notions of citizenship.
The new context of self-surveillance embedded within neo-liberal
versions of citizenship raises key questions about the nature of
professional-client relationships, the experience of trust and the
production of risk. Indeed, the case of cervical screening can be used to
examine the production, maintenance and negotiation of a series of
tensions in late modernity: between the state and civil society;
surveillance and citizenship; authoritarian and liberal discourse. In
particular, the case of cervical screening demonstrates the ways in which
participation in preventive strategies is normalised, or, the non-coercive
techniques which encourage individuals to voluntarily govern their own
conduct in ways which meet the objectives of health (Rose, 1990).
However, the conceptual location of cervical screening within a neo-
liberal discourse of prevention, in which information and autonomy are
linked, has deterred critical engagement of the social relations in which
screening is located. Cervical screening, like breast screening, 6 differs
from other screening initiatives in the sense that it is focused solely on
the female body, and therefore addresses particular subjects. This can be
interpreted as preferential treatment, for instance, recent media
6 See Hann (1993) for a recent critical discussion of breast screening.
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discussion has drawn attention to the absence of screening programmes
exclusively addressing male complaints, such as testicular or prostate
cancer, and addressed this absence as an issue of gendered inequalities.
Yet such debate also highlights the status of the female body in post-war
health activism, and the way in which feminist focus on the particular
experiences of female embodiment have been critical to the development
of the welfare state. Feminist attention to the female body has been
central to the expansion of social rights through the provision of health
care which, in turn, has helped to secure participation in the labour
market by the removal and modification of what have been both perceived
and socially shaped as bodily constraints. Cervical screening, therefore,
must also be placed in a wider context in which screening more generally,
as an expression of prevention, is understood as a gendered project, which
also represents authoritarian notions of citizenship.
As I outlined in Chapter Two, aspects of this health care, such as medicine,
have been subject to feminist critique. Medical culture has been seen as
instrumental in the social control of women and the female body through
language and technologies such as hormone replacement therapy,
tranquilizers and reproductive technologies. In reponse to mechanistic
health care systems, perceived to be morally directed towards the social
control of women, a key strategy has been the self-help movement, which
advocated self-knowledge and care as a means of challenging the
masculinist, medical mode of practice (Lewin and Olesen, 1985). Feminists
have argued that the key to establishing power over one's self is the
establishment of power over one's material body. Yet within debates on
the status of the female body in civil society there are considerable
tensions between the potential for autonomy and social control through
self-knowledge. This is evident in the case of cervical screening.
Prevention has therefore been seen as a solution to medical power but
more recently it has been argued that it should also be seen as a problem
of modernity (Scott and Freeman, 1995) and as a form of surveillance
which contributes to social regulation (Hastie, Porch and Brown, 1995).
Public discussions of cervical screening, and social science research
agenda, have largely adopted a normative position vis-a-vis cervical
screening, which has reinforced the importance, and defined the
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parameters of participation. Embedded within prevention discourse are
issues of social participation, which are articulated through the nature of
information about screening, the provision of screening and the notion of
consumer choice with which it is increasingly associated. Female subjects
are addressed in terms which place responsibility on them for the
prevention of potential disease, located within specified bodies,
identifiable through diagnostic tests which are thought to reveal such
potential within particular bodies. The moral project of prevention lies
both in its emphasis on individual responsibility and its demand for
compliance. Professional and political anxiety over default from
participation in prevention, reveals the tensions between obligation and
entitlement, between an authoritarian and liberal approach to health
(Scott and Freeman, 1995). These tensions are reproduced in feminist
approaches which place emphasis on empowerment, but in doing so
normalise compliance and locate non-participation as deviance. Such a
gesture silences the diversity of experiences of screening and the
contradictions, ambiguities and ambivalences embedded within.
Normative assumptions about obligation can also be identified within
feminist discourse on women's health, particularly those which emphasis
empowerment and entitlement as a political strategy for redefining health
care in line with female embodied experience (for instance, Lewin and
Olesen, 1985). By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the cervical smear was
perceived by many as a key entitlement which women could, and should,
claim from the state. In a pre-quota era, the smear test could be read as an
identity marker, as a mark of sisterhood. The cervix was explicitly marked
out and politicised by the women's health movement in North America
(see Ruzek, 1978). Visualisation was identified as a key empowerment
strategy which would enable women to 'own' their cervix, as a basis for
establishing challenges to medical knowledge and practice. Whilst
cervical self-examination did not become an entrenched self-help
strategy within British female society, nevertheless the cervix was still
marked out within feminist discourse as a site of contestation through
texts such as Spare Rib and Our Bodies Ouselves (Phillips and Rakussen,
1971).
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Indeed, self-help groups, such as the Cervical Screening Campaign, in
parts of Scotland, encouraged women to challenge medical culture, and
much of the social science research in the 1990s draws on a similar set of
assumptions (Posner, 1991; Schwartz, Savage, George and Emohare, 1989).
Hence, feminist discourse also places obligations on women to participate
in screening, to embrace notions of empowerment and make entitlement
claims on the state. Therefore, there is considerable potential for overlap
between notions of obligation, entitlement, empowerment and self-care
(Crawford, 1979; Rose, 1990). Empowerment and obligation are intertwined
within feminist discourse, and are mobilised through liberal ideas about
choice and entitlement. The material presented in Section Three raises
the question of whether notions of empowerment and entitlement
encourage women to make claims on the state, or whether they take their
force from the ways in which the obligation of participation, and the risks
of non-participation, are internalised.
Cervical screening is therefore critical to debates around surveillance,
self-surveillance and citizenship. Located within a preventive discourse,
it is associated with the production of 'health' for individuals, and is also
associated with issues of inequality and access to health care. The
articulation of health promotion within feminist discourse encourages
women to assume responsibility for their health, by participating in
screening programmes. For women, however, this is often ambiguous. It
may, potentially, affirm social membership through conformity to
normative standards. However, to assume responsibility for one's health,
for instance, by having a smear test, demands that individuals place trust
in expert knowledges and practices, and disregard their embodied
experience. At the same time, women are encouraged to challenge aspects
of the process which continue to be problematic (Posner, 1991), such as
ambiguous language and information. Women are encouraged to demand
information through which choices can be exercised, and this is
reinforced by the language of empowerment and entitlement deployed by
prevention professionals. Thus, crucial to prevention discourse, is the
investment of trust in expert knowledge and the system in which cervical
screening operates. Yet, to acknowledge knowledge ambiguities and
procedural problems, throws trust in expert knowledge into question
(Giddens, 1991).
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Therefore, whilst cervical screening is represented as a social
entitlement, it is also located within a context in which the state has
increasingly endorsed the notion of individual responsibility for health
and correspondingly disease. This raises issues concerned with the nature
of social obligation in modernity and claims to entitlements which
members of society might make on the state and upon expert knowledge.
What precisely might such responsibility entail for women participating
in screening intitiatives, and what are the social implications for failed
responsibility? The notion of the individual mobilises a language of
rights and citizenship, and debates over access to cervical screening and
agitation for its routinization also mobilise the concept of citizenship.
This forms part of a repertoire of social action derived from a fusion of
self-help and the women's movement. Hence, cervical screening offers a
site of contestation organised around the female body and its location
between surveillance and citizenship. The following discussion will
illustrate this argument in two ways. First, I discuss how screening is
represented to women in information literature and the media, and how
women are identified within this representation. Second, I outline current
policy and technical concerns and how issues of compliance, or
obligation, entitlement, risk and trust are implied.
Representing Screening
The familiar story of cervical screening is largely written and
represented as a triumphant history of scientific and medical progress.
The 'cervical screening programme' is represented within the public
domain as a co-ordinated programme of primary health care and
secondary prevention and the smear test itself is represented as simple,
straightforward and painless. Information leaflets emphasise the
simplicity of screening and stress normal outcomes. For instance:
'The cervical smear test shows changes in the cells on the
cervix or neck of the womb.'^
'Cervical smear tests spot pre-cancer which can almost
always be treated successfully.'^
7 Posner,T.1987 An Abnormal Smear: what does that mean? Women's Health
Information Campaign Fact Sheet No. 2, London
8 Lothian Health Board publicity leaflet, 1988
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'The purpose of having cervical smears at least every three
years is to detect abnormal cell changes at a stage when they
cause no symptoms, can be treated easily, and before they
develop into a serious condition.
'[The cervical smear test] is an early warning test which
shows if there are any changes in the cells of the womb
(cervix) which might develop into cancer.'1"
'The aim of a cervical or 'Pap' smear is to detect...abnormal
cells before they progress to become cancerous.'1 1
This repesentation of cervical screening as unambiguous has the effect of
'black boxing' (Singleton, 1995), in the sense that cervical screening is
sealed off from further critical examination. Furthermore, women are
addressed in such literature in a limited number of ways. For instance,
one leaflet introduces screening by asking 'why won't you have your
cervical smear test?'.12 This leaflet uses a question and answer format to
draw attention to reasons which women may point to for not having a
smear test, and responses to them. These questions highlight the forms of
knowledge which women may draw upon to legitimate their objections to
screening, for instance:
'I feel fine - I don't want to know.'
'Since there is no cure for cancer, I don't want to know.'
'I don't need the test, I am not promiscuous.'
'My doctor is a man. I would be embarrassed.'
Information leaflets respond to these questions in two ways. First, they
provide factual information about the smear test and what screening
involves, as a counter to statements which are identified as irrational,
albeit understandably so, but nevertheless perceived as statements of
ignorance. Second, responses redefine the identity of those asking the
9 Women's Health Information Campaign Fact Sheet No. 2 op.cit.
111 Women's Nationwide Cancer Control Campaign 1989 Cervical Smear Test:
when did you have your last test? London
1 1 Doyal, L. no date Women's Health and Cervical Cancer London: Women's
Health Information Campaign, London
12 Why won't you have your cervical smear test? (no date)Women's
Nationwide Cancer Control Campaign, London
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question and suggest ways of modifying behaviour. Women are
repositioned in a number of ways, for instance, as 'well women':
'The smear test is done when you are well. The idea is to keep
you feeling fine.'1 3
Or by redefining all sexual activity as potentially risky:
'All women between the ages of 20 and 64 who have ever had
sexual intercourse need regular smear tests.'1 4
Attention is drawn to both specific and general risks by highlighting
potential causal factors such as smoking, having 'sexual relationships'
with more than one partner, or pregnancies at an 'early age'. Neither
'sexual relationships' nor 'early age' are clearly defined in this
information literature. In addition to the identification of 'risks'
associated with cervical cancer, this literature draws attention to the fact
that absence of symptoms is not an indicator of the absence of disease,
thus emphasising a more generalised dimension of risk. Time is the focus
of attention here because of the possibility that 'pre-cancerous' cells may
take many years to develop into cancer.
Women are also addressed as carers and kin. For instance, one leaflet asks:
'Have your mother and grandmother had a smear test?'1 5
The flow of information here assumes relations in which first, there is a
relationship of care between female kin, and second, that the direction of
care flows from daughters to mothers. This is further underpinned by the
nature of the information which then follows about the development of
pre-cancerous cells amongst women over fifty. This draws attention to
chronological age as a risk factor and suggests:
1 3 Doyal op.cit.
14 Policy in England and Wales advocates screening for women between
20-64. For women in Scotland, screening is advocated for those between
20-60 years of age.
13 Women's National Cancer Control Campaign, no date, Have your mother
and grandmother had a smear te^t?London
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'When the older members of your family receive their
invitations - do make sure that they go and have a test.'1 6
Women are asked here to redefine themselves as lay enablers,
encouraging older women to identify themselves as 'older' women and
accept a need for screening. This need is developed by drawing attention
to the possibility of pre-cancerous cells developing at any chronological
age and again, emphasises generalised, rather than specific, notions of
risk. Information leaflets addressing both prevention in general and the
management of clinical encounters in relation to screening, point to
behaviour modifications as a way of redefining identities in ways which
smooth the path for regular cervical screening. Women are told to stop
smoking; to have a smear test regularly; to consider the use of barrier
methods of contraception in sexual relationships; to wear clothing which
will minimise exposure to reduce 'embarrassment' during the
examination. The tenor of this kind of information mobilises an
authoritarian notion of prevention, which emphasises the responsibility
of individuals to contribute both to their own health and well-being, and
that of other women, such as friends and kin.
The concern in information leaflets is to address the kinds of questions it
is assumed women will have about cervical screening. In doing so, the
intention is to persuade women to identify themselves as women who have
much to gain from participating in regular screening. Other kinds of
literature, such as technical, research and professional literatures, have
similar concerns embedded within them. For instance, Professional Nurse,
Health Visitor, Practice Nurse and the British Medical Journal, periodically
carry articles which address cervical screening and the difficulties
associated with encouraging women to participate. These difficulties are
addressed through a variety of categories, which often draw attention to
the 'role' of various factors in preventing or facilitating participation.
The presumed association between sexual activity and cervical disease has
been central to discussions of (non)participation.
16 ibid.
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Information literature places emphasis the role of authorities, parents,
health care professionals and teachers, to spread information about
cervical cancer. Professional Nurse carries such a piece:
'Parents, teachers and youth workers all have a role in
spreading information regarding the disadvantages of coitus
at a young age as well as the disadvantage involved in
multiple sexual relationships. Notice the word 'disadvantage'
rather than 'danger' is used - the idea of danger and risk
taking can be very attractive to the young.'1 7
I will return to the relationship between 'sex' and 'risk' later in this
chapter, but it is worth noting here how they are discussed by appealing
to an authoritarian discourse of prevention. Here notions of risk are
explicitly associated with the sexual activity of a particular social group,
'young women', and particular attention is drawn to the association
between cervical cancer and 'multiple sexual partners'. Associations are
made here between chronological age and sexual agency in ways which
locate the idea of 'risk' within the practice of a particular understanding
of 'sex'. However, attention is also diverted from sexual agency in a way
which redefines all 'sex' as 'risky', and draws attention to the tensions
between the identification of particular groups thought to be at risk from
cervical cancer, and attempts to address all women in ways which will
encourage them to think about the nature of their own risk. For instance:
'To imply that cervical cancer is only linked with multiple
sex partners is unhelpful and induces not only sexual guilt,
but also the idea that any symptoms in women who have not
had multiple partners are not and cannot be dangerous.'1 8
Sex and risk are also conjoined by appeal to a neo-liberal notion of
personal choice which is articulated through the idea of responsibility.
For example, Edwina Currie, a vocal advocate of cervical screening,
implored women in the 1980s to participate in screening by drawing
attention to the particular risks associated with sexual activity in general.
In an interview with Family Circle, she said:
17 Black, P. 1989, 'Cervical cancer: a preventable problem' The
Professional Nurse April, pp338-342
18 Black, 1989 ibid., p342
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'The old fashioned values are good sense in health terms. The
way young girls get cervical cancer is by being far too
sexually active...Don't screw around and don't smoke.'1 ^
Women are invited here to take personal responsibility for their own
sexual practice and exercise choice in a particular direction, yet risk is
used here both as a particular and universal category, in ways which are
similar to general practitioners' use of 'risk'. For instance, research
reported in the British Medical Journnal demonstrates similar tensions
between the particular and universal nature of risk associated with sexual
activity.20 In a discussion of the profile of the patients participating in
one study, the language used by the author draws attention to these
tensions. First, some women were not offered cervical smears 'because the
woman was a virgin' or the practitioners 'considered it inappropriate'.
This raises questions about the criteria practitioners use to make such
decisions and the assumptions which guide their assessments of whether it
is or is not appropriate, or whether women are 'virgins'. Second, some
women did not have smears because it was 'not known if at risk'. The
author reports:
'This latter category covered women aged 20-29 who were not
known to be sexually active; unlike in older women we did
not consider it appropriate to pursue such women to attend
for a smear test without knowing their degree of risk.'2 1
This use of risk carries implications of redefining all sexual practice as
'risky' and in doing so, ensures that those defined as being 'at risk' carry
the responsibility for reducing their own risk by participating in
screening. Consequently, this use of risk both erases male partners as
participants in the catgories of sexual practice which are defined as being
'risky', and reinforces a neo-liberal version of prevention and
citizenship.
In summary, the representation of cervical screening as a health check¬
up to which women are entitled, obscures the intervention necessary to
10 Family Circle April, 1988, p24
20 Ross, S.K. 1989 'Cervical Cytology Screening and Government Policy'
British Medical Journal 299: 101-104
21 Ross, 1989 ibid., pi01
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treat abnormalities and potential disease. There is an implied connection
here between cervical screening participation and the production and
maintenance of health. This connection, is however, couched both in a
discourse of individual responsibilities and social entitlements, and draws
attention to the relationship between women's health and the state,
through which such 'rights' are delivered. Furthermore, the
representation of screening in both public information documents and
research reports is often couched in moral terms (see for instance,
Lupton, 1993, for further discussion of risk as moral discourse).
Therefore, far from being a simple, straightforward procedure, locked
into cervical screening are a range of articulations of citizenship. I turn
now to the ways in which social science research agenda have approached
cervical screening and the assumptions which inform these approaches.
Policy Issues and the Research Agenda: 1960 - 1990
The Organisation of Cervical Screening
Recurrent themes in the technical, policy and social science literature,
include a consensus around the ways in which success has been measured;
issues of organisation and delivery; the role of personal choice in
addressing cervical screening participation; and, more recently, the way
in which issues of risk are increasingly mobilised to secure and sustain
female participation in cervical screening. First, published literature
between 1960-1990 emphasises a strong statistical association between
participation in cervical screening and mortality decline.22 it has been
argued that this association is particularly marked for areas of Scotland,
British Columbia and the Nordic countries, and has been linked to good
population coverage.23 Furthermore, research has highlighted that a
high proportion of women with cervical cancer have never had a smear
22 For instance, Boyes, D.A., Fidler, H.K. and Lock, D.R. 1961 'Significance of
in situ carcinoma of the uterine cervix' British Medical Journal i:203-205;
MacGregor, J.E. et al 1985 'Case control study of cervical cancer screening
in North East Scotland' British Medical Journal 290: 1543-6
23 Hakama, M. 1982 'Trends in the incidence of cervical cancer in the
Nordic countries' in K. Magnus (ed) Trends in Cancer: Causes and practical
implications Washington: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation
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test,24 and that women who are screened have a low incidence of cervical
cancer.2 5
These data hav/e been used to emphasise the need for systematic cervical
screening, and to address the uptake of screening by women, which is
consistently perceived as inadequate. However, less often cited in
literature reviews is research which has drawn attention to stasis in
mortality decline, despite the introduction of screening and research
which more critically addresses the success of screening, or the way in
which success is measured.2(> The success of cervical screening is
measured in terms of mortality reduction in the long-term. In the short
term, success is measured in terms of the disappearance of abnormal cells,
or the disappearance of signs (Posner, 1991). However, the process
through which abnormalities are eliminated may produce symptoms
where none previously existed, such as bleeding, discharge and pain
(Posner and Vessey, 1988). This tends to be obscured in representation of
cervical screening and is under-discussed in the technical literature.
The second concern addressed in the technical and policy literature
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was the organisation and delivery of
cervical screening. Of particular concern has been the location of
responsibility for smear taking; the management of the cytological
services; and concerns over women's non-participation. Both the British
Medical Association and the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists published their own appraisals of population screening,27
24 Paterson, M.E.L., Peel, K.R., Joslin, C.A.F. 1982 'Cervical smear histories
of 500 women with invasive cervical cancer in Yorkshire' British Medical
Journal 289: 896-898
25 Chamberlain, J. 1984 'Failures of the cervical cytology screening
programme' British Medical Journal 289: 853-854
26 Foltz, A.M. and Kelsey, J.L. 1978 'The Annu al Pap Smear Test: a Dubious
Policy Success' Millbank Quarterly 56: 426-462; Brown, J. 1990 An
Annotated Bibliography of the Economic Literature Concerning the
Evaluation of the Screening for Cervical Cancer Health Economics Group
Research Paper No. 9, Brunei University
27 British Medical Association 1986 Cervical Cancer in Great Britain
London: British Medical Association; Scientific Services Advisory Group
1987 Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the Histopathology Sub-Committee on
the Cervical Cytology Service in Scotland (The Strong Report) Edinburgh:
HMSO; Royal College of General Practitioners, Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Royal College of Pathologists, Faculty of
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in which screening for cervical cancer was identified as opportunistic,
locally organised and narrowly targetted at particular groups in the
female population.
In the mid 1980s, both the BMA and the RCOG argued that many women
were excluded from screening coverage and called for the government to
increase funding for cervical screening. This call was intensified, when
in the middle of 1986, the Forrest Report, commissioned by Kenneth Clarke
for the Department of Health, prompted debate over a breast screening
initiative. Edwina Currie, amongst others, made the point that if the
government accepted the report's recommendations it would be difficult to
refute calls for a co-ordinated cervical screening programme.
Furthermore, both funding for AIDS research and breast screening was
announced in January 1987. This focused debate on the absence of
computerised call/recall systems, particularly in the north, where
mortality rates were perceived to be rising. 2 8 jn particular, cervical
screening was perceived as failing to find those people most 'at risk' of
developing cervical cancer,29 namely young and working class women.
Public groups also expanded in the 1980s in response to the perception of
the rising incidence of cervical cancer and the under-commitment of the
government to fund a co-ordinated screening programme. Lobby groups
such as Women Against Cervical Cancer and the Women's National Cervical
Cancer Campaign denounced cervical screening as underfunded,
understaffed, and non-computerised. A report by the National Federation
of Women's Institutes in November 1987 surveyed 9,500 women, many of
whom identified the perceived failings of the system.2° Two thirds
claimed they had never been offered a smear test; 25% didn't want to
'bother their GP'; another 25% were 'too embarrassed' and 20% 'feared the
result'. The RCOG responded to this as 'disturbing' and used it to illustrate
the need for greater prevention.
Community Medicine 1987 Report of the Intercollegiate Working Party on
Cervical Cytology Screening London: Progress Press Ltd.
28 Guardian 6 February, 1986, p4
29 Guardian, 29 July, 1986 p2
30 Reported by John Illman in Daily Mail 15 January, 1987, pi5
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Professional bodies such as the Public Health Laboratory Service and Area
Health Authorities were consulted by the government about computerised
call/recall systems for screening, although at managerial rather than
professional level. This process of consultation also engendered a cost-
effectiveness study to examine staffing levels in laboratories and the
potential for replacing highly trained technicians with a semi-skilled
workforce. This prompted what was seen by the medical establishment as
backdoor manoevering by the government to expand screening without
additional public cost. Re-organisation in the late 1980s therefore focused
on institutionalising the responsibility for taking smears, and the
management of cytological services. District Health Authorities in
England were encouraged by the then Department of Health and Social
Security in 1988 to implement computerised call/recall schemes in order
to encourage general practitioners to invite women to attend for cervical
screening and enable the screening of all eligible women by 1992.31
Similarly, the Strong Report (1987) in Scotland requested Health Boards to
establish computerised call/recall systems to ensure that women aged 20-
60 years would be invited for a smear test by the end of 1993 and recalled
on a five yearly basis.32 In 1988, a Community Health Index was also
established, which enables patients to be identified with a unique number
which is computer compatible. The intention was to link this to a Cervical
Screening Module which would identify women eligible for screening and
allow more accurate monitoring of screening uptake rates.33 However,
there was little confidence that Health Authorities would be able to
introduce computerised call/recall systems in the specified timescale.
There are parallels to be drawn here between HIV and debates around
anti-body testing. Local and Area Health Authorities were expected to
implement HIV testing with no new funding and also establish
31 DHSS Health Circular 1988, HC(88)1/HC (FP) (88)2; Elkind, A. Haran, D„
Eardley, A., Spencer, B. 1988 'Reasons for non-attendance for computer-
managed cervical screening: pilot interviews' Social Science and Medicine
27(6): 651-660
32 See also SHHD/DGM1987(74) and SHHD/DGM( 1987)78 Cervical Cytology
Services in Scotland as indicated in the Scottish Office 1993 Report of the
Inquiry into Cervical Cytolopaboology at Inverclyde Royal Hospital,
Greenock Edinburgh: HMSO.
33 McKay, K. and Wallace, A.M. 1991 A Report of a Survey of Cervical
Screening in General Practice Edinburgh: Department of Public Health
Medicine
127
counselling in response to the uncertainty and anxiety which it was
presumed such testing would generate. Similarly, Health Boards and
Authorities were now being asked to establish a co-ordinated network of
call/recall systems for cervical screening with no new monies. The
failure of Health Authorities to meet the government imposed deadline of
March 1988 to implement call/recall systems was therefore seen by
professionals as inevitable and drawn upon to argue for further
screening re-organisation.3 4
Other revisions targetted Family Practitioner Committees to encourage
general practitioners to take responsibility for the implementation of
routine screening. This set the context for the introduction of Promoting
Better Health (DHSS, 1987) and General Practice in the National Health
Service: the 1990 Contract (DoH, 1989b) in which specific targets for
screening were established. Cervical screening is now, therefore, pegged
to general practice remuneration; quotas and targets provide incentives to
general practitioners to offer smear tests, hence the context in which
cervical screening occurs is increasingly defined by a market ethos.
Furthermore, these changes have shifted the ways in which women might
exercise choice in terms of where to obtain a smear and from whom. One
Scottish survey of cervical screening carried out in 1991, indicated that
seventy five per cent of all smears taken in one Health Board were taken
by general practitioners.3 3 Thus there has been a general shift
throughout the 1980s, towards encouraging local and district health
authorities, and health boards in Scotland, to provide and operate the
structures within which general practitioners are encouraged to offer
cervical smears to women.3 6
The implementation of computerised call/recall systems has not vastly
improved the uptake of screening and has been criticised for failing to
34 Scientists and practitioners identified shortages of computer
hardware/software; staff training and resources as problematic. Guardian,
8 December, 1987, p6
35 McKay and Wallace, 1991 op.cit.
36 These proposals and changes have largely been structured through
shifts in general practice remuneration and have not been without their
tensions. As Webster (1988) points out, issues of remuneration have
always been central to the services offered by general practitioners and to
the basis on which medicine in the community is practised.
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reach, or for under-representing, women who are 'at risk' of developing
cervical cancer,37 such as women in low socio-economic groups and older
women.38 in part, this has been associated with the quality of computer
software itself, the workload managed by laboratories and the general
resources available to support call/recall systems;39 and administrative
problems such as the inaccuracy of the mailing lists on which such
systems are based and knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the
target population.411 Current social science approaches to cervical
screening continue to highlight the need for further re-organisation to
reduce opportunistic screening,41 better follow-up and ways of ensuring
participation;42 and ways of ensuring that 'attenders' do not become
'defaulters'.4 3
Participation and Compliance
The third concern for technical and policy literature has been rates of
participation and, in particular, non-participation. This concern has
largely focused on the relationship between screening uptake and
women's knowledge, beliefs and attitudes towards screening. There is a
broad bifurcation in this literature between rational choice models of
health behaviour and liberal feminist approaches to health care. In both
approaches, there is a tendency to assume, that given specified forms of
information, women will make informed choices and comply with the
information with which they are presented. The adequacy of the expert
37 McKie, L. 1993 'Women's views of the cervical smear test: implications
for nursing practice - women who have not had a smear test' Journal of
Advanced Nursing 18:972-979
3 8 Nichols, S. 1987 'Women's Preferences for Sex of Doctor: a postal survey'
Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners 37: 540-543; Eardley,
A. et al 1985 'Attendance for cervical screening - whose problem?' Social
Science and Medcine 20(9): 955-962
39 Elkind, A., Eardley, A., Thompson, R., Smith, A. 1990 'How district
authorities organise cervical screening' British Medical Journal volume
301: 915-917
40 Doyle, Y. 1991 'A survey of the cervical screening service in a London
district, including reasons for non-attendance, ethnic responses and
views on the quality of service' Social Science and Medicine 32(8):953-957
41 Nicoll, P., Narayan, K.V., Paterson, J.G. 1991 'Cervical Cancer Screening:
Women's Knowledge, Attitudes and Preferences' Health Bulletin 49/3: 184-
190
42 Nathoo, V. 1988 'Investigation of non-responders at a cervical cancer
screening clinic in Manchester' British Medical Journal 296: 1041-2
43 Doyle, 1991 op.cit.
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knowledge embedded within cervical screening is taken-for-granted,
whilst the extent to which it is shared is criticised. Nevertheless,
assumptions of compliance, are at times framed, in expert and media
discourse, by reference to the domestic and family obligations which
women are perceived to have, which disease is seen to disrupt. For
instance, in the mid 1980s, Dr. John Davidson, head of BMA Scientific
Division was quoted in the Guardian as saying:
'This disease has a major impact on families and children. We
are talking about premature death. We have the technology
to deal with it now.'44
Within such statements lies an assumption that women ought to be
concerned with prevention, not only in order to secure their own health,
but in order to maintain their obligations to others. Compliance is the
preferred outcome within much of this literature, although it is
articulated through appeal to both personal choice and authoritarian
models of participation. For instance, research in the early 1980s, in
particular, focused on women's attributes, pointing to their 'failure' to
take advantage of screening services.45 Factors such as fear, perceptions
of pain and embarrassment, are identified in this approach as
disincentives to participation and screening uptake. Here women are seen
as choosing to not participate in screening.
i
In contrast, liberal feminist approaches to screening identify women's
inability to exercise choice to participate due to material barriers and
organisation problems, of the kind outlined above. Similarly however,
these approaches to screening also unproblematically link the provision
of information to the exercise of choice.46 Here women are identified as
consumers of health care, but such models have as their goal, the
production of data which can be mobilised to encourage and persuade
women to participate in screening. Critical to both these models is the way
44 Guardian October 8, 1986, p2
45 Anon. 1980 'High risk groups and cervical cancer' British Medical
Journal 281: 629; Chamberlain, J. 1989 'Failure of cervical cytology
screening programme' British Medical Journal 289: 853
46 Schwartz, M, Savage, W., George, J., Emohare, L. 1989 'Women's
Knowledge and Experience of Cervical Screening: a failure of health
education and medical organisation' Community Medicine 11:279-289;
McKie, 1993 op.cit.; Doyle, 1991 op.cit.
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in which compliance is normalised. This research takes as its starting
point the notion that the beliefs and attitudes which women may hold,
operate as disincentives and barriers to screening uptake. A key focus,
therefore, has been to identify the nature of such knowledge, in which we
can identify recurrent themes.
The first theme in this research is the crucial role which information
dissemination, health education and publicity is seen to play in providing
information about cervical screening.47 Sources of information which
women consistently identify include friends, kin, the media, campaign
leaflets and health professionals. Health professionals, in particular, are
identified by the social science literature as sources of encouragement to
promote women's uptake of screening.4^ This literature identifies
women's 'limited knowledge' of cervical screening and 'fear' as
disincentives to cervical screening participation. Such literature poses
women as disempowered through the language which is used to describe
abnormal smears and the screening process. This literature is therefore
concerned to redress the disjunction between 'limited' or inadequate
knowledge and non-participation, by providing information for women as
a source of empowerment. Furthermore, it assumes that expert knowledge
sharing would establish conditions of compliance, although from my
discussion of interpretive debates in Chapter Three, the adequacy of such
knowledge to secure compliance must surely be questioned.
Second, a common understanding of the smear test amongst women is that
it is a measure to detect, rather than to prevent, cancer.49 This is often
interpreted in the technical, policy and social science literature as 'poor'
or 'bad' knowledge,5 ® which prevents women from participating in
screening. Other research identifies this kind of knowledge as 'invalid',5 1
47 Wilkinson, S., Jones, J.M., McBride, J. 1990 'Anxiety caused by abnormal
result of a cervical smear test: a controlled trial' British Medical Journal
300: 440
4 8 Schwartz et al, 1989 op.cit; Savage, W. and McPherson, A. 1983 'Cervical
Cytology' in A. McPherson and A. Anderson (eds) Women's Problems in
General Practice Oxford: Oxford Unjveristy Press
49 McKie, 1993 op. cit.,; Schwartz et al 1989 op.cit; Wilkinson et al, 1990
op.cit
50 Nichol et al 1991 op.cit
51 Doyle 1991 op. cit. p955
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or inadequate, and draws attention to further examples of 'invalid'
knowledge which operate as disincentives to screening participation.
Such knowledge includes not knowing about the need for regular
screening; drawing upon a perceived 'invasion of privacy' as a deterrent;
associating cervical cancer with 'promiscuity' in ways which prevent
participation; and identifying embarrassment or pain as a barrier to
participation. These knowledges are identified by liberal feminist
approaches to screening as problems to be overcome in order to secure
screening participation.
Indeed, many of the statements which women make in response to
questions about their reasons for attendance, non-attendance and beliefs
about the purpose of screening, are interpreted as knowledge deficiencies.
Furthermore, women may be perceived as 'apathetic' about screening and
urged to be more active in their response to screening. This is mirrored
in journalistic discourse in which women have been identified as
'apathetic', or 'patient apathy' has been deemed the 'worst' enemy in
relation to cervical screening participation. The response to perceived
apathy is 'action'. For instance, in the late 1980s, Ann Robinson urged
women to step up their participation and 'demand' smears from their
general practitioners, citing Scandinavia as a model of progress and
success and identifying the inherent risks of smoking; sexual activity and
social class.5^ A key assumption within such a position is that knowledge
informs practice and that deficient knowledge can be changed in order to
alter practice. It is assumed that the epidemiological connection between
screening and mortality decline operates as an incentive to rational action
on the level of the individual. Furthermore, this assumption underpins an
implicit view that the woman who participates in screening will possess
knowledge of a particular, pre-defined kind.5 3
Hence, to understand the cervical smear test as prevention, rather than
diagnosis or detection, is to hold good knowledge about screening. More
recently, there is an acknowledgement that the language in which
screening is framed is problematic, for instance, that 'precancer' is a
52 Guardian, August, 1988, p23
53 Eardley et al, 1985, op. cit., p958
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difficult concept for both women,54 and for practitioners,5 5 to
understand. Research has identified the need to provide women with
information which allays fears about what abnormal cells mean in order
to prevent what one study terms 'future psychiatric and psychological
morbidity and improve compliance with treatment" ,5^ An entrenched
response to acknowledged difficulties in perception and understanding is
the provision of more information.
Therefore, in these approaches to cervical screening, women are
identified in limited ways, as 'attenders', non-attenders' or defaulters'.
Whilst the boundaries between these categories may vary between studies,
they generally refer to women who have regular smear tests; women who
have never had a smear test; and women who have had smear tests but
have failed to do so regularly. This identification is important and the
positioning of women in this way serves to mark out normality and
deviance. Participation in screening is in the interests of social cohesion:
non-participation is not in these interests. Hence research of this nature
is oriented towards identifying ways of eliciting responses from women
which can be used in the process of recategorising 'non-attenders' and
'defaulters' as 'attenders'. The difficulties of securing mass population
participation are emphasised over ambiguities in the processing and
interpretation of cervical smears. Furthermore, the provision of
information feeds into feminist concerns with empowering women to
resist subjects positions of passivity.
Posner's (1988; 1991) work is illustrative of this approach. On the one
hand, she draws attention to problems inherent in the organisation and
delivery of screening, the ambiguous language used to explain differences
between normal and abnormal smears and the anxiety generated by the
process of screening. On the other hand, however, her solution to the
problem of screening is the provision of more information through
which women might be empowered to challenge biomedical models of
health care. Generally, liberal feminist approaches to cervical screening
54 Wilkinson et al 1990 op.cit.
55 Hopwood, J. no date Background to Cervical Cytology Reports West
Sussex: Schering Health Care
56 Wilkinson et al, 1990, op.cit., p440, my emphasis
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place emphasis on the power of words to empower women to make
decisions about their health and treatment. However, placing emphasis on
language and information as a source of empowerment also comes close to
identifying women as responsible for their own health and having a duty
to participate in screening (Singleton, 1995). Hence empowerment in the
liberal feminist approach to cervical screening has potential to slip, in
ways which reinforce the importance of social duty and compliance.
Indeed, empowerment in this framework is only identified if expressed
through participation, and in liberal feminist discourse is equivalent in
meaning to compliance.
Risk, Trust and Credibility
A third concern in literature which addresses women's knowledge is the
way in which risk is defined and redefined. As previously discussed, risk
is defined on one level in terms of socioeconomic position,57 smoking,5 8
chronological age and sexual activity.59 As my earlier discussion
suggests, this definition of risk is reproduced in information leaflets
which are presented to women, in terms of identifiable activities which
can be avoided, modified or transformed. On another level,
epidemiological data are interpreted and used to mark out groups of
women for whom there is a statistical connection between screening and
the development of cancer.60 In discussions of these connections, risk is
redefined in terms of its relationship to screening, not in relationship to
other forms of activity or factors. For example, research reports have
begun to identify not being screened as a form of risk.61
Linked to risk categorisation are issues of quality control within the
cytological services and problems of sensitivity in the detection of
57 For a review of the epidemiological literature see Johnstone, K. 1989
Screening for Cervical Cancer: a review of the literature Discussion Paper
4/89: Health Economics Unit, University of Aberdeen
58 wigle, D. T., Mao, Y. and Grace, M. 1980 'Smoking and cancer of the
uterine cervix: hypothesis' American Journal of Epidemiology 111:125
50 Vecchia, C. et al 1986 'Sexual factors, venereal disease and the risk of
CIN' Cancer 58: 935-941
60 Ellman, R. and Chamberlain, J. 1984 'Improving the effectiveness of
cervical screening' Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners
34: 537-542
6' Nichol et al 1991 op. cit.; McKie, 1993 op.cit.
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cervical abnormalities. A number of incidents in Birmingham, Liverpool,
London, Greenock and Cambridge, have drawn attention away from issues
of responsibility for the organisaiton of screening towards the
interpretation of smear slides. In 1987, an 'error of judgement' became
national news and exploded latent debates about the training of laboratory
technicians; the knowledge base of pathologists and the exercise of
clinical judgement within pathology. In Liverpool, a locum female
consultant pathologist was accused of misdiagnosing 911 smear tests
between 1983-1985. Laboratory staff questioned the judgement of the
consultant, which was supported by another consultant colleague. A new
consultant appointment followed up the query, reviewed the cases, and
supported the laboratory staff in their allegation. Most of the women
identified (487) were recalled for rescreening and in some cases
treatment, and they set up a self-help group.
This case was interpreted by the broadsheet press as an error of
judgement which could have been avoided if cytological services had
priority funding, thus avoiding the employment of locum consultants who
were most often near retirement age and female.62 The tabloid press also
focused on the individual characteristics of the locum consultant involved,
such as the age and status of the consultant (she was retired but was
working as a locum) and her 'momentary inability to understand
things'.^ 3
This case of perceived misinterpretation drew attention to the risks of the
cervical screening system in the 1980s. What occurred in Liverpool,
followed by a similar case in Oxford, was identified as the 'tip of the
iceberg' and the nature of medical knowledge acquisition was debated in
the media. During 1986 there was considerable debate on the social
organisation of screening, the issue of medical competence and expert
fallibility around smear interpretation.64 A particular focus for attention
62 Other reports on perceived misinterpretation also identify these issues
as errors of personal judgement, most recently the Scottish Office
1993Report of the Inquiry into Cervical Cytopathology at Inverclyde Royal
Hostpial, Greenock, Edinburgh: HMSO, 1993.
63 Reported in Daily Mail 6 November 1986
64 In a study published in 1991, in the European Journal of Obstetrics and
Gyaenocology the authors reviewed literature on sampling quality of
cervical smears by world region. The adequacy of smears in Holland, the
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was the perceived need to balance clinical judgement on the one hand
with a system which entailed cross-checking and peer regulation.
Medical competence in relation to smear taking was also targetted by the
press and has been subject to professional scrutiny.65 Poor skills were
identified amongst general practitioners and in some cases, it was
advocated that nurses be trained to take smears both on grounds of higher
levels of competence and to reduce embarrassment amongst women.
However, nurses had their own anxieties about smear-taking, for example,
the Royal College of Nurses and Midwives acknowledged that nurses:
'fear they are inadequately trained to carry out some duties
in doctor's surgeries'.6 6
Singleton and Michael (1993) document the ways in which general
practitioners themselves acknowledge opportunities for error in current
smear taking practice, which potentially contribute to false negative
rates. Incorrect sampling of the cervix, poor preparation of the smear
slide itself, the microscopic screening and interpretation of slides,67 can
all mean that a test is returned to the general practitioner as 'inadequate',
requiring a repeat smear test. Hence there are uncertainties attached to
the process of obtaining a smear sample, which undermine the seamless
and linear way in which screening is often represented to women. These
uncertainties structure clinical management in two ways. First,
practitioners respond to the smear test as an objective measure of cellular
change and in doing so, respond to ambiguous abnormalities as something
determinate. As Posner (1991) argues, practitioners draw on decision-
USA, Scandinavia and Britain were reported as 90%, 79%, 60% and 38%
respectively (F. Buntin et al (42):227-230). Other studies draw attention to
intraobserver variation, for instance, S. Ismail et al 1989 'Observer
variation in histopathological defin ition and grading of cervical
intraepitehlial neo-plasm' British Medical Journal (298):707-710)
65 A. Singer and A. Szarewski (1988) challenge current smear-taking
techniques and argue that the cytobrush is a better .i^eans of collection
than the spatula because of the way in which it picks up cervical cells
from high in the cervical canal. In the late 1980s this technique was not
available to general practitioners or to Family Planning Clinics.
Furthermore, the authors point to cervicography as a more progressive
means of staini^ cervical cells which also involves in situ photography.
66 Daily Mail 6 November 1986, p5
67 For technical discussion of this problem see The Scottish Office 1993 op.
cit.
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making rules which guide them towards intervention rather than
abstention. Second, the assumption of objectivity embedded within the
cervical smear test enables medical culture to extend its control over
uncertainty and ambiguity (Gifford, 1986).
Many of these issues have been recurring over a period of fifteen years,
and demand analysis of the social organisation of the interpretive
processes (Cicourel, 1968), through which smear classifications have been
developed over time and are indeed currently made. Of particular
significance is the relationship between gender, the production of
knowledge and occupational divisions of labour. In review of these cases,
one individual, typically a female, locum cytopathologist, near retirement
age, has usually been criticised by technicians for poor decision-making
and has subsequently been apportioned personal blame. This raises issues
about the role of tacit knowledge and the way in which local judgements
are made in laboratory contexts (Shapin, 1994). As can be seen from my
discussion in Chapter Three, debates around classification and smear
reliability also reflected divisions of labour between acute and community
specialisms as well as the context in which these interacted. In the same
way, a pattern emerges in contemporary debates around judgements made
in the pathology laboratory.
Drawing on Shapin's work (1994) on truth and trust, what is significant in
these cases, is how screening guidelines and local procedural rules shape
clinical judgement and link decision-making to the context of laboratory
observations. Scientific knowledge, such as that embedded within
pathology and cytology, is created in conditions of familiarity (see also
Luhmann, 1988), where face-to-face relations continue to be critical to the
credibility claims of knowledge. The implication here is that local
knowledges develop in ways which normally ensure consistency of smear
interpretation. Trust is mobilised because pathologists are dependent on
the observations of technicians, who make most of the observations in
relation to cervical smears. Technicians diagnose 'negative' findings but
not 'positive' findings, and there is little peer observation between
pathologists, who therefore retain an 'authorial voice' in their
identification of abnormal smears. The division of labour between
pathologists, as 'experts' rewarded with responsibility, status and
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autonomy and technicians as skilled workers who nevertheless carry out
repetitious, eye-straining work (Clarke and Caspar, 1991b),68 is sustained
whilst conditions of familiarity and trust are stable.
However, these conditions of familiarity and trust may be disrupted when
non-local pathologists are asked to make judgements about smears. Locum
pathologists embody non-local knowledge which interacts with and
disrupts local knowledge and definitional boundaries (see MacKenzie and
Spinardi, 1995, for analogous discussion in relation to the nuclear weapons
industry). Hence what may represent different definitional boundaries to
those who embody non-local knowledge are interpreted by those who
embody local knowledge as 'errors'. The paradox here is that technical
staff, a hidden, feminised occupational category (Witz, 1992), perceive
themselves, and are perceived by others, to be better placed to identify
abnormal results, because their experience of examining all smears is
greater.
Responses to these incidents have focused on counselling and reassurance
in the short term, for women who experience 'false' negatives. At the
same time, health professionals are usually concerned to restore public
confidence in cervical screening, and to ensure that women maintain
regular screening participation. The media has been instrumental in
supporting this position. For instance, media reports on false negatives at
the Inverclyde Royal Hospital, Greenock, emphasised that women should
continue screening participating despite also drawing attention to
interpretive and judgement errors in the processing of smears. Whilst
problems were identified which undermine the knowledge claims of
cervical screening, media accounts tended to adopt a normative position
on the obligation of women to continue their participation. Hence, a
manifestation of the rhetorical power of cervical screening is the way in
which social obligation is discursively mobilised in public responses to
68 Clarke and Caspar (1991b) argue that the feminisation of screening has
been part of a strategy to redefine the Pap smear as an acceptable
screening tool. Whilst I have not examined data which would allow me to
agree with this point, the gendering of screening implicit in this
argument raises issues for a Foucauldian consideration of screening.
Developing this insight, we can begin to see how central gender is to
health surveillance, in the way that, in this case, women are incorporated
into the surveillance of other women.
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what are perceived as administrative and interpretive errors. Indeed, the
adherence to a normative position can also be seen as an expression of
risk consciousness, as actors struggle to establish certainty in the context
of uncertainty.
A second response, has been one of quality control. Discussions
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s have focused on the necessity of
eliminating 'false' negative reports and sampling errors through the
introduction of external quality assurance to complement in-house quality
control. Reports on what are perceived as interpretive and administration
errors, such as those in 1993 for the Inverclyde Royal Hospital, Greenock,
have also examined false negative rates; the general approach to cervical
screening; and the staffing and operation of cervical cytopathology.
Invariably, such reports also recommend clearly defined policies to be
placed under the supervision of the consultant cytopathologist; laboratory
computerisation and review of staff training. However, improving quality
control in the etiological services raises its own technical problems, since
good organisation may contribute to an increase in new smear
abnormalities.69 Consequently, many more women may be referred for
colposcopy which in turn, raises questions about the impact of further
investigation and treatment on women and fertility.7 ®
Sex and Risk
A final concern across the technical and policy literature is the general
absence of attention to the role of men in the development of cervical
cancer. The technical research literature has been equivocal about the
aetiology of cervical disease. As I briefly discussed in Chapter Three,
epidemiological research in the 1950s observed the absence of
abnormalities within social groups which were assumed to have had little
69 Raffle, A.E., Alden, B., MacKenzie, E.F.D 1995 'Detection rates for
abnormal cervical smears: what are we screening for?' British Medical
Journal 345: 1469-1452
79 There is little research on the impact of screening and treatment for
abnormal smears although it is clearly a source of professional concern
for those working in this area. During fieldwork, for instance, nurses
raised their concerns about the unknown long term impact of screening.
Those with experience of midwifery had impressions that certain kinds of
colposcopic treatment, such as diathermy, narrowed the cervix in ways
which increased difficulties for women in labour.
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or no sexual contact.71 This influenced further research which identified
lower incidence rates amongst women within the Jewish community;7 2
higher rates amongst married women and women with children. These
particular risk categories have evolved to include relationships with men
at an 'early' age; relationships with more than one man; and sexual
relationships considered to be 'too frequent'.
Research has drawn attention to statistical associations between the
presence of cervical disease in certain categories of women, such as those
with sexually transmitted diseases, including the transmission of human
papilloma virus (HPV). Attention has also been drawn to potential
carcinogenic properties in seminal fluid.73 Associations between cervical
disease and (hetero)sexual activity have become a marker which identifies
risks for all women engaging in heterosexual sex and specific risks for
some women engaging in particular kinds of sexual activity. Statistics
pointing to rising incidence in the late 1970s and 1980s, were interpreted
in the context of a perception of increasing heterosexual activity amongst
younger women and also of increasing public awareness of HIV and AIDS.
Furthermore, evidence pointing to epidemiological shifts in the age
distribution of cervical cancer was interpreted by some researchers in
moral terms, pointing to, for instance, the excesses of 'sexual liberation'.7^
An initial moral panic engendered by the observation that cervical
cancer incidence was expected to rise amongst young women was also
amplified by the media. Newsprint coverage of cervical screening from
the mid to late 1980s in general is suggestive of an emergent moral panic,
highlighting the 'virulence' of penetrative heterosexual sex amongst
71 Gagnon, F. was credited in the 1950s with conducting a 25 year study of
222 Canadian nuns in whom he found no cervical cancer
72 Priden, H. and Lilienfield, A.M. 1971 'Carcinoma of the cervix in Jewish
women in Israel 1960-7' Israel. J. Med. Sci 7:1765 (cited in Robinson, 1982
'Cancer of the Cervix: occupational risk of husbands and wives and
possible preventive strategies in pre-clinical neo-plasia of the cervix' in
J. A. Jordan, F. Sharp and A. Singer (eds) Proceedings of the Ninth Study
Group of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
73 Singer, A., Reid, B and Coppleson, M. 1976 'A hypothesis: the role of the
high risk male in the etiology of cervical carcinoma' American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 126:110 (cited in Robinson 1982, ibid.)
7 4 Husain, O.A.N. 1987 Women's Cancer: positive action London: Royal
Society of Medicine/Women's Nationwide Cancer Control Campaign
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young women.7^ The British Medical Association responded to this
information with demands for priority screening for sexually active
women.
Calls for a 'major drive' in screening were further underpinned through
the identification of a link between cervical cancer and the wart (HPV)
virus.76 The authors of this study suggested that male sexual partners may
introduce an infective agent to women during sexual intercourse or that
the cervix reacts to certain compounds in semen. These observations were
coupled with associations between cervical cancer and long-term use of
the contraceptive Pill. Cervical disease has also been associated with
women in lower socio-economic groups, where explanations about:
'...poor personal and sexual hygiene, poor medical care, loose
living habits and unstable marriages, have been put
forward...'7 7
Other researchers dispute any link between social class and cervical
disease,78 but acknowledge the role of smoking and the contraceptive
Pill,79 or rather, the link made between Pill use, sexually transmitted
disease and changes in sexual behaviour.
Robinson (1982) notes however, that associations between cervical cancer,
multiple sexual partners and coitus at an early age, have been used to
apportion 'blame' to women for developing cervical cancer, rather than to
support the expansion of screening male sexual partners. The notion of
promiscuity plays a significant role here in identifying categories of
women in terms of risk. Examples of blame can be found in the technical
literature, where the role of male sexual transmission is discussed.
7^ Guardian 22 October 1986, p7; Daily Mail 8 October, 1986, pl2
76 Chamberlain, G. 1981 'Aetiology of gynaecological cancer' Journal of
the Royal Society of Medicine 74: 246
77 Anderson, M.C. 1987 'Premalignant and malignant disease of the cervix'
in H. Fox (ed) Haines and Taylor Obstetrical and Gynaecological Pathology
Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone 3rd. Edition p258
78 Harris, R.W.C., Brinton, C.A., Cowdell, R.H., Skegg, D.C.., Smith, P.G.,
Vessey, M., Doll, R. 1980 'Characterisitics of women with dysplasia or
carcinoma in situ of the cervix uteri' British Journal of Cancer 42: 359
(cited in Anderson, 1987, p258)
79 Draper, G.J., Cook, G.A. 1983 'Changing patterns of cervical cancer rates'
British Medical Journal 287:510-512
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Anderson (1987) for instance, argues that some men may be carriers
whilst others may not, therefore:
'the woman who is promiscuous is more likely to encounter a
man who is a carrier, which may explain the high incidence
of the disease seen in women who have multiple sexual
partners.' (p259)
Whilst 'high risk males' may exist in biomedical discourse, this extract
illustrates how they only become high risk in relation to 'promiscuous'
women. Promiscuity is rarely, if ever, defined in the technical and policy
literature, yet it is implied in clinical encounters. For instance, evaluation
research highlights the implied promiscuity embedded within the
experience of screening (see for instance, McKie, 1996), particularly
where questions about sexual history and the number of sexual partners
are elicited from a woman (Posner, 1991).80 Those women who participate
in screening, who have no children, and are in their twenties, are often
asked to give an account of their sexual status and history, such as their
age at first intercourse and the number of sexual partners they have had.
These categories of women may also asked about contraception and
encouraged to take the contraceptive Pill. This advice is surprising given
the emphasis placed upon the statistical relationship between the Pill and
the incidence of cervical disease, but is unsurprising in that it reflects
medical assumptions about youth, morality and femininity. Hawkes (1995)
for instance, draws attention to the way in which general practitioners
encourage young women to take the contraceptive Pill because their
concern is to minimise pregnancy rather than to minimise disease. In
contrast, sexual status and history is seldom routinely elicited from women
with children or post-menopausal women.
Little of the technical, policy and social science literature in the 1980s has
pointed to the role of men or male sexual activity in the development of
cervical cancer. However, this has been a recurrent, although it has to be
said, muted, theme in some of the feminist literature. Robinson (1982) has
80 During clinic fieldwork I observed that where women had come for
their first colposcopy, medical, reproductive and contraceptive histories
were taken and some women asked questions about their sexual status and
history. I return to this observation in my discussion of risk and sexual
health in Chapter Six.
142
commented on the way in which the emphasis placed on screening
participation has diverted attention from primary prevention. Drawing
on OPCS mortality and morbidity statistics, Robinson's work has drawn
attention to the way in which 'risks' have been obscured for women textile
workers; women in relationships with men in dusty occupations; and
women on the contraceptive Pill. In particular, the focus on screening
participation as a form of prevention has drawn attention away from
heterosexual activity and its relation to the production of cervical disease.
In doing so, men have not been targetted as subjects for screening. More
recent feminist research has begun to explicitly place the aetiology and
experience of cervical cancer in the context of heterosexual relations
(McKie, 1996). HIV-positive status has also been acknowledged as a marker
of cervical disease (Bury, 1994) and feminists have also drawn attention to
the previously unacknowledged incidence of cervical disease amongst
women who identify themselves as lesbians (Richardson, 1994). These
new commentaries are important, not least because of the way in which
they potentially open up the issue of cervical disease and screening and
point to issues of access to welfare and social citizenship.
Conclusion
In contrast to, and as a critique of, policy approaches to cervical
screening, I have examined prevention as a site of power relations, in at
least three ways. First, I have argued that embedded within the
prevention paradox, illustrated in my discussion of the representation of
screening and current policy concerns, are a range of notions of
citizenship. Whilst cervical screening is represented as a simple form of
secondary prevention, it is complex, and interwoven between notions of
neo-liberalism and authoritarianism. Second, the issue of compliance is
critical to understandings of current policy and technical concerns.
Compliance is most often implicit in discussions of screening: it is simply
assumed that women ought to participate in screening. Therefore much of
the literature draws upon authoritarian models of participation. In
contrast, personal choice and empowerment is mobilised by liberal
feminist approaches to screening.
However, as my discussion demonstrates, compliance is also an implied
outcome in this work, produced through the internalisation of adequate
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information. The adequacy of information and knowledge is therefore the
third issue for understandings of prevention, such as cervical screening.
Recurring interpretive debates around smear reliability, the social
organisation of screening and the embodiment of local knowledges in
particular persons raises issues about the relationship between the form
of knowledge held by experts and that provided for public consumption.
Paradoxially, if women were provided with 'more information' about
screening, rather than secure compliance, it would deter participation.
Nevertheless, examining women's knowledge and attitudes to screening
continues to be the principal approach within the social sciences to
cervical screening.
In sum, uncertainty and risk can be provisionally understood as a product
of the screening experience. This understanding should draw our
attention to the tension between the uncertain benefits of prevention and
the difficulties of identifying, with any certainty, those who might
benefit from preventive strategies (see Klein, 1989, for instance, for a
more general discussion of prevention policy). Smear misinterpretations,
combined with the emphasis placed upon the need for regular screening,
draws attention to the intensified observation over a period of time to
which women are increasingly subject. Risk is mobilised in relation to
cervical screening, as a set of categories, such as 'sexual activity', which
are used to identify certain groups of women for preventive intervention.
Risk, as a product of screening, is seen in the way 'false' negative rates, or
increases in the background prevalence of abnormalities, reveal how the
category of 'errors' are resolved in practice. This resolution raises
questions about the nature of interpretive indexicality and the procedural
rules which govern the classification and processing of smears.
Practitioners themselves are becoming concerned with these issues
expressed through, for instance, an increase in background prevalence.8 1
Whilst the thesis does not directly address these issues, they are implictly
addressed through much of the material presented in Section Three.
In what follows in Section Three, I consider the relationship between
women's embodied interaction with the experience of screening, and the
body as a cultural resource. Embodiment is central to the structure and
Raffle et al 1995, op. cit.
144
process of the thesis, which I use to express a dialectic between the body,
as a universal category, and embodied experience, as a particular
catgeory.82 i am concerned here to examine how 'the body' is experienced
and interpreted in the context of a preventive strategy, such as cervical
screening. In turn, I examine cervical screening as an aspect of
surveillance and draw attention to aspects of screening which have
previously been obscured. In Section Three, therefore, issues of
obligation and entitlement, risk and trust, will be addressed in relation to
the knowledges and practices of cervical screening, in order to further
examine the relationship between the body, gender and health.
82 Shilling (1993) uses the concept of embodiment to revisit Marx's
observation that individuals make their own lives but not in
circumstances of their own choosing. This differs, I think, from Merleau-
Ponty's (1962) use of the notion of embodiment to express a dialectic
between mind and body in which the latter retains biological stability. In
contrast, drawing upon Gadow (1992), I use embodiment to express a
dynamic between the body and embodied experience, on the premise that
neither are fixed or stable.
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SECTION THREE
In Section Two I introduced material which illustrates the relationship
between prevention and surveillance in the context of cervical screening.
In Chapter Three, I described local knowledges which have contributed to
and developed from preventive discourse. Furthermore, I demonstrated
how risk, as a category and marker of social groups, can be seen as a
product of the negotiated character of surveillance. In Chapter Four, I
described the interconnections between prevention discourse in cervical
screening and issues of governance, and highlighted the complex ways in
which governance is interpreted and represented.
In Section Three, I continue to unpack these interconnections through a
discussion of interview material with women who have participated in
cervical screening. In Section One, I argued that one of the ways in
which sociology has addressed the body has been through the concept of
surveillance, which, following Foucault, has engendered new identities.
In Section Three, I examine this argument by exploring the negotiated
experience of cervical screening participation and the expression of
shifts in the nature of knowledge and the client-professional relationship.
The experiences articulated here are diverse, but relate broadly to themes
of obligation and entitlement, risk and trust, and reveal the sense of
embodiment central to these articulations.
In Chapter Five, I describe how women place themselves as active
participants in screening initiatives through the expression of obligation.
This can be seen as a way of claiming attachment to screening despite
quite contradictory experiences. Furthermore, many women experienced
surveillance as a form of care provided by the state, and their negotiation
of this experience articulates a sense of entitlement. For some women,
making claims on screening as a form of social entitlement could provide
an active mechanism for the management of ambiguity. I argue that the
themes of obligation and entitlement are played out in ways which
highlight issues of citizenship.
In Chapter Six I introduce themes of trust and risk. I draw on the
interview data to demonstrate the ways in which the experience of
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cervical screening participation and knowledge of an abnormal smear,
for some women, transformed the relationship between lay and expert
knowledge. Embodiment provided a medium of transformation in ways
which displaced, undercut and heightened the degree of confidence
which women felt they had in expert knowledge. In Chapter Six I argue
that this reconfiguration of confidence relates to the production of risk in
two main ways. First, the experience of abnormality for some of the
women developed a sense of embodiment which was defined by internal
limitations and articulated in terms of risk as a state of being. For other
women, embodiment was redefined in terms of being at risk, not from
cervical disease alone, but from the ambiguities and uncertainties
associated with the 'abstract system' of which cervical screening is part.
In these two chapters, I present interview data in two forms. First, I
present data as block text when illustrating a broad theme. Transcription
units for this form of text refers to the original interview transcripts and
are identified as [TU 1 - 5]. Second, when introducing a narrative to
illustrate a process of reflexivity and negotiation, I present the data as text
in numbered lines [01-05] and also indicate the transcription units from
which they are drawn. This convention allows me to refer to specific
phrases and ways of telling in my discussion of the data. Biographical
details of the women who participated in the study can be found in
Appendix I.
I reserve any methodological discussion for Chapten Seven. Chapter
Seven presents an account of the thesis as a constructed negotiation and
here I discuss the production of the thesis as an expression of my own
local knowledge. My focus on the contested nature of abnormal smears
emerged in the process of engaging with the concerns of the technical
and policy literature on screening, as well as my interpretation of
historical debates around smear classification and interpretation.
Therefore, in Chapter Seven, I discuss the relationship between this
process and the products of my research. For instance, in discussing the
interview data, I attempt to make visible both the creative processes
through which women in the study made their experiences meaningful to
me and the way in which I have treated those experiences as meaningful.
In Chapter Seven, I first discuss the process of negotiating access to a
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regional colposcopy clinic, in order to identify women who might be
willing to participate in the research. Second, I outline the process
through which the interview data was analysed and third, I focus on the




Social Duty, Empowerment and Responsibility
Introduction
As Section Two suggests, current understandings of cervical screening
emphasise its role in the prevention of disease. The idea of prevention has
been criticised as a form of medicalisation (Crawford, 1980), and, as Illich
(1986) has observed, the pursuit of health is increasingly perceived as a
social norm, as a kind of work to be done with and upon the body.
Crawford, and others drawing on his work (see Lupton, 1994), identify
health as a symbolic category which reveals tacit assumptions about social
life, or where:
'bodily states are key markers in which are invested the social
definitions of the self...' (1984, p60).
Following Douglas (1970), Crawford (1979; 1980; 1984) describes the body as
a cultural object through which health operates as a moral discourse, as
healthism. As the expression of a new form of consiousness, to which both
prevention and the body are central, healthism seeks autonomy from
medical terms, meanings and perceptions. Improving and protecting the
body has been identified as part of a logic of health consciousness which
developed in the 1980s, as part of a new ethic (Ehrenreich, 1983), played
out through a regimen of restraint and denial (Glassner, 1995). Health and
body maintenance has become a disciplined activity which requires the
allocation of time in highly structured lives, and is most vociferously
advocated by the middle classes (Bourdieu, 1984). Such ideas are also
culturally pervasive as they are circulated and disseminated by the media
(Lupton, 1994). For instance, injunctions to participate in exercise, the
patronage of anti-smoking, the prevalence of vitamin consumption and
the proliferation of health magazines highlight the predominance of
health as a cultural category.
The notion of self-improvement within the middle classes draws on an idea
of the body as a biophysical entity which can be threatened by physical
agents and controlled by science (Crawford, 1980, p72). This idea of the
body draws from the dominant assumptions of contemporary biomedicine,
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in which the body is an object of rational control (Kirmayer, 1988).
Therefore, within healthism, the normal becomes abnormal and subject to
rational control and everyday aspects of life are increasingly managed
(Arney and Bergen, 1984) often in collaboration with expert forms of
knowledge (Armstrong, 1984). This view of the body is strongly associated
with ideas about personal and social responsibility, which Crawford
defines as a political discourse stemming from the self-help ethos
emerging in the 1970s, and which I discussed brielfy in Chapter Two in
relation to women's health. Similarly, Herzlich and Pierret (1987) point
out how self-groups of the 1960s and 1970s were based on identification of
the limits of medicine, and challenged orthodox biomedical
understandings of the body.
Self-help groups, many of which were feminist in origin, appropriated
medical knowledge as a way of 'learning the language of professionals'
and contributing to personal autonomy and empowerment, as I have
argued in Chapter Two. Self-help groups were, and many would argue
continue to be (Giddens, 1992), collective enterprises which break down
the isolation of individuals in their management of disease and disorder.
The basis of their relationship is voluntary and the nature of their task is
reflective, stemming also in part from the inward-looking or narcissistic
culture of the 1970s (Lasch, 1980). Self-help groups provided a means of
collective identity mobilised around self-care, in an attempt to reduce the
reliance of individuals on medical knowledge. Self-care included the
development of diagnostic and therapeutic skills, as well as the adoption of
disease prevention strategies. Empowerment through self-care,
furthermore, has been linked to the development of a consumption logic
within welfare states, where individuals are increasingly identified as
'partners' in the production of health (Armstrong, 1984).
Within the emergence of healthism, ideas about empowerment and
responsibility have become intertwined. For Crawford (1980)
responsibility, or personal autonomy, has become a symbol of
empowerment, but is one which elevates the status of the individual, and
obscures the power relations underlying the production of disease.
Alongside the growth of personal choice, through which individuals may
make decisions about the kinds of practices which will contribute to their
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health, there increasingly coexists a social duty to pursue health (Herzlich
and Pierret, 1987). Hence personal choice, autonomy and empowerment
can also be seen as a new form of governance (Rose, 1990). As Greco
(1993) points out, the notion of personal autonomy and choice, in neo-
liberal discourse, can be seen to express internalised morality and rational
will, therefore enabling boundaries to be drawn around those who express
rational will and those who fail to do so. The expression of health as a
personal choice, therefore expresses social membership. Prevention has
become a dominant means of addressing health, and hence those who fail
to express health, or prevention, as a personal choice, are subject to
'victim-blaming' (Crawford, 1979), or as we have seen in Chapter Four in
relation to cervical screening, identified as 'defaulters'.
The pursuit of health, however, has also increasingly come to be seen as a
form of social entitlement in welfare states. Whilst many areas of welfare
are the focus of increasing contention, commitment to the notion of
socialised health care remains high. Expectations around what the
National Health Service can and should provide have risen and many
people consider the provision of health as a key aspect of citizenship. Yet,
with few exceptions, the hidden discourse within much discussion of
prevention and personal responsibility in relation to health, is that of
social democratic citizenship.
Preventive discourse, seen in this light, is a productive power which
draws both upon a neo-liberal notion of autonomy and choice, and notions
of both social duty and we shall see, entitlement, to mobilise individuals
into both the construction and resolution of health issues. The idea of the
body as an entity which can be known in a particular way, and which can
be controlled through instrumental action, underpins the power of
prevention. Concomitantly, the achievement of health is possible through
instrumental actions and 'healthy' behaviours, which are aimed at
enhancing the biological functioning of the body. In this view, the body
is distinct from both mind and society, and comes to be 'managed'
according to criteria elaborated in biomedical discourse (Crawford, 1984).
Such management occurs through the internalisation of medical
knowledge which is reproduced in everyday life and discourse, and
contributes to self-policing activities.
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This management, is however, also disrupted and (re)negotiated and it is
this which I explore in this chapter. In particular, I place emphasis on
embodiment, and how this mediates the social and cultural meanings of
cervical disease. The cervix is often perceived as a taboo aspect of female
embodiment. It is associated with reproduction as a gatekeeper of life and
death and with sexuality as a site of pain and pleasure (Thomas, 1992). The
cervix is seen by some in terms of contamination and pollution (Posner
and Vessey, 1988) and not to be touched by self, only by sanctioned others.
This kind of thinking may be expressed through some women's reluctance
to wear tampons during menstruation (Laws, 1990). It may help to explain
why cervical self-examination is perceived more negatively than breast
self-examination since it involves a degree of familiarity with internal
body space.
For the women who participated in this study, the cervix, as a discrete
body part, was seldom an object of individual scrutiny prior to screening
participation. For some women, the experience of cervical screening
involved pain, discomfort and bleeding and they were made acutely
conscious of their cervix both within this frame, and through the process
of reflection which I asked of them in the interview context. Hence the
experience of cervical screening was both fractured and contested, and
the sense of embodiment articulated in the accounts which follow supports
the notion of the body as a site of transformation and negotiation,
particularly in relation to perceived boundaries between wellness and
sickness. Women articulated their experiences according to similar broad
themes but different themes also coexisted in single accounts. A common
theme running through the experiences of many of the women was the
way in which obligation to participate in cervical screening was
constructed, perceived and manifest. Cervical screening was seen as
something in which women were obliged to participate, identified as:
an everyday thing [Carol TU 59-60]
something which just had to be done [Sheila TU 26-27].
something that women get used to [Julie TU 61-62]
something that women should go and get done [Rose TU 97-99],
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In this chapter I address three expressions of obligation articulated in
women's accounts of their patterns of entry into, and experiences of,
cervical screening. Expressions of obligation were mediated through
rituals identified in the clinic setting; as an aspect of femininity; and
finally through a sense of care owed to both self and others.
Rituals and Routines
A recurring feature of sociological literature on the experience of health
in clinic settings, is the way in which the highly ritualised and
ceremonial order of the clinic sustains power relationships (Strong, 1979;
Roth, 1963) and marks social boundaries (Frankenberg, 1988). The rituals
invoked by some women referred to those which regulate the female body
within the context of the clinic, such as being asked to dress in ways
which can accommodate medical examination, or by perceiving the clinic
to be impersonal in ways which anticipate judgement about women. The
control of time and information was perceived by some women as
constraining and regulatory. For example, Alice (32) first had a smear
eighteen months prior to our discussion in response to a 'Well Woman'
invitation from her general practitioner. She indicated that she had had a
'bad time' and felt 'very uncomfortable' during this encounter, although
she did not elaborate on this. She found out five weeks later, via a
computerised letter, that her smear was abnormal and that she should see
her own general practitioner 'as soon as possible'. Here she recalls
discussion about this with her general practitioner:
Alice Extract 1: TU 55-56
01 I was told to put it out of my mind,
02 that I had an abnormal smear and had to have an examination
03 to see the extent of the spread,
04 but that I didn't have cancer, that it was precancerous...
[
05 AH: How did you feel about it?
[
06 Frightened and concerned...I had a weekend of waiting,
07 because I got the letter on a Friday...
08 it was a weekend of not understanding...
[
09 AH: What did you think it meant?
[
10 I thought it meant cancer of the cervix...
1 1 ...I thought about what spread meant,
12 of how it might affect my fertility
13 and I thought about death.
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Alice's response here is to a 'routine' procedure which points to further
investigation [01-02]. This produces anxiety for her [06-13] which is
undermined by the instruction of her general practitioner to 'put it out of
her head'. She was invited to attend for further examination at the
colposcopy clinic and here she reflects on what she considers her
inability to 'assert herself. When she arrived at the hospital she recalled
that she:
Alice Extract 2: TU 91-92
01 had to take off my clothes, put them in a basket and put on a gown,
02 and I was asked to participate in a study for new treatment.
03 But I had no information about this, like what the old treatment was.
04 I in fact had the old method, loop diathermy,
05 since it had spread too much rather than cold coagulation.
06 I wasn't surprised at having an examination, I was used to them,
07 and there was nothing I minded being asked...
08 my partner came with me, but not when I had the colposcopy,
09 although I would have liked him with me.
In this account, the perceived agenda of the clinic dominates and sets the
framework for Alice's interpretation of her experience. She is asked to
engage in the ritual of presenting herself for examination [01-02], with
which she complies. However, she is aware of the way in which both
ritual, time and the control of information regulate her experience [03-
04], Although her partner stayed with her until she had colposcopy, she
implies that again, her experience is regulated by clinic routine [07-09],
On reflection, she thought she had not asserted herself, had not been able
to question the events at the clinic because they were part of a routine
order. She explained how she felt disempowered because of the tight time
controls imposed on her, and how she felt obliged to comply with the
instructions issued her at the clinic. She sums up her assessment of this
obligation thus:
Alice Extract 3: TIJ 100-101
01 I hadn't asserted myself at the time I went to the clinic,
02 that bothered me...I was literally doing everything I was told,
03 but there was no time for explanation, no apologies...
04 I was disappointed that I had such little control over myself.
05 Because there was little time everything was rushed
06 and I felt I had an obligation to comply with the treatment,
07 but I was given no choice, and there was an unspoken pressure,
08 although I knew they were under pressure too...'
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Here Alice's obligation to comply with treatment is structured both
through the medical management of time, by being rushed [03-05] (see
also Roth, 1963; Frankenberg, 1988) and the perceived assumption of
compliance [05-07]. Importantly, however, Alice's account does not draw
on disempowerment to explain her experience. Rather than focus only on
the way in which power is taken away from her or exerted over her,
Alice's account also points to the way in which her autonomy is
undermined, which makes it difficult for her to sustain a sense of
embodiment as a woman 'in control' of the situation in which she finds
herself. Alice is given minimal explanation of the process of examination
and treatment being offered [03], despite the fact that she is also being
asked to participate in research which is nominally covered by codes of
conduct and ethics and which require informed consent from potential
subjects of that research [Extract 2 02-03], Furthermore, Alice is aware of
the expectation of obligation and refers to the 'unspoken pressure' on the
part of the staff that women will comply with clinic procedures and
treatments [05-07], Her perception that she has little or no control is thus
reinforced. She does not understand this in terms of being dispossessed of
power, but of the contingent nature of power [03-04].
Indeed, she acknowledges the conflict between her identity as a
professional woman used to taking responsibility for her actions and her
clinic identity as a women unable to assert her autonomy [08], expected to
conform to the rituals and routine of the clinic. This sense of obligation
was reinforced by the fact that:
'they want women to have smears and women want to have smears'
[Alice TU 142-143]
Rituals and routines in clinic settings are clearly an important way of
creating and sustaining a sense of obligation to participate in examination
and investigation. However, both a notion of the routine and of perceived
obligation extended beyond the social space of the clinic. Many women
saw screening as part of a more general set of routine procedures which
they could expect across the life course. Ann (28), for instance, had little
contact with health services prior to her abnormal smear. Her first
smear, at the age of 20, was at the Family Planning Clinic and her memory
was that she was 'due to get a smear' and 'there was a big sort of scare on
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about...something to do with the Pill and cervical cancer' in which she
remembered that 'there was a big rush 'of women wanting to have a smear
and 'make sure they are alright and everything'. Whilst Ann did not use
the term 'routine', her perception of being 'due to have one' conjures a
notion of routine, or of a perception of a socially appropriate time in
which to be intiated into screening. When I asked her if she had been
conscious or aware of her cervix prior to her first smear, she said:
'I don't think about it. I don't really...I suppose I would have been
about 20 or something when I went for my first smear and 1 really
thought it was par for the course. I didn't really think about what it
was all for.' [Ann TU 27-28 my emphasis].
Whilst the question refers directly to the cervix, Ann responds in relation
to screening in general, in a way which suggests that her perception of
screening was a part of a more generalised set of examinations as part of
women's reproductive health. Ann's perception of screening as par for
the course has a degree of inevitability attached to it. In addition, she
assumed that screening was associated with cancer detection. The
following extract illustrates this.
Ann Extract 1: TU 19-20
01 I suppose at the time I thought it was for cancer,
02 for checking out cancer which I suppose...
03 well it's not particularly cancer
04 but just changes they're looking for,
05 but at the time I thought [if] there's something abnormal
06 - you've got cancer.
07 It was all...it wasn't really...nowadays especially
08 with all this happening in Glasgow with the smear tests,
09 I mean, it's on the news all the time and everyone seems to know
10 what it's about now. But at the time
1 1 it wasn't very often talked about.
12 You didn't really undertand it.
1 3 You just knew you had to go and get a smear test and that was it .
[my emphasis].
Here Ann is reflexive about the nature of her knowledge about cervical
screening prior to and in the context of her participation [05-12], This
new knowledge is expressed by appeal to a preventive discourse [01-04].
However, she expresses her initial participation in terms of obligation
which is linked to the perceived routine and inevitability of screening
[13], as something which is part of the routine surveillance which women
experience rather than the monitoring of health. Furthermore, Ann
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places this memory in the context of a 'big scare', in which cervical
disease and the contraceptive Pill are linked to her experience in ways to
which she feels obliged to respond.
Liz (32) also had her first smear in the context of family planning, around
the age of nineteen. Asked to describe this, she said:
Liz Extract 1 TU: 4-5: 22
01 I cannae mind exactly, but I'd say I was 19...at the doctor's...em...
02 probably with family planning. I mean,
03 they had me down for family planning so that would
04 suggest I had a smear test then....
[
05 AH:What did you think the smear test was for?
[
06 It's necessary to find out if you have something wrong with you...
07 I just knew you had to have it...[my emphasis]
Like Ann, Liz places screening in the context of the routine examinations
which women might expect as part of their reproductive careers [01-04],
The doctors 'had her down for it' suggesting that she was not proactive but
responded to an examination in the context of other routine procedures.
She later invokes its necessity by saying she 'knew you had to have it' [07],
A stronger sense of obligation to participate in screening came from Pat
(43) who described her first experience of screening in the context of
pregnancy when she booked in for her first baby at the age of twenty
three. She described her anxieties about the impact of the smear on her
unborn baby and her ambivalence to smears. She characterised her
participation in ante-natal care as reluctant and performed in ways which
identified her to medical and nursing personnel as a 'non-complier' in
general and a 'late-booker' in particular. The following extract illustrates
this ambivalence and reluctance.
Pat Extract 1 TU: 44-48
01 I was 23, pregnant for the first time. It was taken by a doctor
02 in the ante-natal clinic...It was done as a routine [the first time],
[
03 AH:How did you learn about the smear test?
[
04 I was told at the time. I vaguely knew about it from time spent
05 working on a gynae ward.
[





08 AH: How important do you think it is for women to have a smear?
[
09 If smear testing reduces death from cervical cancer
10 then it is important. If not, and I am not convinced
11 that it does reduce death rates in women,
12 I think it is an intrusion by medical people.
Again, the pattern of entry into screening in Pat's case is through what is
perceived as a 'routine' procedure which occurs in the context of women's
reproductive health and pregnancy [01-02]. Pat is not proactive in her
participation but instead, responds because the smear test is placed in the
context of pregnancy, as a routine measure. There were anxieties for her,
connected to the technique of taking the smear. For instance, she was
worried that the 'scraping' of the cervix would put her into premature
labour. She felt her body was vulnerable, yet nevertheless, she felt
obliged to participate in screening. Significantly, the ambivalence Pat
expresses is mediated through the 'expert' knowledge represented by
medical culture, as Pat herself had been a nurse [04-05], However, her
embodied experience transforms expert knowledge into local knowledge,
in ways which underpin both her reluctance and her sense of obligation
to participate.
Ivy (33) too articulates this sense of obligation. Her first ever smear was
also at her booking appointment with her first child thirteen years prior
to our discussion, and here she talks about her initial perceptions of
screening.
Ivy Extract 1: TU 14-15
01 At that time, to be honest I thought they were checking you
02 for something like they check to see if there's anything there.
03 I knew it was related to cervical cancer but I didn't think
04 they suspected I had it or anything like that.
05 I understood it was like a blanket screening, kind of thing
06 - everybody was getting it so...I knew it was connected
07 to cervical cancer but I never went into any great detail about it,
08 it was just a blanket screen that everybody got and that was that..
Like Pat, Ivy's first smear was associated with pregnancy and she places it
in the context of a 'blanket screen' which 'everybody' gets [05-08].
Therefore, screening for Ivy was something with which she would comply
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not because of a prior knowledge about its efficacy and reliability,
although she presents a knowledge of this [01-04], but because of its
application to women in general. This perception of general applicability
and universality contributes to Ivy's understanding of her participation
as a compliant subject.
This pattern is also evident in Eve's account. Eve (44) was apologetic
throughout our discussion for not 'providing interesting information or
complaints'. Her previous contact with health services was mainly in
connection with her pregnancies, one of which she explicitly booked in
late for because she 'didn't like examinations since they were usually
carried out by a man'. Although she could not remember her first ever
smear she recalled that she had had an invitation from her general
practitioner to go for a smear three years prior to our discussion.
Eve Extract 1: TU 8-27
01 I got a letter from the Well Woman clinic saying, you know,
02 that I was due for a smear test - I hadn't had one for a long time
03 and so I went to Dr. Smith over in [the] Health Centre...
04 it might be just over three years ago...and when it was sent away
05 they found that some of the cells weren't right so
06 I had to attend in Edinbugh since then.
[




09 AH:What was your reaction to that?
[
10 Well...just hoping that it wasn't cancer or anything like that,
1 1 that's the kind of upset that comes into your life.
[
12 AH: Right, what made you think it might be?
[
13 Well, it's quite a...quite a lot of women get that now you know.
[
14 AH: Had you had a smear test before?
[
15 It's been quite a long while. I hadn't really...
16 oh I think the last time must have been when I had Mandy and she's
15...
[
17 AH: Did you remember much about it?
[
18 Well it was Dr. Smith at the centre that done it. I suppose just...
19 it never really bothered me too much. I used to feel...
20 I suppose you could say butterflies...you know, kind of funny,
21 but then once you get up and get on with it it's OK like.
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22 It was just one of those things, / just know that
23 you've got to get it done. You know, you find out everything's OK.
[
24 AH: Did your doctor tell you what the smear test was for and
25 what it involved at the clinic?
[
26 Not really, no. You just get used to people telling you..
27 they advise you to get it done like...just like a check up.
[my emphasis]
Eve first presents a summary of her story here [01-06] in which she
briefly outlines how she has come to know that she has an abnormal
smear. She follows this by describing both her initial response [10-11]
and then her reasons for participating in screening [18-23], Eve
articulates resistance to participation in other areas of her reproductive
experience. Nevertheless, she responded to an invitation to have a smear
on the grounds that she 'ought to have it done' because 'you find out
everything's OK', which in her experience was not the case. She was
aware of its purpose and had some information about what it entailed, yet
despite an initial reluctance to participate she does so on the grounds that
it was expected of her.
A further example which illustrates a shift from initial resistance to
compliance is the case of Fiona (34), who had her first ever smear at an
ante-natal booking clinic. Here she talks about how she perceives the
benefits of screening, by developing an account through which she
renegotiates her initial reluctance and accepts the obligation which she
sees as incumbent upon her. The extract which follows is slightly
confusing because of the way in which Fiona moves back and forward in
time in her telling of her account, using her 'new' knowledge to inform
her interpretation of her pre-screening knowledge.
Fiona Extract 1: TU 45-46
01 Well, me personally, if I hadn't had a smear test I probably
02 wouldnae be telling you this. I got this smear test, the second one...
03 I think it was after the last one [child] and it was a year before I got
04 another smear test but the smear was normal.
05 So it really means I got this smear test, the second one...
06 because I was pregnant I had to wait a while
07 before they did another one.
08 I think it's really important that you get them...
08 although I must admit before that
09 it hadn't really given me much thought.
10 I got them when I was pregnant but that was the only time.
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11 I wouldnae have actually asked the doctor but now I would ask,
12 because I had an abnormal one.
13 Before, I had done anything to avoid it.
14 The very first time I was pregnant, I didn't want to have an internal
15 the first time I was pregnant, so I went
16 when the doctor was really really busy
17 and the doctor asked, he says, how long ago have you had a smear?
1 8 And I knew that maybe I'd had it a year ago and I said, I've no idea.
19 So I didnae get a smear test then.
20 He said, well we'll do it after the pregnancy.
21 But I didn't even get an internal until I was actually in labour.
22 But I realise now 1 shouldn't have done that ,
23 I should have went back and had another smear.
24 It's important that you do. For me anyway
25 I had blood tests which came back abnormal so I had to get taken in.
26 But I don't know if that was because during
27 the same time I had the abnormal smears and I was actually waiting
28 to go for treatment but I couldnae go because I was pregnant...
29 I don't know if that affected the blood tests...[my emphasis],
Fiona presents a mortality tale [01-02] here in which she describes her
experience of her first smear and the tactics she used to avoid having
smears taken [05-06; 10-20], She was initially reluctant to have smear tests
because of their association with internal examinations which she earlier
had indicated she found sore. She knew about smears as she elswhere
says:
'I just assumed they were taken for cancer...I knew they could come
back abnormal.' [Fiona TU 67-68]
She did not, however, actively seek them out until they caught up with her
in the context of pregnancy and childbirth. Indeed, the initial action she
invokes is one of avoidance by adopting delaying tactics and identifying
'safe' moments to visit her general practitioner when she perceived that
he would be too busy to take a smear [15-20]. Embedded in her narrative is
the sense of obligation which has emerged from her experience [08; 22-
23],
Reluctance to participate because she wishes to avoid internal
examinations is replaced in Fiona's account of her experience by anxieties
over the impact of having a smear on her baby. She was having blood
tests which may or may not have been connected to the abnormal smear,
and there was some uncertainty in her perception of the management of
the smear test. Elsewhere she says:
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'I hope they know what they are doing.' [Fiona TU 105]
Fiona's sense of reluctance is also reinforced by the response of her
general practitioner to her avoidance strategies. On one occasion when
she went 'late' for a smear, her general practitioner reprimanded her
thus:
Fiona Extract 2: TU 60-66
01 I went late the last time and she [her GP] went absolutely crazy.
02 She said, make sure you have your smear...but for people
03 who haven't had smears I don't know what their doctors would say.
04 Maybe they would say, if they didn't want one
05 they would just leave it.
[
06 AH: How late did you go the last time?
[
06 I had an appointment at Elsie Inglis, it was every six months
07 and then they got yearly.
08 Well they forgot to give me a yearly appointment
09 so I contacted them and they said they would send another one out
10 but they sent if for another three months
11 and so I don't know whether..
12 maybe it was just the kids and everything. I forgot all about it...
[
13 AH: So your doctor wasn't very pleased?
[
14 No, so I had to phone up again and Elsie's werenae too pleased
15 and they said they would refer me.
16 It might be easier for you to go to your doctor.
17 So they wrote me a letter saying to me just to contact my doctor
18 and so it was a while before I eventually
19 got around to going to the doctor
20 and she said, oh, I was going to write to you. [pause]
21 It is a thought going though.
The professional response to Fiona's reluctance to go for a repeat smear
[01-02], which may have been compounded by the material difficulties of
finding time and space to go to either the hospital or her general
practitioner [09-12], was to signal her failure to comply [14-16] and to
confirm her identity as a reluctant participant. This did not improve the
experience of screening for Fiona and she responded to requests and
invitations at points when they connected with material openings for her
in terms of time and space, reinforced by the embodied experience of
pregnancy.
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The reflexive nature of these accounts highlight how structures of time
and routine reinforce a sense of social obligation to comply with
examination and investigation. These women identified themselves, first,
as resistant to, then subsequently, as compliant with a perceived
obligation to participate in screening. The context in which these women
were invited to have a smear test further contributed to this sense of
obligation because of the way in which non-compliance is perceived to
carry implications for reproductive outcomes and their sense of
embodiment. In these accounts, the normative power of cervical
screening is apparent.
What begins to emerge is a picture of a surveillance continuum along
which women are placed, and into which women might be drawn at
particular points. Obligation to participate in screening is reinforced
through normalisation processes such as clinic rituals and appeal to the
'routine'. The generation of anxiety further contributes to this sense of
obligation. On the first count, these women perceived screening as a
normal aspect of repoductive health care and on the second, anxieties
associated with reproductive outcomes reinforced their compliance. These
processes of normalisation were grounded in the structures of time and
routine which create boundaries around acceptable and unacceptable
forms of participation in cervical screening. Nevertheless, whilst these
women responded to the perceived imperative, they did so in their own
terms by adopting tactics of hesitancy and reluctance.
Regulated Femininity and Responsible Citizenship
Cervical screening was also seen by some women as a routine procedure
associated with femininity, with part of being/becoming a woman. For
instance, Mary (39) associated her understanding of smear tests as part of
a 'common knowledge' which certain women would have:
'...Women that have been...sort of...on the Pill, or had children, or
things like that should go for smear tests.' [Mary TU 52-53]
Mary links cervical screening here to both sexual activity and
reproduction. Susan (36) makes similar connections. Her previous
contact with health services was minimal and she had participated in
screening since the age of sixteen in the context of family planning.
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Susan elaborated on the notion of 'common knowledge' and commented
that she would make her daughter go for smear tests 'as soon as she is old
enough'. When asked to explain what she meant by 'old enough', she said:
Susan Extract 1: TU 126-127: 214-215
01 I don't know...eh...to be perfectly honest with you.
02 I mean, they're no really fully developed are they, at even 12.
03 I don't know what age they start doing smears on them...
04 I think maybe...it depends how mature they are...
05 I would say maybe 15 or 16.
06 Because, I mean, it could be lying there,
07 and they would catch it in time
08 or whatever. I think maybe 15 or 16 they should have...
09 because obviously they're having their period at that age
10 and so surely they should be able to have a smear
11 by that time as well.
12 Just as I say with Lisa, I would definitely get her a smear test
13 and that when she's old enough to have it done, you know?
14 I would never let her say, 'I'm no going'.
15 If I had to drag her, I would drag her.
This normative view of femininity as regulated was further supported by
statements referring to the initiation of young women into femininity.
For Fiona, for instance, screening was also seen as something which
should be part of the education of growing up as a girl, linked to learning
about menstruation, sexuality and reproduction. Furthermore, she
identified the nature of women's participation in terms of whether they
were good or negligent citizens:
Fiona Extract 3: TU 80-81
01 I think everybody from the age of maybe...
02 oh, when you start having sex. I think that girls
03 should be more aware. Like at school when they get
04 talks about periods and things, I think they should
05 be taught about cancer smears as part of growing up.
06 I think I wasn't very good, if I'd thought about it, to me,
07 it was just a nuisance, getting a smear.
08 I thought it was uncomfortable
09 and an embarrassment. I think you should start it early,
10 but I think you should continue them on.
11 No woman wants to have them,
12 but I think you should have them more often.
The obligation to attend for a smear test and the examinations and
treatment which an abnormality engendered clearly implied a compliance
which could be linked to routine interventions which regulated female
bodies. The smear test was also seen as a gender marker. Cervical
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screening for these women, symbolised transitions to adult femininity
represented by the onset of menstruation, initiation into sexual activity or
pregnancy. This form of obligation could also be seen as a form of self-
surveillance ('starting early, keeping regular, going often') and was
considered important by women who did go regularly for smears, or who
claimed that they would do so in the future.
Obligation could therefore be read as a cultural expression of normative
femininity, in which the latter, as a public understanding of
responsibility, is incorporated into the world of private conduct. Thus
women who did not participate in screening were perceived by those who
did so, as negligent citizens, and moreover, sometimes perceived as
unliberated and out of tune with their bodies. For instance, as Linda (37)
reflected on her first smear experience, she struggled to present a picture
of herself in terms of responsibility. She tried to discount her feelings of
discomfort as she talked about her experience. She did not, for instance,
remember feeling embarrassed, but acknowledged that embarrassment
might have manifest itself in ways which she would not, in retrospect,
recognise. She says:
Linda Extract 1: TU 14-15
01 ...I didn't really feel too bad about it.
02 I thought this was very necessary,
03 this needs to get done and I gauged my reaction
04 in contrast to other women
05 I know women who actively avoid going for smears
06 and some who I suspect might have never gone for smears at all
07 because they just find it too embarrassing, and I just find that so...
08 I suppose I think that's nonsense.
09 I feel sad - that's a terrible way to feel.
10 It's a shame.
This extract is framed by a discourse of responsible citizenship, where
Linda perceives participation in screening in terms of necessity [01-04].
She presents herself as an 'informed' woman and implies that women who
particpate in screening know that this is best for their bodies and health,
and have been freed from constraints of femininity which make it
difficult for women to subject their bodies to examination or discussion
[08-10], Indeed she expresses sadness and presents a normative femininity
which is open to scrutiny, which does not get embarrassed under a
medical gaze since this is a gaze which has 'seen it all before'. The
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understanding of femininity which Linda presents here is one which is
rational and calculative, a regulated, yet self-possessed femininity,
through which she actively constrains expressions of irrationality, such
as embarrassment.
Linda's account compares both with liberal feminist notions of
empowerment where embarassment is seen as something to be
transcended, and with neo-liberal ideas about self-governance which
demand the transcendance of the 'irrational'. Such work highlights the
ways in which both women and health professionals perceive that
'having children' or being sexually active anaesthetises women against
any embarrassment which might be experienced by an internal
examination. As phenomenological research suggests, during
examinations such as that associated with the taking of a cervical smear,
the actors involved define the situation as a clinical rather than as a
sexual encounter (Emerson, 1970; Henslin and Biggs, 1982). Posner and
Vessey (1988) describe this struggle to place emphasis on the clinical
nature of internal examinations and draw attention to the ways in which
women in their study deny a place for embarrassment in their experience
of cervical screening. The 'motherhood effect' here could also be seen as
an expression of the way in which deference and compliance are expected
and mobilised in the context of client-professional relationships. Hence
the responsible citizen in cervical screening is one who identifes the
screening experience in clinical terms and partitions the potential for
embarrassment, by moving it from the potentially sexual to the
reproductive sphere.
Within liberal feminist debates around health, sexuality is associated with
'privacy' and it is privacy which is seen to be disrupted in medical
encounters, such as those incurred by cervical screening. This is
mobilised when feminists encourage women to challenge questions about
sexual activity which are asked by doctors and other health professionals,
in order to protect liberal notions of privacy in relation to sexuality.
However, when women attempt to protect their privacy and use
embarrassment as a means of doing so, they are perceived by other women
and feminist commentators as resisting participation. Embarrassment is
discounted as a rational response to screening by liberal feminists who
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seek to 'empower' women to take control over their health. Further,
within this discourse of empowerment, refusals and other resistances are
effectively discounted as rational responses to the screening imperative.1
Empowerment, by, for example, overcoming embarrassment, is a norm
which has come to mean participation and compliance within liberal
feminist accounts of screening. Therefore, the various uses to which the
notion of embarrassment are put reveal the instability of boundaries
between notions of the public and the private as they are mobilised in
prevention discourse.
Both the rationalisation of the female body and the logic of surveillance
are reinforced where the importance of the individual in the production
and reproduction of self-governance is emphasised. Other women
mobilised notions of responsible citizenship and individual choice, but in
ways which identified the importance of information in order to secure
entitlement as a rational course of action. Liz, for instance, a member of a
women's group which campaigned for more information about cervical
screening and which supported women with abnormal smears, said:
'I think you should get more information, I think it's my right to
get that information, but I know that for some people it can cause
embarrassment. But you should be able to get it from your doctor or
go to the library.' [Liz TU 36-37]
This notion of rights was further articulated by Lorna who perceived
reluctance on the part of her general practitioner to give her a smear test.
She said:
'I went for a smear and she said, she asked me if I was on the Pill or
anything like that and I wasn'ty at the time. And so she said, you're
not entitled to a smear. She said every five years, but...then I had
the coil fitted so you're actually entitled to have it done every three
years.' [Lorna TU 75-76]
Susan also expressed a notion of entitlement in which health care is
linked to consumption.
1 Drawing on Actor Network Theory, Singleton (1995) makes a similar
point about the ways in which way some women may 'position' themselves
outside screening by, for instance, highlighting material barriers to
participation. She does not, however, use this insight to address issues of
surveillance.
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'If I went and asked for a smear and they wouldnae give me it then I
would fight to get one. I just wouldnae say, oh well, that's it then.
I'd say, well, look it's my womb and I want it done. It's my body,
you're my GP. You're meant to do what I'm wanting done, you know.
I would fight for it definitely.' [Susan TU 122-123]
Responsible citizenship was also articulated in other ways. For instance,
one young woman suggested that having smears ought to be 'like giving
blood', a distinctly public minded form of behaviour. Chris (21) perceived
cervical screening as taboo and that it ought be 'detabooised' and become
even more routine through, for instance, advertising.
Chris Extract 1: TIJ 334-342
01 I don't know if it's regular practice here to offer smears
02 when you reach a certain age.
03 Maybe it depends on what doctor you go to.
04 I don't know. But I think it's a good thing,
05 if you come to a certain age.
06 I suppose maybe you should lower the age now, because, definitely,
07 people are having sex younger now than they did do
08 and maybe they should lower that age to 17. Maybe even 16.
09 I suppose it's going to be a bit of an ordeal
10 for someone who's a bit younger - going for a smear -
11 but it should become a common thing, like
12 going to give blood...to have your smear, it's an important thing.
13 Probably I don't think it's talked about enough.
14 It's like a taboo subject.
15 So the more taboo it is,
16 the more apprehensive people are going to be doing it.
This extract places cervical screening participation in a more
authoritarian or social democratic discourse of responsible citizenship in
which cervical screening is seen as something which should become a
social norm [09-12], This stands in contrast to the neo-liberal versions of
citizenship articulated above, with their emphasis on notions of personal
choice. For Chris, as a young woman negotiating her sexual identity in
the context of a recent sexual relationship, screening for cervical cancer
was also part of a wider set of social taboos which she perceived as
requiring redress [13-16], She draws links between the personal and the
public as a means of increasing participation and consequently locates
notions of responsibility in the public domain. For Chris, bringing the
private conduct associated with screening into public discussion, operates
as a normalising strategy which places emphasis on social norms.
Furthermore, this extract draws attention to the 'technologies of
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citizenship' (Rose, 1990) such as advertising, which regulate the private
sphere through the production and dissemination of social norms.
Obligation can also been seen as a response to the perceived potential for
the detection and curability of cervical cancer. In some accounts,
prevention and cure are indistinguishable. For instance:
'I just knew it was something you should go and get done basically,
at that time it was every 5 years or so they advised it should be
done...em...I knew why they did it obviously, to watch out for
cervical cancer. [Rose TU 94-95]
'Oh I knew what it was for, I knew it was for cervical cancer. I
knew what it was for.' [Margaret TU 185]
'I had to go since it it is curable' [Alice TU 35-36].
'Obviously just to prevent anything like cancer appearing. That
would be it. It's certainly not a nice experience, you know?' [Ann
TU 83-84]
The indistinguishability between prevention and cure, and the notion of
disease progression as an inevitability sometimes co-existed in women's
accounts. For instance, Rose, who moved back and forwards between
normal and abnormal smears over many years, alludes to this when she
says:
Rose Extract: TU 464-475
01 I suppose if I hadn't had the smear to begin with,
02 things could have been a lot worse. I wasn't...
03 I mean I didn't feel that there was anything wrong with me.
04 I didn't have any problems with my periods or anything like that,
05 so I don't know whether I would have done, if I hadn't had a smear
06 and just carried on with things.
07 I don't know if I would have felt whether there was eventually
08 something wrong with me or not.
09 But obviously the longer it goes on the worse it becomes,
10 at least being picked up at that stage...
11 it was for most people easy to cure,
12 for most people it would have been.
13 But certainly it's not a serious problem or anything, you know?
A disaster narrative is introduced here by reference to screening as cure
[01-02]. For Rose, 'picking it up before it got worse' was an important
aspect of the experience of screening, despite the ambiguity and perpetual
169
state of abnormality in which her own experience was cast. Cervical
disease is perceived here as inevitable progression and screening as an
objective test which will reveal hidden disease [03-08], The sense of cure
is strong when abnormalities have been recognised and treated, but this
could also cross over into an articulation of prevention.
Yet even where preventive treatment has apparently failed (for instance,
subsequent smears are abnormal) the obligation to participate is still
strong. So for instance, Susan explained her position if she had another
abnormal smear.
Susan Extract TU 104-105
01 Oh I think I'd be devastated. I'd just remember
02 everything that I went through this time.
03 I'd hate to have another abnormality, I would.
04 I think most other women feel the same though.
05 You expect when you get the treatment that it's over and done
06 and you're cured or whatever.
07 But then if I did have that, I wouldn't not go.
08 I would go but I'd know what I'd be like again - up to 90.
09 As long as I wasn't kept waiting I'd probably be OK.
10 I'd be thinking, 'oh no, no again please.' No that' s OK.
1 1 I'd definitely go back. I wouldn't not go.
Eve also invokes this notion of revealing the unseen within the context of
a medical or expert gaze in her explanation of participation.
'...the only thing is just as I say to make [sure] I go now and not
miss...you know, go regularly...just to get it checked out...just in
case....just in case there are any signs of cancer because that's
something that bothers me.' [Eve TU 118-121]
Here the expression of compliance is expressed by reference to the sense
of security provided by screening participation. Eve draws on an assumed
certainty of expert knowledge which, rather than confirming the absence
of cancer, reveals the possible presence of cancer.
The conflation of cervical cancer as both preventable and curable might
be interpreted as an expression of 'knowledge gaps', such as those to
which I referred in Chapter Four. However, this indistinguishability is
linked to a sense of obligation to participate and indeed persuade other
women that they ought to participate. Some of these women draw on a
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sense of responsible citizenship to articulate their embodied experience of
cervical screening. Despite considerable ambiguities, anxieties and
ambivalences, many see themselves as moral agents who, by placing their
bodies under surveillance, also meet social expectations, or exercise social
duty through the expression of what they see as rational action.
Furthermore, the expressions of self-governance here, through choice
and entitlements, highlight an active and engaged sense of participation
in cervical screening.
Negotiating Surveillance and Care
'I'm going for smears, I'm doing everything I can.'
[Diane, TU 85-86]
Finally, obligation was expressed by some women in relation to a
perceived regimen of self-care and watchfulness over other women. For
instance, an obligation to inform and persuade friends and kin of the
necessity of screening features strongly in some accounts. Similarly,
some women expressed a sense of increased vigilance in relation to their
own screening participation. Mary recounted how she responded to a
sister and a friend who were requested to attend for a cervical smear. The
following narrative extract illustrates how Mary places emphasis on the
way in which this vigilance is expressed.
Mary Extract 3: TU 48-49 'The Persuasion'
01 ...a couple of years ago she says to me
02 — they've sent me a thing for a smear.
03 I'm not going and opening my legs — she says.
04 And that's the sort of attitude she had,
05 and I said I think you'd better be going.
06 But I never made any comment that
07 I had problems or anything like that.
08 Some women, as I say, they say it's embarrassing.
09 I've a friend who actually came with me when I went for a smear
10 and the nurse was saying about what's up with these women
1 1 who just won't come for a smear?
12 And I says her out there won't come.
13 Well she got nabbed for an appointment and she had...
14 well she did go.
15 To me, they just don't bother.
16 I think it's a thing you should...
Mary first introduces her sister as non-compliant [01-03], and indeed
appeals to 'privacy' to ground her non-compliance. Mary's own critical
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voice is embedded within this story and she actively obscures her own
struggle to deal with the ambiguities in her own experiences of screening
[05-07]. She acknowledges the reluctance of other women to participate
and the way in which women appeal to 'embarrassment', as a means of
explaining their non-participation [08-11]. Despite her own struggles
however, Mary presents her own participation in terms of obligation. Her
reference to her sister [01-03], her friend [09] and the nurse's observation
about women who do not participate [10-11], all draw boundaries around
her own identity as a woman who has acknowledged her social obligations
and those women who have failed to do so. The nurse's reference to 'these'
women especially operates as an identity marker which alerts us to Mary's
consideration of her own sense of embodiment.
In recalling her response to her sister, with whom Mary no longer has
contact, she is clear that she considers the best course of action for her is
to have a smear. Yet she immediately qualifies this definitive statement
with reference to her own experience, which was characterised by a
series of abnormal smears, examinations, normal smears and treatment.
Yet she alerted neither her sister nor her friend to this complex
experience and indeed submerged it in a positive statement of the
necessity of screening. This indicates a certain ambivalence on the part
of Mary. On the one hand she clearly states what she perceives as the
correct course of action, yet on the other, she does not wish to reveal the
extent to which her own abnormalities remain unresolved. Thus she
prioritises the needs of the system over her own needs for answers, in
order to persuade her sister of her obligation to attend to her health [05].
Her obligation to what she perceives as prevailing social norms outweighs
her desire to find answers to her own dilemmas. There is, therefore, a
mismatch expressed here between her own ambivalence and her response
to a perception of social obligation.
In her reference to her friend, Mary is more beligerent. She reveals to
the nurse taking her smear that her friend falls into that category of
women who 'avoid' having smears. She is therefore exposed as a
'defaulter', deviant, an outsider. Mary felt justified in providing the nurse
with this information and may have done so on the assumption that the
nurse would then approach her friend and 'nab her for an appointment',
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thus providing no means of escape or resistance [13]. Therefore, not only
health professionals participate in the opportunistic screening of which
many women complain. Indeed, some women themselves may participate
in this watchfulness over other women through a sense of obligation to
reveal to kin and friends ways of maintaining health and preventing
disease, and in doing so, appeal to an authoritarian discourse of
citizenship.
A sense of watchfulness was evoked by some women in relation to the care
they received in their experience of screening, and the way in which
nurses in particular tried to provide information from which women
might make decisions. However, this sense of of care could be counter¬
productive. For instance, Julie suggested the 'cosy, all women' atmosphere
of health centres and colposcopy clinics undermined the clinical context
in a way which was unhelpful for her, precisely because of the way she
was expected to make decisions and, therefore, deal with their
consequences. Kathleen echoed this sentiment. She was full of praise for
the way in which she had been reassured and her anxieties had been
addressed by both her general practitioner and the clinic. However, such
reassurance could also be counter-productive. For instance, she said:
'...perhaps they collude with you in underestimating the impact of
having somebody...having gone through this panic that you've got
cancer, and just having that physical assault - and it is one - it's
so ...minimised. And there's this big notion that it's all preventive
and that it's wonderful. And you think, yeah, that's great, but it
actually minimises the bit that says this is frightening. It's
traumatic and an assault on your body.' [Kathleen TU 48-49]
Obligation to participation in response to watchfulness is expressed here
in ways which draw on neo-liberal notions of information and choice.
A sense of watchfulness was expressed through the identification of the
impact of the experience of others upon them, or the ways in which their
experience impacted on other women. For instance, Margaret perceived
screening as evidence of 'progress' because they were unavailable to
women when she was younger. Margaret also acknowledged her response
to her daughter's implicit watchfulness over her:
173
'My daughter always goes and my chum goes and one of my other
friends - she had a mastectomy, she still goes for her smear tests - so
I thought I'd better go' [Margaret TU 147-149]
'...we never really heard of them until the things that your family,
your daughters and your daughters-in-law go through.' [Margaret
TU 113-114]
Margaret's previous contact with health services were minimal and she
indicated that she went to her local health centre if she had 'flu' or a 'bad
cold'. She was prone to bronchitis and was initially reluctant to respond to
an invitation to visit her general practitioner for a smear test.
Margaret Extract 1: TU 29-57
01 Um...they're all very nice around there and Dr. Paul,
02 I mean you can sit and talk to her as if I'm talking to you.
03 She's great, she's a great wee buddy. In fact whoever, she said
04 phone the surgery if I wanted to talk to her
05 so I went round and I did that,
06 I made an appointment to see her and she showed me
07 all the pictures of the cells you know at each different...
08 and normally it's - my age group , this is the time
09 when they like you to have a smear test,
10 because the body's changed
1 1 because you've been all through the menopause,
12 I mean I went through the menopause when I was about 43, 44,
13 and no bother, no problems I mean I never needed a doctor
14 or needed to be put on the hormone replacement
15 or anything like that
16 and that's what Dr. Paul said to me yesterday
17 'you've always been a very well woman'. I said 'aye'.
18 That's why I've always been against the cervical smear test,
19 because I've always been a very well woman.
Margaret identified herself as a well woman and therefore not in need of
medical examinations and tests [19]. As she recounts her experience,
however, there appears to be a shift in the status of screening and its
relation to her sense of embodiment as a well woman, which moves from a
location outside screening participation to one in which screening is an
important aspect of her sense of embodiment as a well woman. Margaret's
objection to screening, is articulated through her sense of embodiment.
Screening therefore is not, initially, connected to being a well woman, as
part of a programme or wider regime of healthy behaviour and strategies.
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For Margaret, her perception of screening is also linked to a life course
transition [08-12], She evokes time in terms of the changing body in ways
which link it to a sense of normality and sanction medical monitoring and
intervention. She says of her age group, for instance:
'...this is the time when they like you to have a smear test, because
the body's changed, because you've been all through the
menopause...' [Margaret TU 36-38]
Margaret's account of her screening experience incorporates a more
active definition of well woman which introduces new 'practices of self
through the persistence of her general practitioner. Margaret's doctor
also mobilised the notion of well woman as a means of getting Margaret to
agree to a smear test in the first instance [ 16-17}. The implication here is
that the smear test will confirm this sense of embodiment.
Yet, well woman is evoked both by the general practitioner to support
cervical screening and by Margaret, to reject it. The notion of the well
woman operates as a 'helpful discourse' (Foucault, 1990, pi 01) which
supports her shift from non-participation to participation. However, her
sense of embodiment as a well woman is articulated through her
experience of inhabiting a body which does not break down or require
medical intervention. This sense of embodiment is confirmed by her
doctor but is broken by her first contact with screening in which she has
an abnormal smear. Indeed, it is the fragility of her embodiment which is
threatened and renegotiated by the knowledge of an abnormal smear and
which gets transformed in the process. Margaret's doctor emphasises the
preventive apects of screening in her response to the fears expressed by
Margaret that it is disease which has been revealed.
Margaret Extract 2: TU 50-55
01 'Well' she says, 'it's OK, everything's fine,
02 prevention is better that cure'
03 and I said 'oh well that's right'. I think my daughter even said that.
04 She said 'mum, you're lucky,
05 if you hadnae had went you would have gone on',
06 I mean it did say on the letter in 10-15 years
07 it could have gone onto a serious cervical cancer, you know.
There is a conflict here between Margaret's sense, in Extract 1, of what a
well woman is and the views of her doctor and her daughter. Her doctor
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emphasises that screening prevents cervical cancer [01-02] and her
daughter mobilises the idea that disease which was revealed was better
than disease which remained unrevealed [04-07]. Both these views,
emphasising the revelatory aspects of modern medicine, stand in contrast
to Margaret's sense of embodiment as a well woman. This account also
draws attention to the way in which ambiguous knowledge can have a
disruptive effect on embodiment which individuals then have to negotiate
and renegotiate.
Other women identified the impact of the experience of others on them.
For instance, Fiona links her own experience of participating in
screening with her sister's abnormal smear.
Fiona Extract 4: TU 91-92
01 I don't think my family were bothered either.
02 My sister had a smear test that was abnormal
03 and then the whole family went out, and all my friends went out
04 and got appointments to get smears taken,
05 even folk that wouldn't normally...every one of them,
06 they panicked, thinking cancer.
07 I think that's all it takes really, just a fright.
08 Somebody that you know anyway, and that's you alerted.
09 I do remember anyway my mum and my sisters going...
A sense of vulnerable embodiment is being drawn upon here as a source
of connection with other women [02-07], Fiona draws links between her
sister's embodied experience and that of other women in her family to
underpin her sense of obligation.
A link between obligation and the life course was evoked in other ways.
Participation in cervical screening was seen by some women as part of the
responsibility of maturity (acting your age, being rational) based on an
assumption that the result will have 'normal' outcomes. Rose illustrates
this perception:
Rose Extract 1: TU 478-484: 488-492
01 ...when she suggested to me that I make an appointment to go back
02 and have a smear done - they did it on particular afternoons...
03 I thought, 'I'm not going for that'.
04 I must admit, I went away and I thought,
05 'I'm not going for a smear'. But, however, later on I thought,
06 'that's stupid, act your age' and so on...
[
07 ...My conscience...I don't know if there was any inner knowledge
176
08 that I wasn't aware of, but I just thought,
09 'this is stupid, it's no big deal, go and get it done.
10 It's time you had one anyway'. So I went along.
1 1 But I mean, I didn't expect to have anything
12 other than a clear result, you know?
Screening participation here is expressed here in terms of age-related
maturity and responsibility [10], in ways which impute moral agency to a
particular point in the life course [09]. Some women's accounts draw
attention to the trajectory of the life course and a sense of particular
moments which have to be respected. Women over thirty five years old, in
particular, appeared to acknowledge a point at which they saw themselves
as responsible persons in relation to notions of maturity which were
expressed in terms of 'acting your age'.
Some women resisted the initial obligation to participate by redefining the
ways in which they did so. The embodiment of time could be used to
negotiate entry into cervical screening and to control transitions between
resistance and compliance. Many women reconstructed the ways in
which they had 'put off' screening from their personal agenda through
redefining and recategorising time. The point at which such negotiation
was difficult to sustain was when there was some recognition of
participation as a social norm. For instance, this was acknowledged by
Rose:
Rose Extract 2: TU 114-124
01 ...it's one of those things that most people put off.
02 There's very few people who I know who actually voluntarily go
03 for these things, that make a point of going.
04 I think it is becoming more and more the norm,
05 certainly you hear more people talking about it...
Obligation is articulated in many of these accounts, as women came to
identify themselves as compliant participants in cervical screening.
Watchfulness over self and others was expressed here in ways which
invoke a set of social relations which might be characterised as an ethic of
care (Gilligan,1982; Young,1990).
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Subjectivity, Obligation and Citizenship
[Care of the self] 'is the development of an art of existence that
revolves around the question of the self, of its dependence and
independence, of its universal form and of the connection it can
and should establish with others, of the procedures by which it
exerts its control over itself, and of the way in which it can
establish a complete supremacy over itself.' (Foucault, 1988, p238-9,
my emphasis)
Whilst the force of this statement in Foucault's later work, The Care of Self
(1988), invokes a notion of power in which self is understood as
empowered and autonomous, the material I have presented here describe a
range of experiences of cervical screening which are, nonetheless,
framed by a common culture of a sense of obligation to participate.
Obligation is expressed and understood in at least three ways. As I argued
in Section One, Foucault outlines a relationship between surveillance and
self-surveillance, in which first, individuals internalise the values of
dominant discourse (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980). In relation to cervical
screening, this is a discourse of prevention. Second, as power/knowledge
produces interests which intersect with those of individuals, in turn,
individuals begin to act in ways which intersect with those of the
dominant discourse. Hence power is a dynamic and productive force in
the Foucauldian framework, which sociologists of the body have sought to
harness to issues of health.
However, whilst this model points to the productive nature of power, the
way in it has been developed in the literature leaves very little space in
which to identify the 'multiple resistances' and implicit negotiated action
to which Foucault refers. Prevention, as an expression of surveillance,
whilst adminstered through the state, is not done so coercively to ensure
widespread compliance, nevertheless, compliance is an implicit objective.
Consequently, in this chapter I have presented material which describes
the negotiated character of participation in forms of surveillance, such as
cervical screening. Obligation should not be seen as an expression of
coercion, although at times pressure from professionals or other women is
evident. Rather, this was interpreted as part of the rituals and routines
associated with reproductive femininity. Nor should obligation be read as
an expression of disempowerment. In many cases, both obligation and
critical engagement co-existed in ways which undermine liberal feminist
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arguments which position women as disempowered by their experiences
of cervical screening. Obligation should be seen as a more complex
expression of self-governance, through which women express a sense of
moral agency which emerges from an active engagement with the process
of screening. Cervical screening participation provides a space in which
women are active participants as moral agents in relation to both self and
others (Hirst, 1981). Such action is supported by prevention as a 'helpful
discourse' (Foucault, 1988), which read through gendered embodiment,
can also be seen as an 'ethic of care' (Gilligan, 1982).
As feminist discussions of embodied experience and issues of health have
indicated, and as I have outlined in both Chapters Two and Four, notions of
entitlement, empowerment and choice are all evoked through discussions
of autonomy, and in turn, are seen as central to posing challenges to
medical culture. Women are encouraged to claim social entitlements in
the domain of health, by for instance, requesting cervical smears from
their general practitioners. Autonomy and empowerment in this
literature, tends to refer to either overcoming embodiment in order to
subject one's body to scrutiny, or implies drawing upon embodiment to
challenge medical culture. The material presented in this chapter poses a
third interpretation which is that the sense of embodiment, articulated by
women who discuss their screening experience, is complex, and
articulates a sense of obligation. Obligation to participate, as an
expression of embodiment, is linked to three notions of citizenship.
First, some women appeal to neo-liberal notions of choice, autonomy and
entitlement in their interpretation of their experience. Increasingly,
individuals are implicitly and explicitly encouraged to engage in what
Rose (1990) has termed 'liberal governance', as the language of choice and
the market enters the organisation and delivery of health care. For
instance, the boundaries between the public and the private have been
reordered through the introduction of quotas and targets. Within this
framework, citizenship is expressed through active self-maintenance and
notions of choice and entitlement. The liberal, autonomous individual is
encouraged, and indeed, is obliged, to take up social entitlements such as
that represented by cervical screening. The autonomous individual, as a
reflexive citizen, and indeed as a consumer, is obliged to be aware of her
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embodied experience and 'become skilled at translating embodiment into
medical discourse' (Greco, 1993, p361) in ways which express a sense of
personal choice but, nonetheless, meet the demands of a medical agenda.
However, whilst a neo-liberal notion of choice is mobilised in women's
accounts of their screening experiences, this is elsewhere modified by
other expressions of responsible citizenship. The experience of cervical
screening as a routine feature of regulated femininity, appeals to an
authoritarian version of social obligation. This should not be read as
merely the internalisation of normative authority, but rather, as an
expression of both a social duty and the embrace of social entitlement,
through which women place themselves as part of a moral community.
Responsible citizenship, however, can also be understood as an ethic of
care, which emerges through statements about the role women take, not
only in relation to self-care, but also in relation to their watchfulness
over other women. The concern displayed by some women for others who
form part of their social network, draws attention to a notion of relational
citizenship (Gilligan, 1982; Young, 1990). Here female embodiment can be
seen as a site of transformation in which responsibility is both required
and reinforced through the logic of surveillance.
The diversity of experiences of participation in cervical screening,
highlights a tension in the construction of cervical screening as an issue
of entitlement and autonomy. The accounts of women in this study
support a view of screening as a form of regulation in which individuals
are obliged to participate in specified ways. As responsible citizens,
women are expected to 'choose' to participate in screening, and in the neo-
liberal version of citizenship, to consume cervical screening, in order to
maintain a sense of well-being and secure embodiment. Whilst
governance is evoked by appeal to neo-liberal notions of individual
choice, an increasing reliance on the language of the market has not
completely foreclosed a space in which moral agency may be exercised
(see Wolfe, 1989 for a critique). Such agency may be exercised in ways
which are not immediatley apparent, since it operates within a private
domain which is revealed by tapping into female embodiment.
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Whilst screening participation represents a form of social citizenship, it is
also entered into through relations of surveillance over self and others,
which, for some women, is characterised by a sense of moral agency. This
form of surveillance is not one of coercion and control, but one which is
embraced and entered into, through a process of negotiation. Whilst
women expect to subject themselves to medical surveillance, as the data
suggests, at the same time, they develop a critical response to their
experience. Hence, obligation expresses local knowledges which are the
consequence of negotiation and reflection.
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CHAPTER SIX
SURVEILLANCE, RISK AND TRUST
Knowledge and the Limits of Embodiment
Introduction
'Technologies of domination and control compel silence;
technologies of monitoring and surveillance incite
discourse.' (Arney and Bergen, 1984, pi70)
As I have implicitly suggested in Sections One and Two, issues of risk and
trust have emerged as key themes in late modernity and are critical to
understandings of cervical screening as a form of surveillance. Parsons
(1951), for instance, identified trust as a mechanism which sustained
medical power as it developed as a profession, and trust has been central
more generally to the expansion of professional relationships in
capitalism. Sociological discussion of professional-client relationships
and their historical transformation with the development of citizenship,
has drawn attention to the way in such relationships have historically
been based on a high degree of trust. However, recent discussion has
highlighted the changing nature of these relationships in the context of
redefinitions of citizenship. It has been argued that trust has shifted from
a context of personalised relationships, such as those characterised by
deference, for instance doctor-patient relationships, to a context of
abstract, expert systems (Giddens, 1990). Trust, in late modernity has been
transformed into a pragmatic acceptance in which scepticism coexists
with taken-for-granted confidence. As I argued in Chapter Two, feminist
discussion of the interaction between medical interventions and female
embodiment points to the ways in which expert knowledge can be a source
of ambivalence for women. In turn, this raises issues about the
boundaries between confidence, trust and risk.
Giddens (1990) makes a distinction between trust and trustworthiness in
which the former is established when individuals are known to each other
or when expertise is seen as reliable. This creates a sense of security in
which we can subsequently place trust. In contrast, Luhmann (1988)
makes a disctinction between confidence and trust which emphasises the
significance of a transition from familiarity to unfamiliarity. Conditions
of familiarity, such as those in pre-modern times, are characterised by
limits to knowledge which in turn, are sustained by confidence. In
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contrast, conditions of unfamiliarity, such as those of late modernity, are
characterised by the limitless expansion of knowledge, or by uncertainty
(Beck, 1992). Therefore trust functions to establish a sense of the familiar
from conditions of unfamiliarity, and I suggested in Chapter Four that
these relations pertain to the creation of knowledge in relation to cervical
screening.
Trust was also evoked, at a general level, in the stories which women
retold of their screening experiences, as something which allowed and
protected legitimate medical intervention. However, the accounts
presented here highlight how screening participation fails to foster the
'day-to-day' security identified by Giddens (1990), or confidence, and
therefore draw attention to shifting relationships between trust,
confidence and risk. The expression of trust in these accounts are best
seen in contrast to expressions of confidence, which is displaced for some
women through the experience of screening. Concommitantly, the
expression of trust, must be seen as a form of agency which presupposes
risk (Luhmann, 1988).
Risk is an emergent theme in relation to the sociology of the body, which
stems from the influence of the work of both Beck (1992) and Giddens
(1990; 1991). Theoretical issues derived from this work are concerned with
the intensification and multiplication of social and individual risks as a
consequence of modernisation processes. Risk is conceptualised as
ubiquitous, embedded in the environment, technology and pollution
(Beck, 1992). Arguments about the ubiquity of risk stem principally from
observations about the nature and direction of science, technology and
contemporary medicine, where the risks of technical and expert
knowledge are not perceived to be limited to time and space (Beck, 1992).
Risk is seen as out of the individual's control, and for Beck, in particular,
risk sustains social dependence on scientific institutions and expert
knowledge, as risks are increasingly diffused, globalised and generalised.
However, risk is also perceived as context specific, developed through
calculations derived from psychological models of health behaviour and
cognitive appraisals, for intance, in relation to health. Here, medical
culture is seen as contributing to the generalisation of risk, through, for
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instance, risk assessments, diagnostic techniques and the capacity to
visualise the unseen (Turner, 1995), and to wider processes which seek to
remove the unpredictable and the uncertain from everyday life (see also
Ritzer, 1993). For instance, Armstrong (Armstrong, 1995) identifies the
uncertain in his most recent work which argues that the medical gaze has
shifted from a focus on individual bodies towards the social spaces between
'individuals and each other and between individuals and the socially
engineered environment' (Ogden, 1995, p413).
For Armstrong, surveillance in the late twentieth century 'clinic', has
shifted from 'surface' to 'depth', in ways which identify the potential for
disease in the social spaces between bodies (Armstrong, 1995; but see also
Stafford, 1991, who links the desire to visualise the unseen to post-
Enlightenment epistemological processes which cut across both art and
science). This potential is constructed by taking the previously discrete
elements of signs, symptoms and disease and subsuming them under
'factors' which predispose particular bodies to disease. Such factors point
to the extracorporeal spaces in which 'lifestyles' are created, as the
precursors to future illness (Armstrong, 1995, p400). The use of risk in the
identification of potential disease, therefore 'opens up a space of
possibility' across space and time. Therefore, in this approach, risk has a
functional value in sustaining surveillance.
Whilst Armstrong's work, and that which follows from it, makes
significant connections between risk and surveillance, it makes a number
of conceptual leaps, which require empirical substantiation. First,
Armstrong primarily locates the identification of risk extracorporeally, or
in the social spaces between physical bodies, thus drawing heavily on
Beck's notion of ubiquity. However, as has been noted elsewhere (Nelkin
and Tancredi, 1989; Lupton, 1995), and as I have pointed out in Section Two,
the identification of risk in late modernity has also been located within
the internal spaces of individual bodies, as Armstrong himself implies, in
his use of 'surface' and 'depth'. Diagnostic testing is premised not only on
the identification of 'lifestyle' as the space in which disease emerges, but
also on the localisation of lesions within internal body space, as the site of
potential disease. Chapter Three has developed this argument and suggests
that the surveillance machinery which monitors 'normality' identifies the
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potential for disease within the internal spaces of individual bodies. This
is most clearly seen through a consideration of gender and the status of
the female body in the wider construction of 'risk'.
Second, observations of medical practices, set in a health care context
which produces and reinforces prevention as the basis of state
intervention, tells us more about the mechanisms through which
surveillance is delivered, than the transformative power of surveillance
in relation to identity. Recent work on risk and the development of risk
consciousness, suggests that a consequence of the regulatory impulse in
late modernity is the constitution of a new subject identified as a
'controlling self, a 'risky self (Ogden, 1995, p414), or a 'health promoting
self through which people have some awareness of the responsibility to
care for themselves (Rose, 1990; Armstrong, 1993) Ogden (1995) argues,
that identity in psychological thought places emphasis on the constitution
of individual identity as a compartmentalised and intra-active identity:
one with agency and intentionality oriented towards inner correction and
control. As the previous chapter suggests, this notion of a 'risky' or
controlling self, overlaps with neo-liberal notions of governance through
the market and choice.
Whilst it may be the case that contemporary medical practice is
characterised by a new trajectory of surveillance, as I have argued in
Section One, observations about practice cannot reveal the experience of
surveillance in ways which inform us about identity transformation
either across historical or biographical time. Therefore any analysis of
surveillance as a new form of medical practice based on the observation of
normal populations must also be grounded in an analysis of the
experience of surveillance. Arguments about the expansion of
surveillance and the ubiquity of risk are arguments about historical time,
where surveillance is understood as a qualitatively new form of medical
observation and practice, and the nature of risk in late modernity differs
substantively from risk in premodern eras (Giddens, 1990), although there
is considerable debate about this conceptualisation of the changing nature
of risk. However, I suggest that a significant oversight in this version of
arguments about both risk and surveillance is that of biographical time.
By exploring the experience of screening within and across individual
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biographies, it is possible to build up a more substantial picture of the
nature of both risk and surveillance.
Whilst the manifest concern of theoretical and conceptual work on risk
and trust is not embodiment, it nevertheless has potential for locating the
conceptual status of the body more clearly. As I have argued in Section
Two, risk construction and deployment is central to preventive discourse,
as others have noted. Following Beck (1992), Lupton (1995) has argued
that diagnostic testing should be viewed in the logic of risk discourse,
where the pursuit of progress creates new hazards and individuals develop
a heightened consciousness of them. Lupton further suggests that
statements about risk are moral statements (see also Douglas and Calvez,
1990) which address both external and internal conditions, such as the
environment and health. Diagnostic testing should be seen as a:
'strategy adopted to deal with both externally and internally
imposed health risks, by identifying those who harbour the
potential to develop a certain condition or disease...and then
rationally dealt with.' (Lupton, 1995, p78)
Here diagnostic testing, or surveillance, and risk are seen as synergistic,
in the sense that individuals are categorised in terms of risk and the data
produced through monitoring 'at risk' populations is fed back into risk
assessment. The links drawn here between surveillance and risk
undoubtedly develop Beck's analysis in relation to individuals and pose a
valuable distinction between external and internal risk. Armstong (1995)
too develops this line of thought, and it has been articulated elsewhere
(see Shilling, 1993; Castell, 1992), in relation to prevention (Nettleton,
1992). Within preventive discourse, unpredictability within individual
bodies is anticipated, through health check-ups and diagnostic
techniques, which identify 'factors' rather than individuals. Surveillance
is therefore reworked as the systematic anticipation of the unpredictable,
in which expert knowledge is a crucial component.
However, this model presupposes the relationship between surveillance
and risk by assuming that risk precedes the impulse towards surveillance,
and by implying that surveillance should be seen as a professional
response to expert knowledge about risk. In constrast, and in keeping
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with my argument in chapter Section Two, I argue that risk should be seen
as a product of the embodied negotiation of surveillance. First, however, I
discuss how boundaries between confidence and trust are articulated and
negotiated.
Confidence, Trust and Embodiment
'Well women' and unreliable bodies
As Section Two has outlined, abnormal cells are cytologically identified
and translated into grounds for clinical intervention, in terms of either
further examination or treatment. The meaning, however, of an
abnormal smear within this discourse, is often ambiguous in terms of
whether it signifies the presence or absence of disease: such ambiguities
also represent uncertainties in medical knowledge (epidemiological,
clinical, pathological) in which the boundaries between disease and not-
disease are blurred. There are tensions in clinical categorisation in which
it is unclear whether an abnormal smear signifies potential disease or
disease in place, and indeed in which the absence of abnormality is not
automatically taken by women as an indication of normality. The blurred
nature of these boundaries is at least acknowledged within expert
discourse, if not communicated more widely. However, these boundaries
are interpreted as problematic by women who participate in cervical
screening and are told they have abnormal smears.
The interventions made necessary by the identification of abnormalities
through the screening process, produced, for some women, trust in their
own body through (re)kindling a consciousness of that body. This is
particularly marked in the accounts of Jane (62) and Margaret (59), who
described a transformed sense of embodiment associated with the
discovery of an abnormal smear, and the treatment process this entailed.
Both women describe their experience of cervical abnormalities and
interventions and their retelling draws attention to the ways in which
confidence in their sense of embodiment is displaced and trust in medical
power/knowledge emerges, and to their initial resistance to cervical
screening participation.
The process of screening forced both women to consider their sense of
embodiment in ways which they had not done for some time. They defined
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themselves as post-menopausal, and both experienced post-colposcopic
bleeding which they described as distressing. Through their experience
of screening, they were reminded of the centrality of the management of
menstrual blood in women's lives. Their sense of biological, or
reproductive time, was disrupted through the process of screening and
they were forced to manage 'menstrual' bleeding in ways which disrupted
their sense of embodiment.
Jane was intially resistant to the idea of participating in screening. She
had her first ever smear three years prior to her participation in the
study and her identity as a reluctant participant is summarised thus, as she
explains her response to a letter inviting her to visit her general
practitioner for a smear test:
Jane Extract 1: TU 22-23
01 I thought, cheek, damn, I'm no going for a smear...
02 I couldn't go, going down there for the doctors to look at...em
03 in all honesty, I never gave it a thought that I should go.
04 Nobody ever said to me ' how about a smear test?'
05 or anything like that. I mean my youngest is 29 in June.
06 I don't know, a smear test never, ever came into my head.
Jane's identity as a non-participant is framed both in terms of not wishing
to reveal her body to doctors and medical knowledge and in terms of
having reached a point in her life course 'beyond' such examinations [04-
05]. Her reference to her youngest child highlights how she has
considered herself 'beyond' this kind of examination. Here she draws on a
denial of reproductive embodiment to explain her avoidance. Despite the
pain and discomfort experienced by Jane, she was adamant that she would
not only continue to participate in screening until she reached the age
limit at the end of the target range, but would pursue screening beyond
this limit, which she saw as being imposed on her. Jane expressed this
fervently first in relation to the frequency of screening and second in
relation to what she would tell other women about screening.
Jane Extract 2: TU 21: 63: 67
01 I would tell everybody to go and have them, I really would.
02 Especially when you experience a thing like that.
[
03 If Dr. Brown was to say to me
04 'we want you in every six months or a year', I would go 'oh, yes'.
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05 I'd tell anybody - I mean anybody - to go.
06 Definitely, yes..
[
07 Oh I would tell her to go. Oh god...everybody...
08 certain people I've spoken to have said 'I'm going for a smear'
09 and I've said 'go, please go'. Definitely I would say go, yes.
Similarly, Margaret's perception of bodily change is heightened through
the experience of screening. As I discussed in Chapter Five, her sense of
embodiment as a well woman was transformed to a sense of unreliable
embodiment through the process of screening participation. Whilst for
some women, routine monitoring was linked to reproductive health, for
lharcjaret, such monitoring was also linked to perceptions of a 'changing
body'. However this monitoring also disrupted her sense of embodiment as
a post-menopausal woman (/ thought, here's me, with sanitary towels at
my age!). Not only was it a shock for Margaret to experience bleeding
after the menopause, but the amount of bleeding took her by surprise.
Margaret Extract 1: TU 94-98: 144-187
01 I think that's why I was so distressed at 6 o'clock last night
02 I had to keep changing them - I'm not kidding,
03 I thought 'all this blood, where's it coming from?'.
04 But what was going in there, I realise now
05 it's because of what she was doing inside me.
06 I think that's what distressed me.
Here we begin to see how a changing perception of her body impacts upon
Margaret's understanding of screening. Part of Margaret's initial
resistance to screening comes from her sense of embodiment as a well
woman. Examination and treatment within the context of cervical
screening disrupts her sense of embodiment, and continutity between
body and self. Her language becomes more distanced in response to the
experience of bleeding (where is all this coming froml [03]).
The participation of Jane and Margaret in cervical screening, and their
retelling of their experience of abnormal smears, highlights the way in
which they locate themselves as agents claiming social membership
through a transformed sense of embodiment. Furthermore, both women
move from a sense of embodiment as well women, which they deploy to
place themselves outside screening, to a sense of embodiment as well
women firmly located within screening. Therefore they move from a
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sense of embodied confidence, located outside surveillance to a sense of
embodiment within surveillance, in ways which also engendered a new
trust in knowledge and expertise. Some liberal feminists interpret the
accounts of women who see themselves as 'beyond' screening as an
expression of an absence of care of self. The accounts of Jane and
Margaret suggest an alternative interpretation in which such statements
express an initial sense of confidence in embodiment. However, this is
disrupted through the process of screening, in ways which produce an
emergent trust in expert knowledge which reinforces the need for self-
surveillance.
Shifts from confidence in embodiment to trust in expert knowledge are
similarly evident in other women's accounts, where such a transformation
can also be read as the emergence of self-surveillance. Rose, a long-time
participant in cervical screening, indicated that her experience, which
included ongoing abnormalities and interventions over a period of about
two years, had engendered a thoughtfulness and consciousness about her
body which had previously been absent. She began to interpret her body
in ways which actively produced new knowledge about it, which she used
as a resource and which contributed to self-surveillance. For instance,
she described how she began to be watchful and record bodily signs. She
said:
'I suppose I became more careful and I pay attention to
things. If necessary I take any notes of any funny things
that happen, just so that I can remind myself when I do see
somebody...' [Rose TU 422-425]
Alice also pointed to the ways in which she became aware of her body's
limitations. Reflecting about the ways in which her experiences had
affected the way in which she thought about her body she said:
'I want to be kinder to my body. I'm more aware of abusing
my body, therefore I try to be positive about it. I'm better
physically. I try to care about it and have to look after my
body...My body has limitations I hadn't really considered
before. And I think there might just be some things that
medicine can't do anything about.' [Alice TU 135-137; 168-
169]
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Not only could confidence in embodiment be displaced through the
experience of screening, but also confidence in expert knowledge. Mary
had experienced a long period of stomach complaint prior to, and
alongside, her participation in cervical screening and colposcopic
treatment for a cervical abnormality. She was divorced from her husband
and dated the emergence of the stomach complaint from the time of her
marital breakdown. She expressed anger over the inability of medicine to
accurately diagnose the complaint and find a solution to her problem. Her
perception of this inability as an unwillingness to accept a relationship
between social circumstances and physical ailments had the effect of
undermining her trust in the practices and power of medicine in general.
In Chapter Five, I discussed how Mary was drawn into screening despite
her distrust in medical culture and her representation of herself as a
sceptic. Her experience of screening reinforced this scepticism and
absence of trust. For instance, she said:
'You get the smears, smears normally come back normal. I've
had two sets of treatment at this hospital, so how does the
smear come back normal when six months later I have to get
another set of treatment?' [Mary TU 58-59]
As she recalled her experience, it seemed to her that she had received
treatment for cervical disease despite having normal cervical smears. She
found this puzzling to say the least, and her perception underpinned an
absence of confidence in expert knowledge. Furthermore, this perception
raises issues around the status and levels of knowledge in the context of
screening participation. There are different ways of interpreting the
perceived disjunction between the experience of normal smears and the
experience of treatment.
First, it is possible that Mary received treatment but her smears were not,
as she thought, 'normal'. Rather they indicated, for instance, mild forms
of dyskariosis or some other form of borderline change. The
misapprehension arises in her interpretation because she has not been
given this information or has been unable to understand the information
she has been given. Second, it is possible Mary received treatment,
although her smears were 'normal',' because clinical, colposcopic
observations of her cervix were judged to be more revealing than
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cytology reports. It may have been that problems were identified
colposcopically which were not evident in the smear itself. Indeed,
colposcopists in the clinic I observed said that they would discount a
borderline cytological report if a cervix looked 'suspicious' upon clinical
examination. In this way, they prioritise clinical judgement over
laboratory science. A third possibility is that Mary misunderstood the
nature of examination, and interpreted colposcopic examination as
'treatment'. Examination involves 'painting' the cervix with dye which
will show up problem areas. This physical contact with the cervix might
make it difficult to make a distinction between examination and treatment.
Even where women had been offered the opportunity to observe
examination via a television monitor, the procedures which were being
carried out were at times indistinguishable as examination and/or
treatment.
It is possible for any of these interpretations to be valid. However, for
Mary, the valid interpretation is her sense of puzzle, the way in which
this highlights blurred boundaries between normal/abnormal and the
displacement of confidence in expert knowledge which this confusion
reinforces. For Mary, the timing of the normal/abnormal sequence seems
out of kilter in her understanding that she has 'treatment' in the context
of a normal smear. This compounds her sense of distrust in medical
knowledge and practice. Mary's account reveals a paradox: on the one
hand, her sense of embodiment is discounted as expert knowledge is
unable to identify the source of her stomach complaint, which she
identifies as a significant aspect of her embodiment. Taussig (1980),
discusses this kind of expert discounting. On the other hand, Mary also
experienced what she perceived as treatment for a condition of which she
had no embodied knowledge. She felt physically well, yet she was defined
as potentially diseased. The identification of potential disease raises
questions for Mary about her sense of embodiment and her account draws
attention to the ways in which this paradox contributed to the
displacement of confidence in medical knowledge. She is moved to
actively (re)interpret her body as a consequence of her screening
experience and the knowledge ambiguities which this engendered.
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Mary's experience prior to screening participation had already
contributed to a partial displacement in confidence in expert knowledge.
Her explicit distrust was unusual in this sample of women, who otherwise
indicated an initial degree of confidence in medical culture, knowledge
and practice. Yet the way in which she expresses and deals with her
absence of confidence has similarities to those of other women. For
instance, the accounts of some women express tensions between
confidence and trust. After her experience of examination and treatment,
Claire felt she was:
'left to sort it out herself [Claire TU 33-34]
Others said:
'I didn't find the doctor - my family doctor - that helpful,
when I went to see him first off. He just more or less brushed
it off an said "it's just one of these things." That was it.'
[Lorna TU 89-90]
'I don't think we were given particularly that much
information, like, em...especially when I was told my smear
was irregular. I was just told, like, you get a wee card or a
slip of paper saying "your smear is irregular.'" [Chris TU 50-
52]
'I never felt that there was, like, a follow-up actually
explaining to you what the abnormality was. To me they
should have had on that slip, "please come round and see me"
or something like that so they can explain about this
abnormality. But there was nothing like that at all.' [Susan
TU 32-33]
'They've had a smear that wasn't quite normal. Sometimes I
feel they're a wee bit shady about that and you wish they
would say just how abnormal it was...' [Ivy TU 20-21]
Finally, a more explicit statement which expresses a displacement of
confidence:
'Anyway you have to trust them because you don't know what
they are looking for, so I was compliant with them.' [Nicola
TU 20-21]
These statements point to the limited information with which women are
supplied both by their own doctors and in written form from clinics and
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laboratories. Statements such as these are similar to findings from other
studies which have examined women's knowledge and attitudes towards
cervical screening. Such findings are typically used to point up poor
communication skills and gaps in women's knowledge which need to be
addressed, as I discussed in Chapter Four. Drawing on my discussion in
Chapter Three, however, I suggest that these statements also tell us about
the problematic nature of knowledge in relation to cervical screening,
and the role of trust in sustaining participation. All of these statements
draw upon an assumption that medical knowledge is governed by
certainty, but that such knowledge is not shared amongst the public. All
of the statements imply that if doctors shared their knowledge, this would
help women to better understand their own sense of 'trouble'. However, as
Nicola's comment implies, it is precisely the absence of such information
which, in the cases of these women, secures compliance and participation.
Because the nature of the knowledge held by women is uncertain, and
confidence in their sense of embodiment becomes displaced in the process
of screening, trust becomes a necessary component of such participation.
The statements presented here support Luhmann's (1988) observation that
the expression of trust must be seen as a form of agency which
presupposes risk. It is, therefore, to the articulation of risk that I now
turn.
Knowledge, Ambiguity and Risk
Internal Vulnerability and Risk as a State of Being
As my discussion in Section Two suggests, cervical screening has been
subject to a discursive shift from diagnosis to prevention, and is currently
formally understood as an objective process through which 'precancerous
cells' are detected. Furthermore, I have described in Chapter Four, how
cervical smears operate as risk markers, by highlighting the potential
within particular bodies to develop disease. In what follows, I will develop
the notion of risk as a product of surveillance in two main ways. First, the
theme of internal vulnerability is articulated by some women, as an
explanatory model for disease causation, especially by those women who
draw biographical links between themselves and other women with
cervical abnormalities or of other forms of cancer. The idea of being in a
state of risk underpins the interpretation of cervical abnormalities for
such women, in ways which redefine boundaries between health, wellness
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and disease. Second, the perceived ambiguities of external factors such as
the nature of medical knowledge, underpin a sense of being at risk.
Women articulated risk as they described their views about the
organisation and delivery of screening in ways which identify
uncertainties in the abstract system of which cervical screening forms
part. Finally, I will conclude my presentation of interview material with a
discussion of these articulations of risk in relation to sexuality.
A sense of internal/intrinsic vulnerability emerged in connection with
the ways in which women linked their own screening biographies with
those of other women. Often, like expressions of obligation, such linkages
involved identifying sisters, friends and mothers who had either
experienced cancer of some kind, not necessarily directly linked to the
reproductive system, or who had experienced cervical abnormalities, and
in some cases, death. Having knowledge of other women's experiences,
intensified a sense of internal vulnerability for some women. For some
women, perceptions of disease were articulated in terms of inheritance or
personal experience, where women knew other women who had either
experienced abnormalities themselves, or some form of gynaecological
disease, including cancer. Four women in the study had experienced the
loss of a mother, a sister or a friend from cancer: one specifically from
cervical cancer and three from gynaecological cancers. Almost all of the
women knew someone connected to their social network who had
experienced colposcopic examination and treatment for cervical
abnormalities.1 The women themselves thought this odd, and attributed it
to a much wider prevalence of cervical disease than was epidemioiogically
apparent, and indeed this perception intensified a sense of female
embodiment as being in a state of risk.
A common perception amongst many women in this study was the way in
which cervical abnormalities were understood as latent properties of the
female body, as already in place within the female body (in contrast to the
dominant medical view of cervical abnormalities signifying potential
change within the cervix). Consequently, cervical screening, and
' Davison, Smith and Frankel (1991) draw attention to this phenomenon of
being able to identify others within or just beyond their social network,
who have experienced disease or misfortune.
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particularly the smear test itself, was seen as a safety mechnism which
would reveal this property, and open up potential for re-establishing
certainty. Comments about limits of the body included the following:
'I know...em...how can I put this? I know what good comes
out of them getting done at regular periods, you know? Even
if it is only every three years, you know that they are
keeping a check on you and if there is anything...what they
can pick up at the time. So I know the whole point of it
is...obviously for your own sake...if there is anything there,
as the doctor says, if these things are left alone, in years to
come they can turn into nasty things.' [Carol TU 25-27]
'...it's made me more aware of cancer, and it's sort of made me
feel that I have to have the checks. I'll always have the
worry that I'm going to have cancer and I worry even more
because my mum had cancer...'[Fiona TU 178-179]
'...if I want to have a smear when I'm over sixty then I'm
quite within my rights to have one, aren't I? That's
everything, because I'm going to keep having a smear test
because...when you become sixty, that's you finished...what
happens after that if something goes wrong?' [Margaret TU
612-616]
What such comments have in common is the way in which they draw on
ideas about the female body as having limits and how they link this idea
biographically to their own and other womens' experience. They perceive
the limitations of the body but do not place such limitations beyond the
reach of medical knowledge. Instead, for them, their perceived
vulnerabilities can be actively addressed through increased self-
surveillance. These women draw on their own sense of vulnerable
embodiment as a resource which grounds frequent and regular screening.
The ambiguity of what an abnormal cervical smear means opens up a
space for women to construct their own meanings. For Linda, knowledge
of an abnormality produced a sense of risk for her, which was then
reinterpreted in the light of her gynaecological biography. In discussing
her knowledge of cervical screening, she says:
Linda Extract 1: TU 27-30
01 I definitely know more
02 but I think that leads to more questions in some respect.
03 But there's a whole lot of reasons for that,
04 one of which is that I've had a lot of infections diagnosed
05 like chlamydia and that was really very interesting.
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06 Not frightening, a little alarming perhaps
07 when I began to realise
08 the implications of what chlamydia might mean
09 and the fact that those implications were not made clear to me...
Her current abnormality highlighted an uncertain reproductive future in
the context of screening which she linked to past experiences. For Linda,
her current experience of colposcopic treatment threw into relief what
had previously been a fragmented experience of chlamydia. What became
apparent for her, in the light of her current experience, was a connection
between her sexual health in the past, and her potential fertility. Her
present experience of screening foregrounded these connections and for
her, created uncertainties which were embedded within the uncertainties
of an abnormal smear. To a degree, she understood her current
abnormality as a consequence of repeated chlamydia infections, which in
turn raised the possibility of affecting her fertility. What seems apparent
in this extract is the way in which biographical linkages are created
between different aspects of embodiment in ways which cause Linda to
question her reproductive future.
Fiona drew attention to her perceptions of her embodied limitations and
the limits of other female bodies.
Fiona Extract 1: TU 178-181
01 ...it's made me more aware of cancer. I'll always have the worry
02 that I'm going to have cancer and I worry even more
03 because my mum had cancer so it really...brought home to me,
04 I thought - oh god - like I will worry and I think I'll be worried
05 for the rest of my life and I often think,
06 if I'm going to die it's going to be cancer.
07 Like, although they say that they've caught it
08 I just know that it's there and it could start up again.
09 I suppose maybe it's a fear I've got...
10 I'll just keep going for smears.
11 Nothing has proved to me that my mum had cervical cancer
12 but it still worries me. If she hadn't died of cancer
13 it wouldn't worry me so much about my smears
14 but then they don't know if it's hereditary or not.
15 But it's still a worry.
16 It's there, it might flare up again,
17 that's why I'd be keen to find out what really causes it.
For Fiona, her mother's cancer and subsequent death operates as a strong
incentive to monitor her own body through screening participation. She
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linked a sense of latency posed by an abnormality to the death of her
mother, from cancer [01-06]. She perceived cervical disease as an ever-
present property of the female body which could 'flare up' at any time [15-
17]. This possibility was intensified through the fear articulated by Fiona,
as a consequence of her mother's death, a fear which lay dormant until
her own abnormality was detected [11-15], which I discussed in Chapter
Five. For Fiona, the notion of cervical disesase in terms of latency is
inseparable from her memory of her mother's death [04-06], Her account
is framed in terms of a potential with which she lives in the present, or in
terms of risk as a state of being.
Since screening is seen as a technique which reveals latent disease, where
cervical disease is perceived in terms of latency, or internal vulnerability,
women who do not participate in screening are seen as placing
themselves at risk. This view draws on a rational discourse relating to
both the availability of technology and the perception of that technology
as an objective and truthful measure of the existence of disease. For
example, both Mary and Chris understood the smear test itself as a window
of opportunity on a disease process which can be controlled by medical
intervention and which offers certainty. For instance:
'If they catch you quick, there's something they can do.'
[Mary TU 50-51]
'If you don't have a smear, the worst can come to the worst.'
[Chris TU 50-51]
A certainty posed by intevention or external control is expressed here,
particularly by those who knew other women who had experienced either
abnormalities or disease. For Julie, the limits of the bodies of both her
sisters is brought into being as she describes her own fears when she
learns of an abnormal smear. Julie says:
Julie Extract 1: ITU 76-781
01 I was a bit worried because I have two sisters
02 and they both have problems with their organs
03 and one of them actually died of a tumour,
04 but it started in her womb
05 or ovaries or whatever. It may not have had anything to do with it
06 but I thought, oh my god, here I go again,
07 or here someone in the family
08 goes again and this time it's me. My other sister had something
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09 a few years ago as well. So I guess I'm a bit more sensitive to it as,
10 well, possible.
Julie perceived her own cervical abnormality as latent cervical disease, in
part because she could link her experience with the gynaecological
disease and subsequent death experienced by one of her sisters [06-09],
She expressed a tension between her perception of latent disease and the
potential for disease [01-03], Her account expresses an uncertainty in the
boundaries between the notion of latent disease and that of disease
potential in ways which parallel the professional debates I outlined in
Section Two. These boundary uncertainties are similarly evident in the
accounts of other women who emphasised participation as a strategic
response to the uncertainty posed by abnormal smears.
Ambiguity also affected women's experience of screening in ways which
produced risk in terms of the timing of smears and examinations. Liz has
never had colposcopy, but has had a number of abnormal smears over a
period of two years. She has moved between normal/abnormal smear
categories over this period. The meaning of abnormality for her was
ambiguous, but she thought a means of negotiating this ambiguity could
be by having further investigations. She expressed a desire for
colposcopy in order to confirm a particular sense of embodiment, since
what she otherwise experienced was a kind of liminality (Posner and
Vessey, 1988, also provide some discussion of this experience). Whilst
screening rhetoric is framed to confirm well woman identities (see
Chapter Four), for Liz, the movement between normal and abnormal
smears forecloses this sense of embodiment, which is framed by
uncertainty. Medical discourse could not locate her as a well woman, nor
as a female body potentially at risk of cervical disease. Nonetheless, Liz
perceived further examination and treatment as one means of
establishing certainty. She said:
'I suppose it makes you think that things can happen like
that and it makes you more wary and makes you just go and
have regular smears and checkups.' [Liz TU 77-78]
For Liz, uncertainty and ambiguity produced an altered sense of
embodiment which could be described as being in a state of risk. She
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looked to an 'objective' technique, such as colposcopy, to help her
(re)establish a sense of embodiment and therefore of certainty.
Participation in screening both produces a sense of vulnerable
embodiment and forms a source of protection against it. Yet, for some
women, even further examination and intervention, as a means of
establishing certainty, can reinforce uncertainty and ambiguity. Ivy's
account illustrates both how further investigation reinforces uncertainty
and ambiguity and the sophisticated nature of understandings which
women may hold of health and disease.
'I mean there's things you can do to prevent like, heart
disease. You eat less chocolate, and smoking and exercise and
that. But I think there's some things that the investigation
into isnae that far developed that they can actually say what
causes it, or they can isolate the thing, the cause. So I think
it's maybe one of these things. They haven't developed it that
far yet that they can actually put it down to either A, B or C.
And they investigate you and put you into one of these
categories...I think it's just one of these things where you
have to take your chance and some will get it and some will
not'. [Ivy TU 58-59]
Ivy expressed different notions of disease and individual response to them.
On the one hand, she linked heart disease to personal responsibility and
identified practices and actions which she perceived individuals might
take to minimise its onset.^ Heart disease in this account is clearly linked
to lifestyle. In contrast, she neither perceived cervical disease in terms of
latency, nor did she see it as the consequence of behavioural or lifestyle
choices. Rather, she mobilised an understanding of disease as fate, as
outwith the control of individuals or expert knowledge systems, as just one
of those things, currently for which there are no rational solutions. It is
this understanding which appears to inform her sense of uncertainty and
points to risk as a state of being.
The knowledge which women develop in their experience of an abnormal
smear, points to risk as a state of being which is linked to the intrinsic
2 Davison, Smith and Frankel, (1991), ibid., also provide a typology and
perceptions of 'candidates' which individuals use to identify those likely to
develop heart disease. Ivy's complex understanding of different kinds of
disease turns the notion of candidate around to suggest a typology of
diseases which are characterised in terms of how individuals might be
expected to respond to them.
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processes of cervical screening rather than to extrinsic processes such as
sexual activity or smoking. When faced with such an abnormality, female
embodiment is interpreted as neither healthy nor sick; neither diseased
nor free from disease. In the perceived absence of expert certainty,
ambiguous knowledge underpins a sense of risk in terms of potential
changes in the experience of current and future states of health. Being in
a state of risk therefore grounds cervical screening participation for some
women. As Gifford (1986) outlines in relation to breast cancer changes
which are similarly ambiguous:
'What was once risk is now an experienced present. Here,
risk loses much of its unmeasured uncertainty. Risk is
certain and rather than experiencing 'being at risk', women
experience 'risk'.' (Gifford, 1986, p233)
As Section Two describes, debates within medicine and its ancillary
specialisms have recurrently engaged with the issue of cervical disease
classification and development. The construction of cervical disease as a
linear process which requires surveillance allows the possibility of
gynaecological interventions which are presumed to halt, reverse and
eradicate disease. Many women referred to cervical abnormalities as
indicators of disease, understood as a linear process, and to screening as a
window of opportunity on a what is seen as a progressive disease.
However, abnormalities were also ambiguous for many women, in ways
which produced uncertainty and a sense of being in a state of risk.
The ambiguities embedded within the construction of knowledge around
cervical disease constitutes a social space in which multiple risks can be
identified both for and by women. It is this ambiguity, especially, which
underlies the ways in which women themselves contribute to the process
of identifying themselves as being in a state of risk. However, whilst
abnormal smears, for many women, represented ambiguities, for some,
there were certainties to be salvaged. Women drew on this sense of being
in a state of risk in interpretating their participation in cervical
screening and in doing so, perceived screening itself as a means of
reintroducing a sense of certainty. Whilst further intervention could
produce both a sense of certainty and of agency, by 'doing something',
increased external control over a sense of vulnerable embodiment was
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also linked to the displacement of confidence in expert knowledge. Hence
the experience of screening contributes to a reordering of time in which
the potential for future disease is brought into the present. The cervix is
therefore understood as a site of transformation: of cells from normal to
abnormal; and of states of being.
External Ambiguities: Being at Risk
Managing the Absence of Certainty
Nicola had a smear abroad in the context of a routine gynaecological
examination. This was normal, nevertheless, in a gesture of refusal
against its expected normality, she had a repeat smear upon her return to
Britain, 'just to make sure'. This smear was abnormal and colposcopic
examination followed, with a period of treatment. In a short space of time
Nicola's smear status moves from normal to abnormal. Whilst this
transition is explained to Nicola in terms of a 'false' negative, the
distinction between a normal and abnormal smear presented a problem of
evaluation for her. She refused to believe the expected outcome of a
normal smear, suggesting a displacement of confidence in expert
knowledge and a sense of uncertainty which grounded her 'just in case'
strategy.
Similarly, Diane's (27) first smear was in the context of joining a new
general practice. When asked about her previous contact with health
services she indicated that she had had the 'usual things' and that she had
'been going for smears regularly'. However, her 'regular' participation
was not on the grounds that her smears were normal. On the contrary:
'I had to because my cells weren't normal. Or they weren't taking
proper readings or there were discharges that they weren't happy
about. So they never found anything too bad but I had to keep
going back.' [Diane, TU 19-20, my emphasis]
When asked how she responded to this and what she thought it meant:
Diane Extract 1: TU 23-24
01 What did it mean to me? Obviously I know a bit more about it now
02 than I did then so I can't really remember at the time.
03 I remember the first time I was told I had abnormal cells
04 I was really worried about it - I think I was about 20 or something.
05 I couldn't...I thought, what does this mean,
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06 does this mean I'm going to get cancer if they don't get rid of them?
07 I didn't really know that it was harmless at that time,
08 that it could go away, until it was explained to me.
09 I did know that it was going to test my cells
10 to make sure that everything was OK.
This account develops a sense of negotiating ambiguity [01-02], Diane
holds different levels of knowledge about the meaning of screening [OS-
Ob], On one level, she reproduces a conventional medical discourse that
smears are to look for abnormal cells, which were found many times, in
her case. At another level, she draws on a discourse of ambiguity in
which there is less certainty about the significance of abnormal cells [07-
08], They could potentially signify cancer and Diane considers this
possibility. Alternatively they could be 'harmless' and a 'normal' aspect of
embodiment which might simply go away. She alludes to this earlier
when she says that despite the fact that 'they never found anything too
bad' she had to keep participating in screening. So there is uncertainy at
this level of knowledge about what the abnormalities mean and it is this
which provides the basis for her participation.
Uncertainty was similarly evident within the accounts of other women in
this study. In this case, however, uncertainty was linked to a sense of
being at risk from knowledge ambiguities, policy exigencies and
administration errors. For some women, there was a tension between on
the one hand, an acceptance of the necessity of screening and their
obligation to participate in screening and, on the other, a perception of
being at risk from that very process.
For instance, Teresa (40) was sceptical about current screening policy
recommendations. She described her screening participation in terms of
having:
Teresa Extract 1: TU 75-86
01 Em...probably quite a few, because after about 34
02 I tried to make sure I had a smear approximately every year.
[
03 AH: Is that something you initiated yourself?
[
04 Yes. I had a friend and colleague who...em..
05 eventually was diagnosed as having cervical cancer
06 but by the time the diagnosis was made it was very advanced
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07 she subsequently died within a year.
08 Soon after that I did make a very positive attempt
09 to have a smear...em...regularly, particularly...
10 certainly no less than once every two years, although I realise
11 that the recommendation is once every three years.
She did not think that three yearly smears were sufficient [08-11], Her
view was strongly influenced by the death of a friend from undiagnosed
cervical cancer [04-07]. She therefore attempted to obtain smears on a
more frequent basis. Teresa suggested that she had no problem in
obtaining smears. Almost immediately however, she acknowledged that
whilst she had 'no problem', this was a consequence of a strategy of
shopping around for smears from different venues, such as from her
general practitioner, family planning and well woman clinics. When
asked if she thought that there might be problems in obtaining a smear,
she explained:
.'..because I had discussed it with my doctor at length when
we were discussing it in an overall political sort of way about
funding, and funding for cervical screening, and weighing
that up against other sources of cost in the health service
and, you know, that fact that it wasn't necessarily a very
reliable procedure, there are false positives as well as false
negatives. So that did enter my reluctance to go to my
GP...that GP, who has since changed.' [Teresa TU 111-118 ]
Teresa perceives that her general practitioner might be reluctant to give
her a smear test 'on demand' on two counts. First, the financial cost
involved might prejudice him against doing this particularly in the
context of funding changes in which there is no financial incentive for
general practitioners to recommend screening more regularly than
policy guidelines suggest. We might interpret this as a reflection of the
way in which practitioners themselves are subject to surveillance by the
state. Therefore, Teresa perceived her general practitioner as
unsympathetic to her need for more regular screening. Second, Teresa
raises questions about the degree of reliability of the test.
Other women expressed similar anxieties about both the reliability of the
test itself and the timing and regularity of smear tests. Linda, for
instance, recounted her puzzlement over the smear test itself and the kind
of information it provided.
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'..how many different sorts of smear tests can you get?
What's the story? Can you test for all the different sorts of
things you might be looking for from one smear or do you
need to take smears from different areas? I don't know
actually how smear tests work, whether one is taking a
sample and its that which is tested or whether there is
something important about the thing you use to take a sample
with...so is it something like Ph papers are you getting a
different...could you get different smear tests? What is a
standard smear test, is it just checking for...what? How many
different things, I mean, also now with screening done on
HIV is that something that is done as a standard and if so it
would surely be a good thing to know about it...that's going
into another issue. In a nutshell, with a smear, how many
things can they test for and how many things do they
routinely test for?' [Linda TU 34-35]
In some cases, women had experienced what they perceived as errors and
mistakes in the taking and reading of their smears. Fiona for instance,
recalled how she had been informed of her smear status, only to be
informed later that this was incorrect.
Fiona Extract 2: TU 144-145
01 I went to the doctor's and I got a letter the other day
02 saying I was due a smear and I just ignored it
03 because I got one six months ago.
04 But I went to see the doctor for something else and she says, weren't
05 you due a smear because the last one was slightly abnormal?
06 I says I thought it was clear again.
07 You get a slip of paper telling you that it's abnormal,
08 and I said there it is - it's normal.
09 So the doctor said, 'well they read it wrong'. So I was really worried.
10 I got the smear and they wrote back and said it was an error.
1 1 I couldn't believe it. I thought they were hiding things from me.
12 She reassured me that it was normal,
13 she said it was a doctor that was only there for so long
14 had made the error.
Fiona was reminded to have a smear, which she ignored because she had
had one in the previous six months [01-03], She understood that this smear
had been normal [06], yet her doctor observed that in fact it had been
abnormal [04-05] and the information she received had been incorrect
[09], However, following the second smear within a six month period she
was then informed that the abnormality was the wrong reading. Her
initial response to this contradiction was to think the worst and that she
was not being told the truth, rather than as a result of professional
incompetence. Consequently, the expected outcome of a normal smear is
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disrupted here and in its place an understanding of being at risk develops,
first from perceived misinterpretation and second from adminstrative
error.
Fiona's sense of being at risk stems from her observation here that the
certainty which screening potentially provides has its own internal
limits. This extract expresses a dialogue between different forms of local
knowledge. The doctor advises Fiona that she needs another smear
because her previous smear is abnormal, indicating the possibility of
underlying pathology in her cervix. Fiona however, counters this with
her own knowledge of a previously normal smear. This is discounted in
the exchange with her doctor who informs her that the knowledge which
Fiona thought she possessed is mistaken. At this point, the doctor indicates
that there are interpretive issues at stake (they read it wrong [09]). The
way in which interpretation is individualised is significant because this
deflects attention from any structural problems and locates the problem of
interpretation, and therefore the risk of further error, on a particular
individual (a doctor that was only there for so long [13]).
Fiona responded to this sense of being at risk by increased attachment to
screening participation. In contrast to Teresa and Linda, who 'shopped'
around for smears, Fiona was active in a local community women's health
group which sought to raise awareness of the necessity of screening;
provide information to other women in the area about the smear test itself;
and support those who experienced abnormalities. One of the ways in
which she was able to manage uncertain knowledge with which she was
provided was to participate in this group. She said:
'I went to the women's health group so that I could find out
more about it...about the cancer subject. But I don't think I
could do more than I'm already doing.' [Fiona TU 162-163 ]
In common with other women, the risk of system error, added to the risk
of potentially developing cervical cancer suggested to Fiona that yearly
smears would be the optimum frequency for her. Yet even annual smears
might be insufficient and she raises questions of entitlement in relation to
the timing of smears.
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'...I don't know if a year's enough because it was only within
the year that I went from nothing to being abnormal. They
say it takes fifteen years. If I had left it fifteen years it would
probably have been far too late.' [Fiona TU 182-183]
Therefore, whilst there were ambiguities surrounding the knowledge
which screening offered, participation was in itself an active measure
which an individual could take. Other women, however, perceived
themselves to be outside surveillance either because of age. Margaret, for
instance, commented on the distinction between policy guidelines in
relation to screening in Scotland and her new perception of the need for
surveillance.
'Well, when Dr. Paul said to me, you only have to get one now
and another when you're sixty and that'll be you. But Alex,
who's to say that nothing'll happen after you're sixty?'
[Margaret TU 554-556]
As an older woman, she was sensitive to the way in which age defined her
entitlement.
'I mean sixty, that'll be your last, that'll be you. Who's to say
what'll happen after you're sixty? So I think I myself would
go and make another appointment for a smear test even if
I'm sixty two, sixty five, or whatever...' [Margaret TU 554-556;
565-568]
Margaret saw herself as being at risk from current policy
recommendations. She strongly resisted the rigid boundaries placed
around age and said:
'...if I want to have a smear when I'm over 60 then I'm quite
within my rights to have one, aren't I? ...I'm going to keep
having a smear test because...when you become 60 that's you
finished - what happens after that if something does go
wrong?...I would like to be positive and know that at least if I
had that...' [Margaret TU 611-617]
Whilst Margaret and Fiona connected their own sense of risk to policy
exigencies and individualised errors, Sheila's perception of her own
experience illustrates the power of risk as a cultural category, which drew
its strength from linkages between media reports of a major system error
on the west coast of Scotland at the time of interview and personal
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knowledge of a neighbour who had experienced an abnormal smear.
Prior to the extensive reporting which accompanied what was perceived
as misinterpretation at the Inverclyde Royal Hospital, Greenock, Sheila
claimed that she had not given her own abnormal smear much thought.
Now, however:
Sheila Extract: TU 84-85 'knowing my luck I'll be the one'
01 I sit and think you know, what if this one,
02 if this one comes back and it's normal.
03 I was telling my boyfriend about it last night and he said,
04 'my god, I wish this smear test thing would come through.'
05 He says, 'if it comes back normal you'll be quite happy.'
06 I says, 'aye, but what if it's a mistake?'
07 And he says, 'god, that's only down in Greenock'
08 and I said 'aye, but there's nothing to stop it happening up here'
09 sort of thing.
10 There was a woman around the corner from here a few years ago
11 - she had six kids - and one of her smear tests came back normal
12 so she never thought any more about it.
13 And she ended up getting cervical cancer.
14 And of course by the time she found out she had cervical cancer
15 it was too late. I says, 'what about her around the corner though?'
16 He says, 'aye that's one in a million cases.'
17 'Aye', I says. 'But knowing my luck I'll be the one.'
The story of the 'woman around the corner' operates as a kind of cultural
tale here and the category of normal smear poses a problem of
uncertainty. The story which Sheila tells frames her own perception of
risk and articulates fears which she identifies as part of her experience of
screening. Sheila's sense of being at risk from health care
incompetencies, is heightened by the panic framework in which much of
the reporting on Inverclyde was cast. At the same time, however, the
connections which Sheila draws in her account between Inverclyde, the
'woman around the corner' and her own experience of screening links a
more general perception of risk to her own circumstances. She
reinterprets her experience of screening in terms of the possibility of
being at risk: not from cervical disease, but from a failure to detect
cervical disease within the system designed to detect it. In turn, the
perception of risk produces a sense of resignation, as Sheila says:
'If I got one that did come back abnormal, I mean, there's not
really an awful lot I can do about it apart from going and
getting it seen to. I've never been one for worrying for what
might happen. If they come back well, good, and if one
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comes back abnormal I'll just go and get it seen to. You know,
I'll agree and I'll cross that bridge when I come to it.'
[Sheila TU 106-107, my emphasis]
Certain contradictions emerge in relation to risk, which form part of the
understanding and experience of screening. Whilst screening offers a
safety mechanism which creates a sense of certainty, articulated through
notions of the provision of 'peace of mind', the procedures for 'catching
you quick' themselves pose risks in their generation of uncertain and
ambiguous knowledge. The procedures for detecting potential disease may
themselves be fallible, hence the cytological and clinical obervations
central to screening reintroduce risk by their very incertitude. Not only
is there a risk of developing cervical disease, but also, the screening
process itself introduces a risk of having disease which may be
misinterpreted.
Women contextualise their sense of being at risk. For instance, smear
misinterpretations are often placed in the context of a health service
under pressure from busy clinics, understaffing, 'cutbacks', inadequate
funding, mismanagement of staff or poor organisation. Women
acknowledged that it was the role of expert knowledge to police the
boundaries between normal and abnormal, but anxieties often emerged
around the issue of misinterpretation — 'not seeing whatever it was that
was being looked for', or reading a normal smear incorrectly. Whilst the
issue of 'false' positives and negatives are addressed within
epidemiological and pathological debate, these accounts suggest that both
categories of normal and abnormal smears are experienced by women as
forms of risk. Responses to this vary, but include the adoption of
strategies to counter what is perceived as the risk of system error. For
Linda and Teresa, this meant 'availing' themselves of smear tests
whenever possible in an effort to manipulate the timing and freuqency of
screening. For Margaret, this meant initiating smear tests herself as a
woman outside policy recommendations. Fiona's response was to meet with
other women to share information and raise questions about the timing of
screening. For Sheila, accommodating knowledge about system errors and
drawing links to her own circumstances produced a 'resigned dependency'
of the kind to which Beck (1992) refers.
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Hence, screening participation can be interpreted not only as the
internalisation of prevention, if at all, but also as an expression of a
displacement of confidence in expert knowledge and an increasing sense
of being at risk. In this instance, expert knowledge is seen as both a
safety mechanism and a problem of legitimacy which in turn, highlights
tensions in the boundaries between confidence, trust and risk. Risk can
be understood here both as a product of surveillance and as a mechanism
which ties women further to its logic.3
Sexual Health and Risk Identities
A final form of risk, embodied in particular social relationships, emerged
in relation to sexuality. As Section Two points out, although the
construction of women as sexual subjects remains central to current
notions of cervical disease aetiology, as education and information
literature, as well as the media illustrate, the precise relationship between
'sex' and cervical disease is a further area of contested knowledge. Of
particular significance is the way in which the category of 'promiscuity'
is used to specify groups 'at risk' of developing cervical disease. The way
in which promiscuity is used, both obscures the role of male partners in
the development of cervical disease and is under-played by feminists who
wish to secure women's participation in screening.
The link between sexual activity and cervical disease was often mobilised
and disrupted by the women I interviewed, particularly those who sought
to define themselves outside 'promiscuity'. It was also disrupted, actively
denied and erased from the representation of cervical abnormalities to
women by nursing and medical staff in the colposcopy clinic. This
erasure was identified by clinic staff as part of a strategy to 'protect'
women from having to deal with the potentially 'damaging' consequences
of confronting relationships with male partners. McKie (1996) has
recently argued that many women do indeed have to contend with a form
of sexual jealousy and confrontation from male partners in the context of
cervical screening.
3 (Singer, 1994) provides discussion of a surveillance logic in an 'age of
epidemic'.
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For instance, nurses downplayed connections between cervical disease
and sexual activity, though at times they would appeal to medical discourse
and refer to the wart virus (HPV), which as I pointed out in Section Three,
has been linked to cervical disease. The charge nurse at the colposcopy
clinic noted that she was careful not to mention sex since she felt this
might 'alienate' women from both their bodies and their partners. She
acknowledged that she might link abnormalities with HPV on occasion but
strove not to make explicit links to sexual activity and particularly to
'promiscuity'. I have intepreted this to mean she was not critical of the
concept of promiscuity and its gendered implications, nor that the force of
its meaning had been challenged by social and sexual changes for women
in the last two decades. Instead, she accepted its association with cervical
disease, however, she was not prepared to emphasise it for fear of
alienating 'clients'.
Managing Contamination and Risk Boundaries
Contamination and pollution beliefs are often associated with breaching
boundaries (Douglas, 1970), such as crossing intact skin or particular
bodily orifices, such as the mouth (Nettleton 1988), vagina (Caplan 1987;
Laws, 1990) and cervix (Thomas, 1992). These kinds of beliefs have been
articulated in relation to cervical screening where women have
experienced abnormalities (Posner and Vessey, 1988), and also more
generally by women experiencing any kind of examination which entails
physical contact with a male or female hand (Kitzinger, 1992).
Contamination beliefs were expressed in the data I present here in
relation to possible causes of cervical abnormalities and, in more general
terms, where sex/cervical disease/AIDS/risk were discursively linked
together in a way which reinforced an understanding of cervical disease
as potentially ever-present and therefore in need of constant monitoring.
Where contamination beliefs were drawn upon to explain the causes of
cervical disease, it was understood both in specific terms, as the result of
viral entry into the body, and in general terms, as a consequence of 'risky
sexual behaviour'. Teresa, for instance, placed significance on a
particular relationship which she had recently ended when she was
informed of her abnormal cervical smear. She discussed, at length, the
possible causes of her cervical abnormality with her gynaecologist, who
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had indicated the presence of human papilloma virus. She was aware that
its presence did not necssarily explain her abnormality but certainly
suggested a possible cause. Teresa commented on the relationship between
her experience of screening and her feelings about sex. She felt that,
since she had not had sex for some time prior to this relationship, and that
although the virus can lie dormant for three to eight years, this man was
probably responsible for contaminating her with the virus. She
compared HPV to HIV in the sense that it created the same issues around
sexual relationships and whether or not to participate in them. She felt
that she could again be exposed to contact and wished to avoid this. She
refered to 'safe sex' as a possible strategy and implied a reconsideration of
whether (hetero)sex was going to play any part in her future.
Whilst there was uncertainty in the meaning of the abnormality, in this
case Teresa attributed certainty to its genesis. Whilst Teresa could not
identify the particular sexual partner or context through whom the virus
was introduced into her body, since she recognised that it was possible for
this virus to lie dormant for many years, she could, nevertheless, attach
her personal sense of risk to a particular sexual relationship. Thus, risk
here is embodied in a particular sexual relationship.
Other women drew attention to sexual relationships, sexual health and the
risk of developing cervical disease. This was either in explicit reference
to viral transmission and HPV or in more implicit references to their own
sense of sexual agency. As I have outlined in Section Two, public health
and biomedical discourses link cervical disease with sexual activity in
epidemiological terms. However, within the process of identifying and
managing cervical abnormalities, this link may be subjugated or deployed
differentially. Younger, often working class, women may be addressed in
terms which mobilise this link whilst older women, often middle class,
may be presented with rationales of disease which deny such a link.
Within this process of differentiation, young women are positioned as
active sexual agents whilst older women are positioned as passive sexual
agents.
Younger women in the study were most likely to refer to sexually
transmitted diseases in general and HPV in particular in their attempts to
212
explain the 'causes' of abnormal smears. Chris, for instance, linked her
knowledge of screening to sexually transmitted diseases, and suggested
that women ought to begin participating in screening when they became
sexually active. For Chris, the risk of developing cervical disease seemed
to be part of a continuum of risk which she felt her 'generation'
experienced. A dominant theme in her account of her own experience of
screening participation was that of HIV and AIDS. She linked her
experience of negotiating sex to her experience of screening and 'taking
care' applied as much to the possibility of infection from HPV as it
appeared to apply to HIV. Yet her own knowledge of this link was
undermined in her experience of colposcopy and the approach of the
clinic staff there.
For instance, she decribed how she had been asked several questions when
she first went to the colposcopy clinic about her sexual activity and
contraception. When she indicated that she and her (then recent) sexual
partner used condoms, the doctor responded by suggesting she go 'on the
Pill'.4 Chris was surprised at this since she had thought in the current
sexual climate she was being a good citizen and acting responsibly by
using condoms. At the clinic:
'They suggested that I went on the Pill which I thought was
probably a bit of a strange suggestion...with all that's going
on they should be encouraging people to use condoms, not
encouraging people to go on the Pill. I suppose the Pill is
going to lessen the risk of you getting pregnant but it's not
going to lessen the risk of you getting an infection. So, I
thought it was a bit strange.' [Chris TU 462-466]
Chris described herself as a young woman who was negotiating her
sexuality by 'being careful', by which she meant condom use by herself
and her partner. She saw this strategy as a means of not only protecting
herself from HIV, but also, as a precaution against the potential for
cervical disease. Her understanding of risk incorporated not only HIV but
a continuum of infection through which cervical abnormalities might be
4 Hawkes (1995) makes reference to the way in which general
practitioners, in family planning contexts, may guide young women
towards the contraceptive Pill rather than other forms of contraception.
'Responsibility' is interpreted here as the prevention of pregnancy rather
than the prevention of disease and poses contradictions for young women.
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explained. Sexual activity was perceived as indirectly implicated in the
risk of cervical disease by other women.
Similarly, as a consequence of her experience of screening, despite the
absence of explicit connections by either the staff at colposcopy or her
own general practitioner, Susan perceived sexual activity in terms of a
new form of risk.
'I think I'd be really wary, I don't know, maybe it's just how
I'm feeling. I'd be terrified in case I got an infection or
something like that. Like that would cause abnormalities
again or something. I wouldn't have sex without a sheath
nowadays anyway - you can't trust anyone.' [Susan TU 94-95]
Susan reflects on her own sexual practice and her perception of the way
in which sexual activity has become 'risky business'. Her response to this
perception of risk is a presentation of self as someone who will manage
sexual encounters through practical strategies to reduce possible risk of
infection. For Susan, participating in screening is a rational strategy for
dealing with the risk of infection.
In contrast, Claire did not explicitly connect cervical abnormalities to
sexual behaviour but was forced to confront this connection in her clinic
experience. She had understood an abnormal smear as an indicator of
'pre-cancer' and as something which 'had to be sorted out'. At colposcopy,
however, in common with many women, she was asked questions about
her 'sex life' and the number of sexual partners she had had. She accepted
these questions since medicine had 'made a connection between numbers
of sexual partners and cervical cancer' and 'they don't smear virgins'. Yet
she found it strange to 'count up over years of one's sexual activity and
have to produce a number'. This was odd to her because of the ambiguities
surrounding sexual activity and her own questions about what medical
culture defined as sexual acitivity. Did they mean heterosexual
penetrative sex alone or other forms of sexual pratice? This raised
questions for Claire along the lines of 'well, did I sleep with him or not?'
and in the context of a colposcopic examination she found herself
reconsidering her sexual relationship and their link to her sexual health.
Further, they highlight a mismatch between the language which women
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use to describe sexual relationships and the way in which biomedical
discourse expects a calculative representation of sexual activity.
'Promiscuity' and Risk
The possibility of the risk of sexual activity in connection with cervical
disease was also presented to Nicola in the context of history-taking prior
to colposcopic examination. The kinds of questions she was asked included:
'The usual stuff about where I lived, what I did, age and so on.
Also the doctor asked a sexual history and if I had any
partners from Africa, Asia or America, drug users or who
were gay. They asked me my age at first intercourse, how
many partners I'd had, what sort of contraception I used and
the age I first started using the Pill. I think they probably
thought I was promiscuous, assumed I'd be on the Pill,
anyway, probably because GPs seem to dole them out to young
girls. I was used to telling them about contraception - just
about every doctor seems to ask you - so I thought, here we go
again.' [Nicola TU 17-18]
Because of the responses which Nicola gave to the doctor's questions, she
thought she would be defined as 'promiscuous', expressing a perception of
a hidden moral agenda. In her recollection of her experience she did not
comment on her response to such a judgement, except to note that it may
have been made and to critically connect this to the contraceptive
practices of general practitioners. Women who thought that they may
have been defined by health professionals as 'promiscuous' were at pains
to present sexual identities which would not be seen as 'promiscuous'.
Kathleen, for instance, explicitly placed herself outside sexual risk in her
understanding of what screening entailed. She saw cervical disease as
potentially linked to sexual activity but her position was:
'I'm not taking any risks so I'll just get on with it.'
[Kathleen TU 26]
When she went to talk to her general practitioner about her abnormal
smear she had an 'unhelpful' experience. Kathleen recalled how 'uptight'
she was on that occassion and whilst she acknowledged that the doctor was
trying to be reassuring, she also remembered seeing the reaction on her
doctor's face to the smear result, and she felt she 'picked up' on that. In
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particular, Kathleen was upset about the way in which the doctor
explained links between sexual activity and cervical disease.
Kathleen Extract 1: TU 2-33
01 What did really upset me was that she started on
02 about being linked to promiscuous sexual behaviour and that...
03 I've never heard of that...it really upset me,
04 because I'm a fairly monogamous creature.
05 I've been married and then I've lived with someone
06 for another 10 years.
07 I really found that I totally unnecessary statement to be making
08 and particularly since my mother,
09 who only had one sexual partner in her entire life,
10 died of cervical cancer.
First, Kathleen is at pains to identify herself as monogamous. Second, she
is critical about the meaning of 'promiscuous' and the way it is used to
identify risk. She positions herself clearly outside the boundaries of the
concept through the notion of monogamy. Third, she is able to place
herself further beyond the link between 'promiscuity' and cervical
disease which is being presented to her by referring to her mother's
experience of cervical disease and its occurence in the context of
perceived sexual monogamy. Kathleen's powerful rejection of a sexual
identity which might be read as 'promiscuous' was echoed by other women
who acknowledgeed an epidemiological link between sexual activity and
cervical disease but rejected any risk for them.
Therefore, embedded within women's accounts of their screening
experiences were expressions of the ways in which risk could be embodied
in sexual relationships. Risk, as a consistent feature of sexual experience
was alluded to in the following kinds of comments:
you've got to think about it
you've just got to be so careful
* you've just got to be sensible
Medical discourse utilises the category of 'promiscuous woman' but this is
resisted and redefined by women themselves through their experience of
screening. Some women, whilst drawing on contamination beliefs in
order to explain the presence of cervical disease, had in common a sense
of themselves as agents in the development of disease. Whilst some women
articulated a sense of generalised anxiety about sex as a mechanism of
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contamination, others perceived themselves to have some control over the
conditions in which such contamination could occur.
Thus, for some women, embodiment was governed by rational actions
which they could or might take in response to a perception of the risk of
developing cervical disease through sexual activity. Other women
discriminated between their sexual identities and those of other women in
order to mark them off from those which might be defined as
'promiscuous'.^ Whilst such women might acknowledge the role which
sexual activity could play in viral transmission (and not all women in the
study identified sexual activity and HPV as means through which cervical
disease might develop), in their recollection of their experiences they
presented images of themselves as 'non-promiscuous' women.
Generalised perceptions of the risk of disease, were articulated in a
number of ways by women who participated in screening and who
experienced abnormal smears. Such women articulate complex
understandings about what the nature of risk and how they are personally
placed within definitions of risk. The stories told in these interviews
suggest that understandings of being potentially at risk of disease in the
present do not appear to underpin participation, but rather emerge as a
consequence of participation. Therefore being in a state of risk and being
at risk can both be seen as products of the screening experience.
5 Crawford (1994) highlights the importance of boundary marking of self
from 'other' through categories such as 'clean' and 'polluted' in relation to
HIV. A similar process is evident in the reflection of some women upon
the relationship between 'sex' and cervical disease.
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Surveillance, Trust and Risk
'The risk is defined more by the trajectory of an individual
within and between social spaces than by the characteristics
of the spaces themselves. Once more, it is a risk directly
associated with biography, meant as the path between the
different things that one is and becomes; rather than the
'objective' circumstances met through life.'
(Greco, 1993, p360)
Arguments about risk have emerged alongside sociological discussion of
surveillance and are premised on contradictory, though not necessarily
incommensurate, views of society (Turner, 1995). On the one hand, risk
theorists point to processes of deregulation, through for instance, the
expansion of the market (Ritzer, 1993) and the entrenchment of
uncertainty as key features of late modernity (Beck, 1992). On the other,
Foucauldian sociologists argue that late modernity is characterised by
regulatory impulses premised on normalisation strategies which expand
surveillance, and therefore, control. As a gesture of theoretical
accommodation, Turner (1995) points to two possible solutions to this
contradiction, and suggests that risk and regulation might be seen as dual
processes, operating on both local and global levels. The internalisation
of normative patterns of civilisation such as those described by Elias
(1978), produces a desire for everyday predictability, which is reproduced
alongside the growth of global uncertainties, identified within the
emergence of AIDS and polluted environments. Alternatively, as macro
deregulation and economic instability increase, then new systems of
surveillance and governance may provide a sense of personal control at a
local level (Turner, 1995, p226).
As I have argued, these observations are made by examining the practices
which constitute surveillance, and I think we can add, the practices which
identify risk in terms of markers and social groups. Similarly, on the one
hand, Giddens (1990) is attached to the notion of abstract systems as
characteristic of late modernity and, therefore, the importance of trust in
're-embedding' the 'disembeddedness' of such systems. On the other, Beck
(1992) suggests that the absence of trust in, and the experience of
alienation from, abstract systems, is expressed though a 'resigned
dependency' on those systems (1992, p6). However, the current
framework in which arguments about both surveillance and risk are cast,
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suffers from a poverty of gender analysis, and neither the arguments
proposed by Giddens or Beck engage with processes which are gendered in
their practices and outcomes.6 The material I have presented in this
chapter, in posing risk as a product of surveillance which characterises
the nature of participation, challenges the emphasis which Giddens places
upon trust relations in the context of abstract systems, such as that
represented by cervical screening.
I have discussed both practices of surveillance and risk in Section Two, but
I have also, in Section Three, drawn attention to the ways in which women
are drawn into particular kinds of action, such as self-surveillance, and
how these practices are negotiated through a sense of embodiment. The
material I have presented in Chapter Six, suggests that the displacement of
confidence in embodiment, produced through cervical screening
participation, produces a heightened sense of trust in cervical screening,
as an abstract system. Trust therefore emerges through the negotation of
local, or embodied knowledge, in which embodiment must be seen as a
medium of transformation. Drawing on Luhmann (1988; 1993), I have
argued that this awareness presupposes risk, which can therefore be seen
as a product of surveillance. A negotiated sense of risk emerges in two
principal ways. First, drawing on Gifford (1986), the sense of vulnerable
embodiment pertaining to cervical screening participation, produces risk
as a state of being. Second, perceptions of smear misinterpretation and
administrative errors harvest a sense of being at risk.
Women respond differently to this transformed sense of embodiment, for
instance, by shopping around for smears from different venues; by
entering into political action, through group membership and discussion;
and by explicitly placing trust in the knowledge claims which are
mobilised in support of cervical screening. Consequently, I argue that the
material I have presented in Chapter Six demonstrates the complexity of
risk internalisation and the multiple and varied ways in which women
actively produce a risk consciousness in the context of screening.
6 Turner (1984) alludes to the gendered nature of the governance of bodies
but does so by employing a pathological model of the female body. In
Turner's concept of patrism, the female body is a foundationalist target for
political technologies, in the sense that he presents it as an essentially
troubled body estranged from the mind.
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Embodiment, and the sense of transformation which is articulated in
relation to it, is critical to this process.
Furthermore, risk internalisation is cross-cut and undercut by the
production of citizenship consciousness. In contrast to those who might
argue that women require expert reassurance in order to counter the
anxiety generated by screening participation, this data illustrates how
uncertainty and ambiguity is negotiated by women themselves. Women
can and do transform surveillance by reclaiming cervical screening as a
social entitlement and as a social obligation in which they position
themselves as active subjects of participation. Not only, therefore, is risk
'internalised', but a citizenship consciousness is actively produced in the
context of participation in cervical screening. Such consciousness
provides a mechanism for managing anxieties about knowledge
ambiguities; the market culture in which screening quotas exist, and the
expert system in which cervical interpretations are made.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
BREAKING IN AND OUT AGAIN: METHODOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND
NEGOTIATION
'The notion of theory as a toolkit means (i) The theory to be
constructed is not a system but an instrument, a logic of the
specificty of power relations and the struggles around them;
(ii) That this investigation can only be carried out step by
step on the basis of reflection (which will necessarily be
historical in some of its aspects) on given situation.'
(Foucault, 1980, pl45, cited in Clifford, 1988, p23)
Introduction
The subject of cervical screening has a certain social power. When asked
to talk about the topic of my thesis, the immediate response of many people
was enthusiastic. Cervical screening was seen as an issue high on current
policy agendas and as one with which 'all' women 'ought' to be concerned.
Moreover, responses to my topic by peers typically pointed to access and
non-participation as key problems. Similarly, when I turned to feminist
literature on women's health, whilst there were few direct references to
cervical screening, and far more on breast screening, those which
existed, also construed screening as an issue of both access and
compliance.
As Chapter Four describes, the concerns of the technical and policy
literature have been largely directed towards issues of non-participation,
population coverage and the incidence of disease. Furthermore, these
concerns have assumed a position in which an implicit goal is to increase
women's participation in screening. This has been the case even within
feminist studies which have sought to 'give voice' to the authenticity of
women's experience. Within this kind of research, whilst women are
'taken seriously' in the sense that their views are sought and addressed,
the knowledge which women are said to hold is identified, in many cases,
as inadequate. As I described in Chapter Four, prevention discourse
produces appropriate knowledge for the purpose of securing compliance,
itself defined in women's interests. When women respond to research
questions in ways which fail to 'fit' what is defined as 'formal' or objective
knowledge, they are perceived as lacking information and requiring
expert advice.
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Implicit emphasis on the importance of compliance within the project of
screening and the identification of embodied or local knowledge as
'deficient' knowledge holds two implications for the way in which I have
approached this thesis. Broadly, these are concerned, first, with the
process and methodological framework of the research. It is my
contention that the normative position adopted by social science
approaches to screening is reinforced by a methodological framework
which draws on a Health Belief model of action, and research methods
which largely rely on surveys to generate descriptive and prescriptive
data which can be translated and deployed in relation to policy and
information production. The normative position adopted by social science
approaches to screening therefore obscures issues of intersubjectivity,
interpretation and embodiment.
The second concern is the status of knowledge. The dismissal of some
forms of women's knowledge as 'deficient' or inadequate, raises the issue
of what counts as knowledge in the first place (see Harding, 1991, for
extended discussion of epistemology) and the problematic way in which
'experience' is used in feminist approaches to cervical screening. On the
one hand, women's 'experience' is drawn upon as a basis of authenticity
with which to challenge medical assumptions about why and how women
participate in screening. On the other hand, 'experience', articulated
through 'deficient' knowledge, is categorised as inauthentic, in the sense
that it fails to generate the right kind of participation, that is, compliance.
The methodological framework of the literature which I have described in
Section Two, therefore, places emphasis on the authority of the
researcher, albeit at times in ways which seek to 'give voice' to those who
are researched. Paradoxically, the authority of women as subjects of
research is undermined as their accounts are read as indicative of the
possession or absence of a particular kind of knowledge.
In seeking to gain access to women's interpretations of the experience of
cervical screening in general and of an abnormal smear in particular, I
wished to design my own research in ways which would avoid these
problems. I wished to adopt a methodological approach which would give
voice to the subjects of research yet not reclaim the experiences which
these voices revealed, as unmediated authenticity. In common with many
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feminist researchers (Scott, 1985 provides extended discussion), I saw in-
depth interviews as a method which would enable women to speak and to
set their own agenda in the interview context. In the course of analysis, it
became much clearer to me that this method reproduces the notion of
authenticity which I had perceived as problematic. Analysis of interview
data as 'experience' merely reproduced the categories which I deemed
problematic in other kinds of research and obscured my interaction with
both the discourse of the interview subjects and the production of data as
text.
My resolution of this problem was to make interpretation the focus of
analysis and acknowledge the 'data' as 'constructed negotiation' (Clifford,
1988). This has allowed me to generate a 'bottom-up' analysis, not in terms
of grounded theory, which itself can obscure the process of research
(Scott, 1985), but in a Foucauldian sense of local knowledges which emerge
from particular discursive contexts and are constituted as texts. This
strategy also allowed me to address my own 'situatedness' as a postgraduate
researcher; as a trained nurse and as a young woman in ways which
enabled me to reflect on the diversity of 'experiences' in women's
accounts of cervical screening participation.
Finally, the process of doing and reflecting upon the research has
consistently forced me to address the question of what purpose my
research might serve. Clearly, it serves both instrumental and value-
oriented goals, first in terms of professional accreditation and second in
terms of personal enlightenment. The research has another purpose,
which is to address the sociological project and the analytic categories
embedded within that project. Therefore this chapter reflects upon the
process of engaging with that project and the work which goes into the
production of sociological knowledge, through a discussion, first, of my
negotiation of access to a regional colsposcopy clinic; second, of the
negotiated character of data collection; and third, of the process of data
analysis.
223
Breaking In: Access Negotiation1
Negotiating Physical Access
Negotiating access into research settings is an important part of the
research process. Research settings vary considerably in the extent to
which they are 'open' or 'closed' to public scrutiny and these differences
in turn impact on the nature and degree of negotiation necessary to
secure access. Part of my research focused on the experience of women in
cervical screening participation in general and the interpretation of
abnormal smears in particular. I identified a regional colposcopy unit
(henceforth the 'clinic'), from which I thought I would be able to
construct a sample of women all of whom would have had at least one
abnormal smear. This approach also enabled me to identify women who
had spent different amounts of time within the cervical screening
'programme'. I anticipated a number of gatekeepers to social and physical
access, including medical and nursing staff; Health Board ethics committee
members; clerical staff and women themselves, as potential recruits.
Unanticipated gatekeepers included men with whom some women shared
living space,2 and the bureaucratic contingencies of the Health Board
ethics committee. Negotiating this latter gatekeeper, in particular,
prolonged the period of access negotiation and raised issues of compromise
and closure.
Whilst feminist methodological strategies are contested issues about which
there is unresolved debate (see Holmwood, 1995 for a recent overview), in
identifying potential recruits to my research, I wished to minimise any
obligation to participate in the study which women themselves might feel.
Oakley (1981) notes the sense of duty which women experience when they
are approached to participate in research, particularly in clinic settings,
and I did not wish to reproduce those relations of compliance, outlined in
Chapter Four, of which I was critical. Furthermore, I wished it to be clear
that once women agreed to participate in the study, they could opt out of
participation at any point in the process. My concern was to build the
potential for agency and resistance into the research design, and to see
1 Some of the insights in this section were developed in collaboration with
Catrin Smith, a fellow postgraduate researcher. In talking about and
thinking through our experiences of postgraduate research we identified
similarities and contrasts, some of which I discuss here.
- I outline this phenomenon briefly in Appendix I.
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women as 'volitional subjects' (Stanley, 1990). Discussions of
methodological strategies which claim to be distinctly feminist, argue for
an acknowledgement of women's agency (Stanley and Wise, 1993) in
implementing research design. Clearly, the right of individuals not to be
the subjects of research is also discussed in non-feminist literature (see
Burgess, 1985). My intention here is not to argue that feminist
methodological approaches which claim to be distinct have intellectual
continuities with other methodological approaches, but rather, to
highlight how I attempted to develop a feminist approach to the design of
the research and how this attempt was subject to negotiation.
I therefore adopted a loose, exploratory approach which drew on an
interpretive tradition of sociological research. In selecting appropriate
methods of research I wanted to ensure that women, as potential
participants, were given the fullest possible information about the
research and the opportunity to refuse or withdraw from participation at
any point. I planned to identify women from clinic records, then write to
them asking permission to interview them about their experience of
screening. This meant that I would approach women in the clinic myself,
rather than ask clerical staff to approach women, in part, in order to
establish that I was not part of the clinic culture. They would already
know that they had an abnormal smear, so I would not have access to more
information about their smear status than they did. My premise was to
assume women's agency. However, medical practitioners and committee
members also exercised their agency. Therefore, whilst I was able to be
self-conscious about my personal negotiation of what I perceived as a
hierarchical relation of power, my own sense and exercise of agency,
cannot be understood as separate from the process of interaction and
negotiation which I entered into.
In order to initiate clinic access I first established an informal link with a
consultant who was sympathetic to the research. He suggested I meet with
his colleague, who had responsibility for the administration of the clinic.
I provided this consultant with a written rationale which outlined the
open-ended and exploratory design of the research. I presented the study
in general rather than in specific terms and briefly outlined how I
planned to identify a sample of women and my methods of data collection,
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without explicitly linking the work to sociological concerns. Although
this could be described as a progressive entry strategy (Lee, 1993), it was
also a way of managing my own anxieties. Although I wished to avoid the
misrepresentation of myself in order to gather data, and did not see my
representation of my research as a judicious use of truth, I nevertheless
had anxieties about representing the open-ended and exploratory nature
of the research. This reflected concerns about the do-ability of the
research; the perceived imbalance of power between myself as a female
researcher and the official gatekeeper to this research setting; my own
ambivalences towards the clinic and the project of cervical screening.
Despite, or perhaps because of my generalised presentation of the
research, the medical manager responded positively.
My previous occupation, prior to entering higher education, was that of a
Registered General Nurse in the National Health Service. I was wary of
acknowledging this identity in my letter of introduction to the consultant
of the clinic for two reasons. First, I did not wish to signal the research as
nursing research, and thus identify myself on an epistemological plane
not shared by the women whom I wished to interview (see Stanley, 1990).
Related to this, I did not wish to re-enter the hierarchical relations
between doctor and nurse, from which I had become disengaged. Second,
although I was unsure of my identity as a postgraduate researcher, I
wished to at least signal my credentials as a sociologist, albeit in training.
However, I was placed as a nurse by medical and nursing staff and,
therefore, forced to acknowledge my identity as one-time nurse.
This categorisation probably facilitated my access to the clinic. For
instance, although the consultant sometimes introduced me as someone
'doing a Ph.D.', he always introduced me as a nurse. Although I impressed
upon this consultant that the interviews with women were only a part of
the thesis, and that I was not using survey methods, it nevertheless
became clear that he saw the research as another 'attitude survey' which
he welcomed as a way of revealing local concerns. His first questions, for
instance, were: how will this research be representative, and how will it
be statistically useful? Therefore, he defined the research according to
his terms and made suggestions about my methodological approach. This
is an acknowledged aspect of access negotiation (Schatzman and Strauss,
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1973) but also illustrates more generally the context of policy creation and
evaluation to which all academic research is increasingly being attached.
In particular, the consultant objected to my suggestion that I contact
women prior to their arrival at the clinic on the grounds that any letter
sent to women prior to their attendance might 'warn' them off (from what
he did not say, although this illustrates the normative emphasis placed on
compliance). He alternatively suggested that I identify women upon their
arrival at the clinic. In his view, once a woman entered the physical
space of the clinic she implicitly signalled her consent to medical
scrutiny, on the grounds that since the hospital in which the clinic was
based was a teaching hospital, people had to expect to be 'guinea pigs'.3
Further, he suggested I approach general practitioners and request
'permission to use their patients', which effectively became a kind of
conditional access (Lee, 1993). For the consultant there seemed to be an
issue of professional courtesy, and he was clearly anxious to minimise
treading on colleagues' toes. Yet this gesture effectively incorporated
another layer of gatekeeping, this time outside the hospital, through
general practitioners, in ways which invite comparisons with the
relationship between gynaecology and general practice outlined in
Chapter Three. Here, medical power is seen as incorporative and
responsive, in the way that it redefined my research within the terms of
medical discourse and introduced a further layer of surveillance.
My response to this implicit quid pro quo was twofold. First, I perceived
this suggestion as a measure of his professional power to define the nature
of the research and potentially operate closure on the project altogether.
Therefore I did not feel that I could reject his suggestion to approach
women on their arrival at the clinic, because I might jeopardise the
research. More importantly, gaining physical access to the clinic created
the unintended consequence of having to negotiate another social access
point, distinct from the women themselves. My initial resistance to what I
perceived as medical power, and my attempt to undercut this by
incorporating agency for women into the research design, was itself
3 There are parallels to be drawn here between the consultant's
representation of the hospital as a space in which people might expect to
be the focus of research, and the earlier historical practice of using
women as research objects, as outlined in Chapter Three.
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transformed into compliance through the process of access negotiation.
Consequently, I felt my epistemological and theoretical position was
somewhat compromised by accepting the consultant's definition of my
research. Yet it is also illustrative both of a more general process of
constructive negotiation and reproduces the social relations I have
offered for scrutiny in Section Two.
My encounters with nursing and clerical staff in the clinic followed
similar lines. After my initial meeting with this consultant, he suggested I
make my application to the ethics committee, but in the meantime spend
time in the clinic in order to acquaint myself with the procedures and
work carried out there. This gave me an opportunity to make links with
the nursing, clerical and other medical staff on an informal basis. My
presence was welcomed by many of the nurses, including the sister-in-
charge. The nurses I spoke to voiced enthusiasm for the research, and
generally adopted a compliance model in which women who neither
participated in cervical screening nor attended the clinic at the appointed
time, were seen as 'defaulters'. For instance, women were seen as using
'devious tactics' and making 'excuses' to avoid either having a smear,
colposcopy or treatment. 'Excuses' included 'having a period' or, the
question 'if there is any chance you are pregnant', was seen to be used by
women to avoid screening.
As a consequence of the nurse identity imposed upon, but not entirely
resisted by me, I was given the freedom of the clinic. In some cases
women had come for repeat smears following colposcopy six months
earlier and I observed six consultations between women and nurses, with
the permission of both participants. Other women had come for their first
or repeat colposcopy. I was also invited by medical practitioners to
observe two colposcopic procedures. The women who experienced these
procedures were asked if they minded the presence of a 'research nurse'
and agreed to my presence. Although I had concerns about the way in
which I was drawn into observation, it was difficult to refuse this
invitation, because of the way in which I was introduced and addressed as
a nurse.
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Negotiating Social Access: the Health Board Ethics Committee and
unanticipated gatekeepers
Assured of the support of the medical and nursing staff, I approached the
Health Board ethics committee for permission to use this particular clinic
as a base from which to recruit research subjects. This proved to be a
time-consuming and painfully bureaucratic procedure. I made clear that
this was not a piece of medical research, neither were there drugs trials
nor invasive procedures involved. Nevertheless I complied with the
application procedures which entailed a lengthy submission of a pro
forma clearly designed for clinical trials. I attempted to rework my
proposal to interview a sample of women drawn from this clinic, with
their permission, into a shape which would not sit too awkwardly with the
design of the application. This was no easy task.
I intimated that I would approach women in the clinic; that prior to this I
would write to their general practitioners in order to ascertain if there
was any reason why they should not be approached (I will return to the
particular issues this raised for the research); that the interviews would
be semi-structured, tape-recorded and take place in a venue of the
woman's choice. I also supplied a redrafted consent form (Appendix IV),
since the one provided by the committee was inappropriate for the kind of
research I wished to undertake, and a 'subject' information sheet
(Appendix V), which outlined information about the research for the
prospective participants in an informal, approachable way.
In response, I received a request for information about the questionnaire
I intended to adopt; a complaint that the nursing hierarchy had no
knowledge of the research; and comment on the inadequacy of the
consent form I had supplied. I had made clear in the initial application
that the method of data collection would entail semi-structured, open-
ended interviews and that questionnaires would not be used. In response
to the Committee's concern regarding a questionnaire, however, I supplied
the committee with a theme guide (Appendix VI), with which they
subsequently appeared satisfied.
The final objection was in relation to the consent form I had submitted.
This objection was based on the fact that it was not 'the standard type' and
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I was sent, forthwith, another form. This form, I noted, was different from
the consent form I was sent with the original application, since it now
also included the following sentence:
'Your General Practitioner will be informed of your
participation in this study and will be advised of any
clinically relevant information that comes to light.'
I objected to this on the basis that as a sociologist, I had no business
informing general practitioners about clinically relevant information,
since I was not in a position to define what was clinically relevant. Hence
whilst it is clearly the case that in many situations researchers have
found it necessary to comply with certain conditions in order to gain
social and physical access, this kind of condition has implications not only
for the identity of the researcher involved, but also control over the
nature of research itself. A further reason for my objection was the way
in which the inclusion of such a phrase would require me to identify the
research as something which could be recognised by the medical and
nursing profession as fitting into an acceptable biomedical/clinical
research paradigm. I consequently resubmitted the consent form which I
had originally drafted and requested that the committee consider my
position as a sociologist rather than as a clinician. Again I included the
'subject information' sheet which I had drafted as a letter in order to
present information more informally and outline the topic of my research
for potential participants. This was accepted and I was given permission
to proceed.
Closures and Compromises: Negotiating Social Access
As I have indicated, one condition of securing social access, which I felt I
had generated, was to involve general practitioners. I identified thirty-
nine women as a 'sample' from clinic records in terms of age, category of
appointment and consultant, over a period of six months, and approached
their general practitioners by a letter, in which I briefly explained the
study aims, the location of the study and the name of the woman drawn
from clinic records (see Appendix VII). I added the following sentence:
'If there is any clinical reason why your patient should not
be approached and asked to participate in this study, I would
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be grateful if you could get in touch with me...within the
next seven days.' [Emphasis not included in original]
Thirty-three general practitioners did not respond. Five acknowledged
my letter and expressed discretionary judgements. One general
practitioner requested that I did not approach her patient on clinical
grounds, in this case, of postnatal depression. Of the other four, two
general practitioners asked me not to approach the women concerned on
the grounds that they did not consider this to be in the 'interests' of the
patient. Another general practitioner, whom I had approached about two
women, said she was 'agreeable' to one patient being approached, and had
'no objection' to the other being approached. The final general
practitioner of this five wrote to say:
'Thank you for your letter asking permission to speak to Mrs.
— at the colposcopy clinic. Frankly I don't think she is going
to be all that useful to you as she does tend to get very
uptight. However, obviously whether you wish to interview
her is up to you entirely.'
I had not asked for 'permission' to approach women, as the excerpt from
her letter suggests. I saw my letter as alerting general practitioners to the
fact that I was going to approach these women and this placed the onus on
them to identify clinical reasons why I should not. Only one of these
reasons could be recognised as clinical. Three general practitioners
identified themselves as gatekeepers of women's general interests and one
perceived my letter as a request for information about the usefulness of
her patient for my study.
These extracts illustrate how methodological closures drafted in a new,
unanticipated level of gatekeeping. Not only did the consultant defer to
general practitioners on the grounds of professional curtesy, but some
general practitioners clearly saw themselves as the guardians of women's
interests. I interpreted this as a form of protectionism which undercuts
women's right to speak for themselves and in their own voices. My
relationship to women as potential research subjects was mediated by
general practitioners, based on their assumption that they were the
agents in the best position to make decisions about whether women were
capable or not of participating in a piece of research. Such
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circumscription seemed to replicate precisely those conditions which I
had sought to minimise in my early research design.
Because I focused on a clinic culture, which bridges institutional and
community social space, the research process revealed that the
gatekeepers to social and physical access were not always clear.
Furthermore, whilst it was possible to anticipate a number of key
gatekeepers, they responded in unanticipated ways, which produced
closure and compromise. Hence the process of identifying a sample of
women with whom to conduct a piece of research was constructively
negotiated. Lee (1993) has argued that when researchers stress the
problematic nature of field research the picture which is often portrayed
becomes an 'heroic tale', in which the researcher's diligence or artifice
overcomes the reluctance of research subjects to participate.
This account is by no means an 'heroic' tale. Rather, it illustrates the way
in which my negotiation of researcher-researched relationships reflected
issues of power and resistance with which the substance of my research
was concerned. In particular, I experienced tensions in my self-conscious
adoption of 'feminist methodology', especially where women are
positioned as a relatively powerless group in researcher-researched
relationships (Finch, 1984; Oakley; 1981). My attempts to overcome this
perceived imbalance and ensure the potential for agency in the research
process created a shift from my own resistance to compliance, and is more
generally illustrative of the substance of the research. Therefore
attachment to and renegotiation of feminist ideas about the process and
practice of research may be to compromise one's research agenda and
reshape the research itself. This highlights a central tension between the
research, in terms of the sociological questions it addresses, the
theoretical framework in which it is located, and the doing of the
research, with regard to the methodological and epistemological questions
which I have had to address in the process.
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Narrative accounts
'In fact the sociologist and his "object" form a couple where
each one is to be interpreted through the other, and where
the relationship must itself be deciphered as a historical
moment.' (Jean-Paul Sartre Critique de la Raison Dialectique
quoted in Clifford, 1988, p55)
Twenty-three women agreed to be interviewed individually.4 Interviews,
which lasted for, on average, one hour, usually took place within the
woman's own home, but eight were carried out in the Department of
Sociology at the University of Edinburgh. The interviews were semi-
structured and tape-recorded and my questions were broad and general, to
encourage respondents to generate their own stories (Bell, 1988) about
their experiences of screening. I was interested in what these stories
were about, how and why they became meaningful to the women
concerned. My approach was to view the accounts which women gave in
the interview context as stories or cultural tales, as a form of discourse,
which they created around those experiences (Williams, 1984; Mishler,
1986; Denzin, 1988; Thomson and Scott, 1990; Riessman, 1993).
The interview data which the study generated must therefore be seen in
terms of my interaction with women's interpretations, as they illuminated
my theoretical interests, rather than the unproblematic representation of
women's accounts. In approaching the data in this way, I perceived
women's accounts as local knowledges which are embodied in a particular
way of telling and are located within a particular social context. I have
not responded to the data in ways which 'give voice' to women's
experience. Rather, I have responded to the data by both expanding and
reducing it in ways which allow a chorus of voices to emerge, or a series
of 'multivocal exchanges' between myself and the subject (Clifford, 1988),
between the subject's discourse and the text, which I have produced.^
4 Appendix I contains details of the women approached to participate in
the study and biographical details of those who continued to participate.
See Appendix VI for details of the interview theme guide.
^ Clifford (1988) provides extensive discussion of this analytic process in
his critique of ethnographic authority, and refers specifically to Ricoeur's
work on discourse. However similar points are made within sociological
discussions of interpretive frameworks, especially those aligned to
narrative analsysis (see for instance, Denzin, 1988; Riessman, 1993).
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This approach stands in contrast to current social science approaches to
cervical screening which place these experiences within Health Belief
models of explanation. As Chapter Four described, in this approach,
experience is examined to shed light on attitude and belief, with the
purpose of identifying problems in the acquisition of knowledge.
Knowledge 'gaps' are identified and methods of filling these gaps are
developed. A prior conception of the nature of the problem, usually non¬
compliance, is implicit in this work. In contrast, and in criticism of the
model of action implict in this work, my research began from a more
open-ended and exploratory premise which asked women to reflect on and
give shape to their experience of cervical screening. My approach
treated women's knowledge as linked to and embedded within their
experience, and I have examined the ways in which this knowledge was
articulated. In doing so, I have sought to identify embodiment in the
narratives told by women. Two sociological approaches aligned to
narrative analysis have been helpful in this respect.
First is the observation that people make sense of and contextualise their
experience through narration. Graham (1983) and Mishler (1986, p69)
argue that people tell stories in interviews even where the form of the
interview is heavily structured by questions and answers. Bell (1988)
emphasises the way in which the stories which people tell in the context
of interviews can be used to make links between social structure, social
interaction and consciousness. This approach stems from a concern with
the interactional aspects of the interview context and the ways in which
particular accounts or representations of events are actively constructed
in these contexts. In the process of telling, the phenomenon under
discussion becomes real. It is therefore situated within a particular
historical moment but is also taken beyond this moment through the
process of analysis (Denzin, 1988).
For instance, Mishler (1986) poses a distinction between different contexts
for the telling of such stories, for instance, the medical world and the
lifeworld. His analysis focuses on how the world of medicine impinges
upon and transforms the lifeworld and vice versa. When people try to
make sense of their experiences outside doctor-patient and clinical
contexts, they experience struggle between the voices of their own
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particular lifeworlds and that of the medical framework (Mishler, 1986).
Further, interviews and the narratives embedded within them can be
understood as dialogues or struggles between these two voices.
Consequently, in order to deal with the question of how people make sense
of their experiences, in Mishler's approach, analysis focuses on issues
such as which voice dominates; on which explanations do women draw to
articulate their experiences and how are their understandings
transformed?
Whilst this approach is valuable, it has a tendency to separate each 'world'
from the other in representing particular narratives and to separate the
lifeworlds of the teller and the listener in the co-construction of an
account (Denzin, 1988). Within a Foucauldian framework, the boundaries
between these two worlds are less clear, since they are constituted in
discourse. Hence the task for analysis should be to give an account of the
process through which discourse, as a mode of communication in which
the presence of the speaking subject and of the immediate situation of
communication are intrinsic, becomes text (Clifford, 1988, p39). The
discourse of the teller is present and non-transcendent, in contrast to the
data generated and transcribed into textual form, which is open-ended.
Therefore, drawing on Clifford's discussion of Ricoeur (Clifford, 1988), for
discourse to become text it has to come 'autonomous' or separated from its
specific utterance and authorial intention and so experiences become
narratives or meaningful occurrences. In this way, analysis becomes a
constructive negotiation which involves subjects who move between
discourse and text, or which takes text, in the form of theoretical
propositions, to the data for support, refines them and develops them in
the light of what is conceptualised in the data (Ramazanoglu, 1992). Here
analysis moves back and forwards between transcripts or text and theory
(Holland, Ramazanoglu, Scott, Sharpe and Thomson, 1994). This approach
allows for diverse narratives within a single account and retains the
contradictions and inconsistencies within discourse, or places marginal
discourses and subjugated knowledges (Haraway, 1991) as a focus for
analysis, rather than as a problem for analysis. These concepts highlight
knowledges which develop in the context of interacting with the world of,
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for example, medicine, but are interpretively transformed into local,
embodied knowledges.
There are a variety of ways in which narrative analysis can be
undertaken. One is to focus on the organisational framework of the
narrative itself (its form) and how it is structurally organised. This
approach is taken by Riessman (1993) who explores narrative
organisation around time and episode. This approach preserves the form
of talk and emphasises the work which the production of such talk entails.
Another is to explore narrative content and development. This is the
approach taken by Bell (1988) in her study of 'diethylstilbestrol (DES)
daughters'. Bell emphasises how women's understandings of their
experiences as DES daughters lead to their politicisation and she examines
the medical uncertainties faced by these women; their response and the
consequences for their identity. She interviewed women by asking open-
ended questions to allow them to introduce their own issues, then analysed
narratives within single cases. In one interview for instance, there
might be three stories, which she then argued could be linked by
exploring similarities within and across stories. This approach, by
focusing on content (what the stories are about) and form (how they
became meaningful; or how the stories were produced in the interview),
allowed her to demonstrate change over time, because of the ways in
which stories emerged, tying events and significant social relationships
together. This approach links social structure and social interaction with
identity formation through the concept of a core narrative and the
process of how meaning is accomplished.
A further approach to narrative analysis is that of Williams (1984) who
develops the concepts of narrative reconstruction and genesis in order to
reveal the explanations people give for chronic illness. In contrast to
accounts which place emphasis on 'causal' factors identified in health
beliefs (for instance, Pill and Stott, 1982), Williams tries to demonstrate the
ways in which illness talk reveals narrative reference points between the
individual and society. People present narrative reconstructions of their
changing relationship to the world in which they live, or local effects,
and the genesis of illness within it.
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Williams argues for two instances of narrative: the 'routine' and the
'reconstructed'. The former refers to 'the observations, comments, and
asides, the practical consciousness which provides essential
accompaniment to the happenings of our daily lives and helps to render
them intelligible'. Here narrative is a process of 'continuous accounting'
in which the everyday events of daily life are placed in some kind of
order, although not necessarily teleological. His use of biography,
develops a concept of narrative which refers to the reciprocal
connections between individuals, their private 'settings of milieux' and
wider public issues (Mills, 1959).
Williams demonstrates, in one case study of a man with rheumatoid
arthritis, who links its onset and development to workplace toxicity, that
for this man, 'the body is defined by its relationship to the world of social
action not in isolation from it' (pi82). Furthermore, this understanding of
the body is distinct from a medical model of ascertainable facts and
objective observations. For Williams, the body is both an object in the
world but also the medium 'through which our consciousness reaches out
towards and acts upon the world' (pi97). Williams draws on Marx's view
that consciousness is derived from materiality, and further suggests that
consciousness is 'biographically framed'. This approach develops a
dialectical approach to the relationship between body, rather than
embodiment, and society. Whilst consciousness may be mediated through
the body, the ways in which consciousness of the body is interpreted and
expressed will 'lead us to call upon images of the private and public lives
we lead' (pl97). Therefore narrative reconstruction is an attempt to
repair ruptures between body, self and society.
In addition to this concept of reconstruction, Williams uses the concept of
genesis to refer to reference points within a narrative which may be
constituent parts of the imaginative reconstruction of the 'past so that it
has meaning or purpose for the present'. I have been cautious of his use
of genesis because of the way in which it explicitly refers to a sense of
teleology. Feminist epistemologies, in particular, point to the non-linear
and unteleological way in which people experience and recount their
experiences (Riessman, 1993). Time may well be implied in narrative
reconstructions, but not necessarily in linear form. Indeed, the issue of
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temporal ordering is problematic in narrative analysis.6 Nevertheless,
Williams demonstrates how episodes within narrative reconstructions
constitute reference points which are mobilised to bring order and
meaning to illness events and experiences.
Conclusion
I have adapted these approaches to examine women's accounts of their
experiences of cervical screening; their sense of embodiment and the
meaning imputed to these experiences. I have not used the data to draw
attention to lay beliefs or folk theories about the causes of specific
diseases, nor have I used the data to point up distinctions between medical
and lay understandings of disease. Approaches which identify 'knowledge
gaps' have been used in ways which deny the authenticity of lay
knowledge. I have not treated women's experiences as lay knowledge
which needs to be corrected, but as knowledge which has to be understood
within the context in which it is produced and through the meanings
which are given to it by women themselves. I have therefore used the
interview data to examine how the cervix is produced as a site of
knowledge across biographical time.
In contrast to the subjects of Williams' study, the women I interviewed
talked about experiences of prevention rather than chronic illness. A
feature of this experience is the way in which women are asked to
consider, and indeed accommodate, the possibility of future disease. For
many women this possibility poses a disruption to embodiment in ways
which require reinterpretation and accommodation. The 'larger
interpretive process' in which women come to understand and articulate
their experiences can be considered a 'narrative reconstruction'. There
are parallels between Williams' approach and Mishler's distinction
between the world of medicine and that of the lifeworld. With reference
to the way in which one of his interviewees places his experience of
rheumatoid arthritis, in the context of exploitative social relations in the
workplace, Williams says:
'When issues of diagnosis are removed from the quiet
location of the doctor's clinic and situated within the context
of a struggle for compensation, the neutrality of the medical
6 Riessman is drawing upon Ricoeur's work on time and narrative here.
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task and the objective validity of its procedures are thrown
into doubtful relief.' (1984, pi85)
This implies that people transform the medical world they encounter
through the particularities of embodiment, and the discourse by which
such encounters are bound, by relocating and incorporating experiences
in the lifeworld in ways which produce local knowledges. Analysis
therefore focuses on the form of telling, on the assumption that there is
correspondence between form and the experience of reality. For instance,
in the retelling of an experience which acknowledges the reality of
medical culture, individuals may highlight an ontologically different
reality by inserting a 'narrative enclave' (Young, 1989). This breaks the
narrative frame and highlights a shift from general to local knowledge.
Williams' work finds some commonality with feminist and interactionist
analysis of the situated work which people do in their representation of
experience (see most recently Atkinson, 1996). This work focuses on how
stories are told and begins analysis from the inside out, rather than by
looking for content and confirmation of presuppositions. This highlights
epistemological issues in relation to the production of sociological
knowledge through relational encounters, in which the production of
such knowledge is the outcome of particular sets of interactional
negotiations.
Historical truth and authenticity is important for current approaches to
the experience of cervical screening. I have taken a distinct approach to
this issue which attends to the way in which local knowledges emerge in
the process of reflection. I have not used the interview data to support
theoretical claims but rather to illustrate and develop theoretical
arguments and to highlight the coherence and disruptions between local
knowledges in the world of medicine and local knowledges which emerge
in particular contexts of embodiment. Locating the body more centrally
in both substantive and theoretical concerns opens up the issue of
embodied knowledges and subjectivities for exploration in order to
demonstrate how immateriality - ideas, texts, constructs - is materialised
and internalised, in ways which become a lived experience (see Smith,
1991, for instance). I have used this insight to examine how ideas, texts
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and practices are lived out and inform action and experience. This allows
me to explore the ways in which medical culture may address the body as
an abstraction and examine how this notion of the body is taken up,
internalised and materialised into a particular body in the context of
prevention.
Hence, the 'body project' of this thesis, has been to generate empirical data
which it brings into dialogue with feminism, Foucault and sociology, in
order to articulate a status for the body in sociology and feminism. The
methodological approach of the thesis picks up issues in relation to the
status of embodiment within sociological and feminist work on the body.
By placing emphasis on embodiment, it becomes possible to establish a
sociological project which engages with the interaction of 'the' body,
embodied experience, and the nature of social participation and
membership in late modernity.
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EPILOGUE
In this thesis I have presented material which I have used to 'think
through the body', that is, to both follow through the issues presented for
sociology by the body and to examine how the body is deployed as a
medium of local, individual, transformation. I initiated my discussion of
the body at the level of general theory and traced current sociological
perspectives on the body. Consideration of the limitations of general
theory has led sociology to other approaches, the most distinctive and
dominant of which are Foucault and feminism. However, I have argued
that whilst these approaches are critical to the development of sociological
address to the body, each contains unresolved tensions.
Within Foucauldian sociology, engagement with the body under
surveillance places too much significance upon processes of regulatory
power such that resistances, forms of disciplinary power and self-
surveillance are effectively obscured. It is my contention that the
arguments generated within this framework have focused too readily
upon practices of surveillance, which conceal experiences of surveillance
and self-surveillance. A significant implication of this is that the body
persists as an object of scrutiny in ways which bracket out particular, or
situated, knowledges and experience. In contrast, I have argued that
second wave feminism should be seen as a statement of the particular, but
one which has generated its own, unresolved, tensions. On the one hand,
significant discussion within feminism has been concerned with
embodied experience, as a source of authenticity. On the other,
embodiment has been addressed in abstract and philosophical terms.
Nonetheless, despite these tensions, I have argued in support of the
potential for these approaches for considering embodiment as a process of
interaction, or dialectic, between the body as object or idea and embodied
experience.
One of the key areas for debate about the body has been in relation to
regulation and surveillance. Prevention has emerged as a notable
substantive area in which these discussions have taken place and I
therefore offered cervical screening, as an instance of surveillance, for
review. I examined discourses and local practices which have contributed
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to the creation of the cervix as an object of scrutiny within medicine and
social science. The emergence and development of cervical screening is
characterised by a range of enduringly contested knowledges across these
various sites. I have argued, consequently, that within both medical
practice and the evaluations of social science, compliance emerged and
remains a crucial concern. The contested or ambiguous knowledge which
governs medical practice is dependent upon generating the means of
securing compliance, and, I have argued, the most distinctive of these
include obligation and risk.
Cervical screening offers a concrete example of an abstract system and
therefore raises questions about the nature of interaction and experience
within such a system. I have used the notion of embodiment to examine
and highlight two notable aspects of this experience. First, the strength
of obligation to participate in screening is apparent in the accounts of
women I have presented here. Whilst neo-liberal notions of obligation
arise in these accounts in ways which support arguments about the
emergence of lifestyle and liberal governance as characteristic of health
in late modernity, this is by no means the only way in which notions of
obligation are expressed. I have identified authoritarian notions of social
duty, entitlement and a sense of care in these accounts and I have
suggested that these point to a sense of citizenship as a product of the
experience of screening. Second, I have argued that risk should be seen
as a product of the form of surveillance exemplified by cervical
screening. Women's interpreted accounts of their experience point to
both risk as a state of being and being in a state of risk. These
articulations of risk express connections between the abstract system of
which screening forms part and local experiences which are derived
from, and transformed through, embodiment.
Two principal implications arise from this thesis for understandings of
the relationship between the body, gender and health. First, the
discursive transformation from diagnostic testing to prevention embedded
within the emergence of cervical screening has implications for the
current framework in which screening operates. The interpretive
debates associated with medical practice in the middle of this century are
enduring debates which cut across the social organisation of screening,
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laboratory practice and the experience of screening. Whilst the material I
have presented here reveals the persistance of contested knowledges,
further research is clearly required to specify the precise nature of the
links between and across different social sites, and their consequences for
the experience and negotiation of prevention. Second, whilst the
expansion of surveillance continues to be a critical theme within
Foucauldian sociology, particularly that associated with issues of health
and prevention, the material I have presented here suggests that focus on
the body obscures those local experiences with which both feminism and
Foucault have ostensibly been concerned. In contrast, the notion of
embodiment, or 'thinking through the body', as a mode of local
transformation, reveals previously obscured aspects of surveillance, such
as obligation and risk. Therefore, surveillance must be examined i n
relation to citizenship, not as distinct from it, in order that the paradoxes
embedded within prevention can more clearly be seen.
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APPENDIX 1
Details of Women Who Participated in the Study
All names presented in this thesis have been changed to protect
anonymity. Thirty-nine women, who had participated in screening over
varying periods of time, in the predominantly urban social context of
south-east Scotland, were identified through regional colposcopy clinic
records. The colposcopy clinic provided me with a small room in a
corridor between the reception and the waiting area. When those women,
identified as potential recruits, arrived at the colposcopy clinic, I
approached them to ask if they would be willing to talk with me briefly
prior to their appointment. I outlined the rationale of the study and asked
if they would be willing to participate. Five of the thirty-nine women I
initially identified did not attend the clinic on the appointed day. Thirty-
four women initally agreed to be interviewed by me at a venue of their
choice, at which point I collected demographic details such as age,
occupation, civil status, and parity. We chatted briefly and then I
arranged to telephone them at home in order to arrange a time and place
for interview.
Of these thirty-four women, two women later declined to participate, one
woman (46 years) on the grounds that as she worked and lived outwith the
city in which the study was conducted, it 'was not handy for her'. Another
woman (60 years) declined on the grounds that her husband was about to
retire and they planned to travel to France and stay there indefinitely. In
addition, eight women who had initially agreed to participate in the
research, withdrew. Of these eight, one young woman (21 years)
telephoned me to tell me that she did not wish to take part in the study as
she was upset by, and did not wish to discuss, the treatment she had
experienced in the clinic. Another three women (30 years, 42 years, 55
years) were neither at home when I telephoned nor responded to written
cards.
The remaining four women who withdrew did so indirectly through men
with whom they shared living space. Of these four women one (38 years)
withdrew the day following her appointment 'after discussing it with [my]
husband'. Another woman (21 years), agreed to be interviewed in my
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office but did not arrive. When I telephoned her to try and arrange an
alternative appointment, a male voice ascertained my identity before
telling me that this woman was 'unavailable'. I also experienced this
response when I tried to telephone another young woman (21 years).
When I called the final woman (31 years) the telephone was answered by a
man who first asked me what I wanted to talk to her about and then told
the woman in question that 'that woman' (me) was on the telephone. This
woman withdrew on the grounds that she didn't think she would be 'any
use' to me.
A feature of interest in these responses is the way in which many of them
are managed initially by men. There are a number of potential
explanantions for this. First, women may have deployed an 'intermediary'
to convey the 'bad news' of their withdrawal from the study. Second, it
could express a 'client resistance' to the perceived authority associated
with those with institutional affiliation, and therefore illustrative of the
'agency' which I was trying to incorporate into the study. Third, male
'ownership' of women in the context of cervical screening has been
identified, where men are seen to be diffident about their partner's
participation in cervical screening (McKie, 1996). For some men, the
smear taking event is defined in sexual terms as an experience which
either their partner or the smear-taker might 'enjoy' or as an event in
which details of male sexual activity might be implicitly disclosed.
None of the women who continued to participate in the study had been
initially pro-active in their screening participation but had been asked to
have a smear in the context of one of the following:
1. Family Planning
2. Pregnancy and Childbirth
3. General Practice
4. Other
Four women who had their first ever smear in a Family Planning Clinic
did so within the ten years prior to the study. Three of these women were
in their late teens at the time of their first ever smear and perceived the
smear test as part of the 'routine' experience of moving into 'family
planning'. Some women indicated that they knew little about the purpose
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of a smear test but felt obliged to participate. Seven women had their first
ever smear in the context of pregnancy and childbirth: three women had
their first ever smear at a booking clinic, one only three years prior to
our interview, one thirteen years prior to the interview and one twenty-
one years prior to the interview. Four of these seven women had their
first ever smear at a post-natal clinic across the previous twenty one years
prior to our interview.
Twelve women had their first ever smear within general practice: three at
registration; five as opportunistic smears in the contexts of visits to their
doctors for other reasons; and four as part of 'Well Woman' examinations.
This latter category all received their first ever smear within the last six
months prior to the interviews, just after the introduction of Promoting
Better Health (DHSS, 1987) and General Practice in the National Health
Service: the 1990 Contract (DoH, 1989). Of those five women who
experienced opportunistic screening, four received their first smear
within the last seven years and one had done so thirty-three years prior to
our interview. Amongst the women receiving their first ever smear upon
health centre registration, only one did so more than seven years prior to
the interview. One woman had her first smear in the context of a
gynaecological examination abroad at the age of twenty-four and another
young woman had her first ever smear in the context of a termination of
pregnancy about which she talked at length in her interview. Her
articulation of her screening experience was deeply embedded in her
accounts of her experience of abortion and I have not presented any of



































































































































Laboratory smear reports on cervical cell changes are not standardised
and vary in the level and nature of reporting. The following is adapted
from a text designed to explain cytology reports simply and to help
establish 'good cytology practice' (Hopwood, no date). In some centres the
range of reports may be limited to negative, suspicious or positive. Other
laboratories report a range of changes which represent a continuous








The term dyskariosis refers to nuclear abnormalities. The exact stage at
which a benign change becomes a potentially cancerous one cannot
ascertained with certainty. Cervical Intraepithelial Neoplasia (C.I.N.) is
histological terminology which indicates that the cell changes are
restricted to the epithelium, but the following terms are sometimes used on
the cytology report:
C.I.N. 1 mild dysplasia
C.I.N. 2 moderate dysplasia
C.I.N. 3 severe dysplasia
Practices vary, but women receive information about their smear status
either by letter or phone. They may be told their smear is negative and
they will be recalled for a further smear in three years' time. If their
smear shows abnormal changes they will be asked to contact their general
practitioner who will arrange for a repeat smear or colposcopy, depend on




Total Number of New Patients 1987 - 1992 = 10,503
Total Number of Return Visits = 21,391
AGE @ REFERENCE MARITAL STATUS TREATMENT
<16 = 3(0.01%) Single (3488) None (1190)
16-20 = 248 (7.6%) Married (5483) Laser (1885)
21-25 = 755 (23%)
26-30 = 750 (23%)
31-35 = 552 (17%)
36-40 = 361 (11%)








Stable Relationship Lasercone (5)
(51)
Other (169)
46-50 = 168 (5%)
51-55 = 77 (2%)
56-60 = 58 (2%)
61-65 = 18 (0.5%)
66-70 = 12 (0.4%)












I agree to participate in this study.
I have read this Consent Form and the Information letter and had the
opportunity to ask about them.
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this study and a
decision to not participate will not alter the treatment I would normally
receive.
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any
stage.
I understand that this is non-therapeutic research from which I cannot








Research on Women's Views of Cervical Screening
Dear Patient
I would be grateful for your help. This study aims to explore women's
experiences of the prevention and treatment for cervical cancer, and is
interested in your views and experiences of cervical screening. This
information will be used as part of a Ph.D. thesis based in the Department
of Sociology at the University of Edinburgh, and is looking at the
experiences of women involved in cervical screening, and its history.
Your name has been drawn randomly from a list of women attending this
clinic. If you agree to take part in this study, I would like permission to
interview you twice: (a) briefly, before you see the doctor or nurse, in
order to gather some basic infor mation (occupation, address, age) and
arrange a convenient time and place to visit you after your appointment;
(b) after this appointment, in order to conduct a fuller interview
concerning your experience of preventive treatment. If you agree, I
would also like to come with you when you are interviewed by the doctor
or nurse.
Everything you say will be strictly confidential, and used only in
conjunction with this study. You are; of course, under no obligation to
participate, and should you agree to do so, you may withdraw at any time.
If you have any questions about this study, I can be contacted at the above
address.






Could you tell me about your prior contact with doctors and the health
service?
Could you tell me about the first time you had a cervical smear?
What did you think the purpose of the smear test was?
Had you thought about your cervix much before that?
Could you tell me why you are currently at the clinic?
What did you expect might happen at the clinic?
Were you given any explanations about your current experience?
How has this affected your life in general?
What would you say your views are now about screening?
How has this affected other people in your life, your partner, for
instance?
How would you say you think about your body?




Research on Women's Views of Cervical Screening
Re: Patient Name and Date of Birth
Dear
r
I would be grateful for your help. \
This study aims to explore women's experiences of the prevention and
treatment for cervical cancer through in-depth interviews. This
information will be used as part of a Ph.D. thesis based in the Department
of Sociology at the University of Edinburgh. With the permission of
Lothain Health Board the project is based in the Regional Colposcopy
Clinic at the Royal Informary of Einburgh and has received approval from
-the Paediatrics/Reproductive Medicine Ethics of Medical Research Sub-
Committee.
Your patient's name has been drawn randomly from a list of women
attending the Regional Colposcopy Clinic. If she agrees to take part in this
study, I would like to interview her at her convenience about her views
and experiences of cervical screening.
If there is any clinical reason why your patient should not be approached
and asked to participate in this study, I would be grateful if you could get
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